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Racial Profiling and the Constitution
Albert W. Alschulert

Until September 11, 2001, almost everyone condemned racial
profiling. President Bill Clinton called the practice "morally indefensible" and "deeply corrosive."' President George W. Bush
pledged, "[W]e will end it.' A federal court observed, "Racial profiling of any kind is anathema to our criminal justice system."' 81
percent of the respondents to a 1999 Gallup poll declared their
opposition.4
The horror of September 11 produced a shift in sentiment.
Shortly after that date, 58 percent of the respondents to a Gallup
poll said that airlines should screen passengers who appeared to
be Arabs more intensely than other passengers.' Half the respondents who voiced an opinion favored requiring people of Arab
ethnicity, including United States citizens, to carry special identification cards.6 Blacks were more supportive of special scrutiny
t Wilson-Dickinson Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to the
Carl S. Lloyd Faculty Fund and the Lawrence T. Hoyle, Jr. Faculty Fund for research
support and to Roberta Anthes, Mary Anne Case, Jeffrey Fagan, Debra Livingston, Tracey
Meares, Eric Posner, Stephen Schulhofer, Adrian Vermeule, Lu-in Wang, and Welsh
White for insightful and helpful comments.
Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, New Republic 31 (Sept 13-20, 1999).
2 Address to the Joint Session of Congress by the President, reprinted in 147 Cong
Rec H433 (Feb 27, 2001).
Martinez v Village of Mount Prospect,92 F Supp 2d 780, 782 (N D 1112000).
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft said, "Ibelieve racial profiling is an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection under our Constitution." Black Caucus, Ashcroft
Have Tense Meeting:Attorney General Cites "CandidExchange"and Stresses Agreement on
Profiling, Wash Post A6 (Mar 1, 2001). The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller, agreed: "Racial profiling is abhorrent to the Constitution, it is
abhorrent in any way, shape or form." Quoted in 147 Cong Rec S8683 (Aug 2, 2001). Senator Orrin G. Hatch commented, "T]here has emerged a consensus concerning the fundamental point of the debate: racial profiling, also known as bias-based policing, is wrong, it
is unconstitutional, and it must not be practiced or tolerated." End Racial ProfilingAct of
2001, Hearing on S.989 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
the Constitution, Federalismand Property Rights, 107th Congress, 1st Sess (2001), available online at <http://www.senate.gov/%7Ejudiciary/oldsite/oghO8OlOlsc.htm> (visited
Nov 30, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
4 Katheryn K Russell, Symposium: Racial Profiling:A Status Report of the Legal,
Legislative, and Empirical Literature,3 Rutgers Race & L Rev 61, 62 n 5 (2001).
6 Clinton, Race Issues Top First Day for High Court, Houston Chron 4 (Oct 2, 2001).
6

Id.
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for Arabs than were other Americans John Farmer, Jr., the Attorney General of New Jersey, wrote in a newspaper column:
More than 6,000 people are dead, some would argue, because of insufficient attention to racial or ethnic profiles at
our airports. ... Let's be blunt: How can law enforcement

not consider ethnicity in investigating these crimes when
that identifier is an essential characteristic of the hijackers and their supposed confederates and sponsors, and
when law enforcement's ignorance of the community
heightens the importance of such broadly shared characteristics? Law enforcement tactics must be calibrated to
address the magnitude of the threat society faces.
This article examines the constitutionality of using racial classifications in police investigation, evaluating this issue under both
the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
Two early sections of the article set the stage by asking readers to evaluate four cases and by venturing a guess about most
readers' intuitions concerning them. Later sections draw on these
cases to develop and illustrate general themes.
Five sections then offer lessons in how not to think about racial classification in the criminal justice system, criticizing some
approaches of courts and commentators. The first of these sections-Part III-describes how courts often fail to subject racial
classifications to strict scrutiny by denying their racial character.
Some courts, for example, maintain that when law enforcement
officers consider other characteristics as well as race, they do not
classify by race. Among the decisions examined in Part III is the
Second Circuit's ruling in Brown v City of Oneonta! When the
victim of a crime described the criminal only as a young black
man, police officers responded by questioning hundreds of "non7 Clarence Page, Look at Who Favors Profiling Now, Orlando Sentinel
A17 (Oct 4,
2001) (71 percent of blacks favored special security checks for Arabs at airports, and 64
percent favored requiring people of Arab ethnicity to carry identification cards).
8. John Farmer, Jr., Rethinking Racial Profiling, Newark Star-Ledger § 10, p
1 (Sept
23, 2001). Floyd Abrams, a lawyer noted for his championship of civil liberties, declared,
"It would be a dereliction of duty to the American public to forget the fact that the people
who committed these terrible crimes all spoke Arabic to each other.... [We don't want to
be in a position where we're pulling every Arab-American out of line for detailed stripsearches. At the same time, we have to protect ourselves." Kathy Barrett Carter, Some See
New Need for RacialProfiling, Newark Star-Ledger 21 (Sept 20, 2001).
221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 2000), petition for rehg en banc denied, 239 F3d 769 (2000),
cert denied, 534 US 816 (2001).
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white persons."'" The court concluded that, because the officers
relied on the witness's description, they did not classify by race
and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause."
Although many judges have failed to subject the use of racial
classifications by the police to strict scrutiny, some judges have
declared, "That law in this country should tolerate use of one's
ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant
under any circumstances." 2 Part IV contends that these judges
have made an equal and opposite error.
Part V focuses on the Supreme Court's statement in Whren v
United States'3 that although purposeful racial discrimination can
violate the Equal Protection Clause, it cannot render a search or
seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Whren's
separation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause prevents courts from weighing all of the interests impaired by a police action against all of the justifications asserted
for it. Part V contends that, rather than prohibit the consideration of racial discrimination in Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court should read this amendment to proscribe some
forms of discrimination not condemned by the Equal Protection
Clause. Taking its cue from Sixth Amendment decisions forbidding the "systematic" exclusion from jury service of distinctive
groups in the community, the Court should hold that when a police practice systematically subjects minorities to searches and
seizures at a higher rate than the rate at which these minorities
commit crimes, this practice violates the Fourth Amendment
unless it is appropriately tailored to advance a significant state
interest.
When a victim or witness has described an offender by race,
virtually everyone agrees that law enforcement officers may consider race in deciding whether they have sufficient justification
for stopping a suspect. Many commentators and some courts contend that this use of race is appropriate because it rests on "particularized" rather than "statistical" evidence. Part VI contends
that this asserted distinction is illusory. In this part and else10Id at 334.
1 Id at 338.
United States v Martinez-Fuerte,428 US 543, 571 n 1 (1976) (Brennan, joined by

12

Marshall, dissenting).
13 517 US 806
(1996).
" See id at 813 ("[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
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where, I criticize the Ninth Circuit's en banc ruling in United
States v Montero-Camargo,"in which the court held that Border
Patrol agents may not consider ethnicity in deciding whether to
stop someone for a suspected immigration violation."6
The defendants in United States v Armstrong" noted that all
of the defendants charged with crack cocaine offense in the federal court in Los Angeles appeared to be non-white. They claimed
to be the victims of discriminatory prosecution. In holding that
the defendants were not entitled to discovery from the United
States Attorney's office, the Supreme Court emphasized their
failure "to identify individuals who were not black and could have
been prosecuted.""8 A few federal district courts, relying on Armstrong, have denied relief to litigants challenging racial profiling
because they did not identify "similarly situated" whites whom
the police might have stopped but did not. Part VII endorses the
view of the Second and Seventh Circuits that these courts misread Armstrong. This part argues, moreover, that the Supreme
Court was mistaken in describing the "similarly situated requirement" as an "ordinary equal protection principle." It also
notes that requiring litigants to identify unapprehended white
offenders would make claims of racial profiling impossible to
prove.
After discussing how not to think about the use of racial classifications in the criminal justice system, the article turns to how
courts should analyze the consideration of race by the police. Part
VIII maintains that when the police treat race itself as an indicator of criminality and effectively declare some races more dangerous than others, their profiling stigmatizes minorities in much
the same way (if not to the same degree) as the racial segregation
condemned by Brown v Board of Education."9 Not all police racial
classifications, however, convey this harmful message. Part VIII
maintains that when, in terms of ordinary social meaning, governmental action stigmatizes a race, proof of discriminatory purpose should be unnecessary. The government should be required
to justify its delivery of this damaging message.

"

208 F3d 1122 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc), cert denied as Sanchez-Guillen v United

States, 531 US 889 (2000).
16 Id at 1135.
17 517 US 456 (1996).
" Id at 470.

'9 347 US 483 (1954).
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Part IX focuses on the tangible burdens racial classifications
impose on minorities. Even unquestionably appropriate police
practices are likely to subject innocent blacks and Latinos to unwanted contact with the police at a higher rate than innocent
whites. The members of the most disadvantaged racial groups
pay more for law enforcement. When a search or seizure imposes
no additional racial burden, however, it should require only the
justification provided by the existence of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause.
Every search or seizure based in part on race or ethnicity
should, however, require at least this much justification. Although the Supreme Court has upheld race-based administrative
detention even in the absence of particularized suspicion, this
detention should be unconstitutional. Only a life-threatening
emergency might justify a departure from this principle.
Burdening minorities not only at a higher rate than their
share of the population but also at a higher rate than their rate of
criminality should require greater justification. A small perceived
disparity in the rate of offending of two racial groups can lead to
a large disparity in the allocation of law enforcement resources.
The police may "pile on" or concentrate their efforts on the group
whose investigation promises to yield the greater law enforcement return. Part IX argues that neither the existence of probable cause for every seizure nor increasing the police department's batting average or rate of return can automatically justify
burdening minorities at a higher rate than their rate of offending.
A trade-off between distributive justice and efficiency seems
inescapable. Part IX contends that current constitutional doctrine
distorts this trade-off and, if taken seriously, produces counterintuitive results.
Part X applies the analysis suggested in the earlier sections
to three contested issues. It examines the propriety of taking apparent Arab ethnicity into account in screening airline passengers, of devoting disproportionate resources to minority
neighborhoods in waging the war on drugs, and of considering
ethnicity in making checkpoint and roving patrol stops for suspected immigration violations.
Part XI considers questions of standing and remedy. Even
when statistical evidence establishes unlawful profiling, it may
not establish anyone's standing to challenge the constitutional
20 See Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944); Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 543.
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violation. Part XI compares McCleskey v Kemp," in which the Supreme Court held that aggregated proof of discrimination in the
administration of Georgia's death penalty did not establish the
violation of any individual's rights, with Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractorsof America v Jacksonville,2 in which the Court held that a litigant challenging an
affirmative action plan need not demonstrate that, without discrimination, he would have obtained the governmental benefit
sought.
This part also reviews possible remedies for racial discrimination by the police. It focuses particularly on whether a criminal
defendant who establishes that purposeful discrimination produced her arrest and prosecution should be entitled to a dismissal
of the charges against her. It argues that Yick Wo v Hopkins2' entitles a defendant to this remedy in some situations. It also contends, however, that the defense of "selective prosecution" or "discriminatory targeting" should not be available to defendants
charged with crimes of personal violence and most property
crimes. This defense should be limited to cases in which defendants are charged with crimes whose investigation usually is
proactive. Part XI considers in addition the difficulty of devising
effective injunctive remedies for unlawful profiling.
A subtext of this article is that courts have been more sympathetic to claims that affirmative action discriminates against
whites than to claims that racial classifications in the criminal
justice system discriminate against minorities. A conclusion reemphasizes this theme.
I. SOME CASES AND A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

The opponents of racial profiling often have failed to define
the term, and the definitions provided by legislatures and scholars have differed substantially.24 Analysis of the issue can begin
21

481 US 279 (1987).

22 508 US 656 (1993).

118 US 356 (1886).

" Three of the states that have forbidden racial profiling have defined it as "the detention, interdiction or other disparate treatment of an individual solely on the basis of the
racial or ethnic status of such individual." Conn Gen Stat § 54-11(a) (West 2002) (emphasis added); 22 Okla Stat Ann § 34.3(A) (West 2003); RI Gen Laws § 31-21.1-2 (2001). Another state has defined profiling as "the practice of detaining a suspect based on a broad
set of criteria which casts suspicion on an entire class of people without any individualized
suspicion of the particular person being stopped." Cal Penal Code § 13519.4 (West 2002).
Proposed federal legislation declares that racial profiling is "the practice of a law enforcement agent relying, to any degree, on race, ethnicity, or national origin in selecting which
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with a description of four cases and a thought experiment about
them. Please rank these cases in terms of the legitimacy or offensiveness of the use of race by law enforcement officers. Although
you may be tempted to lump some cases together, tie rankings
are not allowed.
In Case 1, a robbery victim uses race as an identifying physical characteristic. She calls 911 and mentions several features of
the robber, including the fact that he was a black man in a green
coat. An officer responding to a radio bulletin stops and frisks a
person near the scene of the crime who matches the victim's description.
In Case 2, social scientists whose research methods are impeccable report that an absolute majority of the young black men
on the streets of Pothole, an inner-city neighborhood, are carrying
concealed knives, a criminal offense. According to the researchers, white youths are committing this crime at a considerably
lower rate. An officer stops and frisks a suspect simply because
he is young, black, male, and on the streets of Pothole.
individuals to subject to routine investigatory activities, or in deciding upon the scope and
substance of law enforcement activity following the initial routine investigatory activity,
except that racial profiling does not include reliance on such criteria in combination with
other identifying factors when the law enforcement agent is seeking to apprehend a specific suspect whose race, ethnicity, or national origin is part of the description of the suspect." End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S 989, 107th Cong, 1st Sess 501 (5) (June 6, 2001),
in 147 Cong Rec S5895 (June 6, 2001). See Oxford American Dictionary and Language
Guide (1999) (defining racial profiling as the "alleged police policy of stopping and searching vehicles driven by people from particular racial groups"); Kennedy, Suspect Policy,
New Republic at 35 (cited in note 1) ("[Rlacial profiling occurs whenever police routinely
use race as a negative signal that, along with an accumulation of other signals, causes an
officer to react with suspicion."); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and
Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U Pa J Const L
296, 299 n 27 (2001) ("I use the term racial profiling to mean any stop, search, or arrest of
a person based in whole or in part on the race of the suspect, except where police are acting on a racial description of the perpetrator of a crime."); R. Richard Banks, Race-Based
Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L
Rev 1075, 1077 (2001) ("The emerging consensus is that racial profiling constitutes the
intentional consideration of race in a manner that disparately impacts certain racial minority groups, contributing to the disproportionate investigation, detention, and mistreatment of innocent members of those groups."); Samuel R. Gross and Debra Livingston,
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 Colum L Rev 1413, 1415 (2002) ("As we use the term,
'racial profiling' occurs whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests,
searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of
that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit
the sort of crime the officer is investigating."); David A. Harris, When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial ProfilingStudies, 6 Mich J Race & L 237, 237
(2001) (defining racial profiling as "the idea that police may use race as a factor, or the
factor, in deciding who to regard as a criminal suspect"); Chavez v Illinois State Police, 251
F3d 612, 620 (7th Cir 2001) ('Racial profiling is generally understood to mean the improper use of race as a basis for taking law enforcement action.").
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Case 3 is probably the paradigmatic case of racial profilingprofiling on the highway. A patrol officer stops black motorists at
a higher rate than white motorists whose conduct is identical.
Assume for purposes of analysis that the officer's reason for differentiating blacks from whites is not his racial hatred but his
belief that blacks are more likely than whites to be transporting
drugs. The officer hopes that his traffic stops will generate evidence of this more serious crime."
Assume that the highway patrol officer in Case 3 has probable cause to believe that both the motorists he stops and the motorists he allows to proceed are guilty of minor traffic offenses. In
fact, 93.3 percent of the drivers observed on one interstate highway were exceeding the posted speed limit or committing other
visible traffic violations."' Although only 17.5 percent of these violators were black, 28.8 percent of the drivers stopped on the
highway were black, and 76 percent of the drivers whose vehicles
were searched were black. 7 The frequency of minor traffic violations poses a nice dilemma for the police, for drug couriers, and
for other motorists. Some drug courier profiles treat obeying the
2'5

The federal government has strongly encouraged state and local law enforcement

officers to view the highway as a battleground in the war on drugs. It has trained patrol
officers to use traffic stops to investigate suspected drug offenses. See the Drug Enforcement Administration's description of "Operation Pipeline," available online at <http'j/
www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/pipecon.htm> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi
Legal F], and see also the Department of Transportation's description of the training
courses offered by the Drug Interdiction Assistance Program of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, available online at <http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/ntc/pages/set.html>
(visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. The federal government also has
provided financial incentives for state and local drug interdiction. See 21 USCA
§§ 881(e)(1)(A) & (e)(3) (2002). States have established programs like "Operation Valkyrie," a program designed to "enhance [the] capability [of the Illinois State Police] to
detect and apprehend drug couriers ... while focusing on the enforcement of highway
safety regulations." Operation Valkyrie: An Officer's Guide to Drug Interdiction Techniques, quoted in Chavez v Illinois State Police, 251 F3d 612, 620 (7th Cir 2001).
26 See William H. Buckman and John Lamberth, ChallengingRacial Profiles:Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev 83, 105 (2001) (citations omitted).
Id. On another highway, 98.1 percent of all vehicles were speeding; 15 percent of
the speeding vehicles contained one or more black occupants; and 35.6 percent of the traffic stops in which police records revealed the race of the driver were of blacks. Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand L Rev 333, 347-48 (1998). Studies of
vehicle and pedestrian stops in other jurisdictions reveal equally striking disparities. See
Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 299-303 (cited in note 24). Recent unpublished evidence
apparently suggests, however, that blacks are much more likely than whites to drive at
fifteen or more miles per hour above the speed limit. David Kocieniewski, Study Suggests
a Racial Gap Among Speeding Drivers on New Jersey Turnpike, NY Times C13 (Mar 21,
2002). This evidence calls into question the judgment that highway patrol officers rely
heavily on race in deciding whom to stop, but it does not explain the extreme disparity in
the rates at which officers ask motorists to consent to searches of their vehicles.
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traffic laws as an indicator of illegal activity. By driving at or below the speed limit, a motorist may make the police both more
interested in stopping him and less able to stop him lawfully.'
The Fourth Amendment as the Supreme Court currently interprets it poses no bar to a thorough search of both a person who
violates a minor traffic law and the interior of her vehicle. That
is, the police may search at will an overwhelming majority of
drivers and vehicles on the highway.' A traffic officer seeking
evidence of drug activity, however, ordinarily does not exercise
his power to make a custodial arrest for a minor offense and to
conduct a vehicle search incident to this arrest.' Instead, after
stopping a motorist, he asks her to consent to a search of her vehicle. The officer understands that few Americans believe that
they are free to reply, "Sorry, Officer, not today."' In fact, a maPeter A. Lyle, Note, Racial Profiling and the Fourth Amendment: Applying the
Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure Equal Protection Under the Law, 21 BC Third
World LJ 243, 248 (2001) (describing a 1985 Florida Department of Highway Safety Guide
that directed officers to be suspicious when motorists exhibited "scrupulous obedience to
traffic laws") (citations omitted).
29 The Supreme Court's effective authorization of general searches on the highways
proceeds from a series of decisions that seem distressing when viewed individually and
terrifying when viewed collectively:
Atwater v City of Lago Vista, 532 US 318 (2001), held that the Fourth
Amendment permits a police officer to make a custodial arrest for a minor
traffic offense. The officer need have no reason to doubt that the arrestee
would respond to a traffic citation.
Whren v United States, 517 US 806 (1996), held that a custodial arrest for
a minor traffic offense on probable cause is not invalid either because the
officer's subjective reason for making it is to investigate other crimes or
because-objectively-the police never stop motorists for this offense except when seeking evidence of other crimes.
United States v Robinson, 414 US 218 (1973), held that an officer who
makes a custodial arrest for a traffic offense may make a full search of
the person of the arrestee incident to this arrest. The officer need not
consider the search necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence or to
protect the officer.
New York v Belton, 453 US 454, 460 (1981), held that "when a policeman
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile." The search may occur although the occupants have been removed from the vehicle, and it may extend to "closed
or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags,
clothing, and the like." Id at 460 n 4.
30 Local laws and police department regulations often preclude the officer from doing
what the Supreme Court's Constitution allows.
31 In State v Retherford, 639 NE2d 498, 503 n 3 (Ohio App 1994), a highway patrol

officer testified that during a previous year he had asked 786 motorists to consent to
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jority of the people who consider themselves free to decline appear to be on the Supreme Court. Black motorists who are
stopped and searched at a higher rate than white motorists are
likely to conclude that their true crime consists, not of a traffic
offense, but of "driving while black."
Case 4 is the Supreme Court's leading decision on the legality of racial classifications under the Fourth Amendment, United
32 At a fixed checkpoint operated by the
States v Martinez-Fuerte.
Border Patrol on the principal highway between San Diego and
Los Angeles, a uniformed agent inspects all vehicles and then
directs fewer than 1 percent to a secondary inspection area.
There, other agents question occupants about their citizenship
and immigration status. All or nearly all of the vehicles the "point
agent" refers for secondary inspection contain one or more people
of apparent Latino ethnicity.' The agent, however, does not rely
on ethnicity alone in making her referrals. She also considers
such circumstances as age and type of vehicle, number of occupants, hairstyle, facial expression, body language, cleanliness,
and dress.3 The Border Patrol discovers one or more illegal aliens
searches of their vehicles. None had refused. Id at 502. When counsel mentioned the officer's testimony during argument before the Supreme Court in another case in which the
officer had obtained a motorist's consent, Justice Scalia commented, "Well, good for him,
so long as he hasn't violated the Federal Constitution." Transcript of Argument at 32-33,
Ohio v Robinette, No 95-891, U.S. Supreme Court (Oct 8, 1996), available on Westlaw at
1996 WL 587659.
32 428 US 543 (1976).
Or so the Supreme Court assumed for purposes of decision. See id at 563. The record in Martinez-Fuerte did not reveal the ethnicity of the people referred for secondary
inspection.
I follow the practice of saying that "ethnicity" distinguishes Anglos from Latinos
while "race" distinguishes whites from blacks. The ancestry of people called Latino and
black in America, however, is highly diverse, and race is much more a social than a genetic concept. I distinguish between race and ethnicity because this usage is conventional,
because some Latinos object to describing their ethnicity as a race, and because referring
to the conventionally described races as "ethnic groups" would seem odd. I do not, however, draw the distinction because I believe it serves a purpose.
Again I go beyond the record in Martinez-Fuerte, although the Supreme Court
apparently concluded that the Border Patrol took account of circumstances like these. It
noted that 16 percent of the California population were "Spanish-speaking or of Spanish
surname" while fewer than 1 percent of the motorists passing the checkpoint were stopped
for questioning. It declared, "This appears to refute any suggestion that the Border Patrol
relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry standing alone in referring motorists to
the secondary area." Id at 563 n 16.
The dissenting justices objected that "[gliven the socio-economic status" of people of
"Spanish or Mexican ancestry," fewer than 16 percent of all motorists were likely to have
this ancestry. Id at 573 n 4. A more serious flaw in the majority's analysis, however, was
its failure to consider whether the selection of Latinos for investigation might have been
essentially random or based in part on the length of the queue at the secondary inspection
area. See Maclin, 51 Vand L Rev at 367 n 153 (cited in note 27). Apparently without direct
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in 20 percent of the vehicles it refers to the secondary inspection
area.

II. A FIRST LOOK AT THE CASES
You need not tell me your ranking of these cases. A genie has
granted me mystical powers, and I believe I can discern your
rankings telepathically.
I am confident, for example, that you placed Case 1, the case
of the suspect who met the robbery victim's description, at one
end of your spectrum. You ranked it the least troublesome of the
cases. Cases in which white criminals have conjured-up phantom
black offenders to draw suspicion from themselves may have
given you some pause, 5 and so may cases in which the police have
relied on descriptions consisting of little more than race to question large numbers of blacks." Nevertheless, if the robbery victim
gave a sufficiently detailed description, you probably believe that
the officer's conduct was unquestionably appropriate. His use of
skin color as an identifying physical characteristic was no more
objectionable than his use of coat color.
My crystal ball tell me that Case 2, the case of the suspect
stopped and frisked simply for being a young black man on the
streets of Pothole, is at the opposite end of your spectrum. You
probably consider the idea that someone could be stopped and
frisked simply for being young, black, male, and the resident of
an inner-city neighborhood highly offensive. Although social scientists have determined that most members of this suspect's
support in the record, the government reported in its brief that Border Patrol agents
"rel[ied] on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry" in diverting motorists. 428
US at 563 n 16. In an earlier case involving roving patrol stops, the Supreme Court observed, "The Government ...points out that trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress
and haircut." United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 885 (1975), citing Reply Brief
for the United States 12-13, United States v Ortiz, 422 US 891 (1975). Many Border Patrol vehicle stops appear to rest on ethnicity, class, and very little more. See Nicacio v
INS, 797 F2d 700, 704 (9th Cir 1985) (discussed briefly in text accompanying note 59).
See, for example, Andrew Kopkind, The Stuart Case: Race, Class and Murder in
Boston, The Nation 149 (Feb 5, 1990) (describing a case in which a white man who later
appeared to have committed the crime himself attributed the murder of his pregnant wife
to a black man and thus prompted the police to stop, question, and search many blacks
over a period of several weeks); Jerry Adler, Innocents Lost, Newsweek 26 (Nov 14, 1994)
(describing the case of Susan Smith who, after drowning her sons, claimed that a black
man had abducted them).
See, for example, Brown v City of Oneonta, petition for rehg en banc denied, 239
F3d 769 (2000), cert denied, 122 S Ct 44 (2001) (discussed in text accompanying notes 63114).
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demographic group are committing crimes, you reject any principle of guilt by racial association.
I believe that you placed Case 3, the paradigmatic case of
racial profiling on the highway, a step below the case of the young
black man from Pothole. The step between the two cases may be
small, but the consensus I sensed concerning the propriety of the
police conduct in Case 1 and the impropriety of the police conduct
in Case 2 is beginning to fade. Racial profiling on the highway
has few defenders, but it does have some. Carl Williams, for example, the New Jersey Chief of Troopers, told the press that minorities were more likely than whites to traffic in cocaine and
marihuana. Governor Christine Todd Whitman fired Chief Williams for making this statement.
Case 4, in which a Border Patrol agent investigating illegal
immigration sixty-six miles inside the Mexican-United States
border relies largely on ethnicity in making referrals to a secondary inspection area, is the case most likely to provoke substantial disagreement. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this practice by a 7-to-2 vote,37 and although most of the
academic literature has criticized the Court's decision," some has
supported it.8 9 When forced, perhaps reluctantly, to separate this
case from the others, I believe that you ranked it between Case 1
and Case 3.
You are now at the last stage of the thought experiment.
Please explain your ranking of the cases. The distinctions among
them may prove less sharp than you would like, and the lines you
draw initially may prove less durable than other, less visible
lines. The strength and clarity of your convictions may obscure
the conceptual difficulty of the issues.'

37 United States v Martinez-Fuerte,428 US 543 (1976).
3' See, for example, Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 154-55, 157-63
(Random House 1997); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement, 78 Wash U L Q 675, 696 (2000).
'9 See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 NYU L Rev 956, 1006-07 (1999); Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the TwentyFirst Century Terrorist Threat Within the Scope of Twentieth Century ConstitutionalLaw,
37 Houston L Rev 1421, 1453-56 (2000).
'o William Stuntz says that racial profiling is an "intractable" problem if confronted
directly, and he calls the legal issues it presents "hard." He makes no attempt to resolve
these issues. William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 Yale L J 2137, 2142,
2162-63 (2002).
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III. A FIRST LESSON IN How NOT TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: DENYING THE
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND AVOIDING STRICT SCRUTINY

A. "Relevant to the Law Enforcement Need to be Served":
Martinez-Fuerteand the Fourth Amendment
The Border Patrol's one-in-five batting average in MartinezFuerte suggested that it might have had reasonable grounds for
some of its referrals to the secondary inspection area. The Government argued, however, that these referrals and the detentions
that followed them could be justified without individualized suspicion, and the Supreme Court accepted this contention.
The majority opinion by Justice Powell tracked the familiar
cost-benefit formula the Supreme Court employed to resolve most
Fourth Amendment issues in the era between Earl Warren and
Antonin Scalia. The Court described the relevant governmental
interest in macro terms: "[L]arge numbers of aliens seek illegally
to enter or to remain in the United States. .. . Interdicting the

flow of illegal entrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems."' It described the relevant individual interest in micro terms: "While the need to make routine checkpoint
stops is great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests is quite limited .... [Ilt involves only a brief detention of

travelers during which '[a] ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the
production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United
States."' The Court then declared the government victorious.
Justice Powell concluded, "Border Patrol officers must have wide
discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted."'
The Court devoted only brief attention to the fact that the
Border Patrol focused heavily on ethnicity in exercising its discretion. Justice Powell declared, "[E]ven if it be assumed that such
referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation."' A footnote ex41 428 US at 551-52.
42 Id at 557-58, quoting

United States v Brignoni-Ponce,422 US 873, 880 (1975). The
Government reported that investigations at the secondary inspection area lasted three to
five minutes "on average," 428 US at 546-47, but this average probably included many
cases in which citizens and lawful aliens produced identification papers that promptly
dispelled the agents' suspicion. When a passenger failed to carry identification papers, her
detention and that of her companions might have been substantially longer.
43 428 US at 563-64.
Id at 563.
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plained, "[T]o the extent that the Border Patrol relies on apparent
Mexican ancestry at this checkpoint ... that reliance clearly is

relevant to the law enforcement need to be served." 5 The Court
reiterated its ruling a year earlier in United States v BrignoniPonce:" Although Latino ethnicity could not itself create the reasonable suspicion required for a roving patrol stop, "[tihe likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is
high enough [in an area near the Mexican-U.S. border] to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor."'
The majority's analysis swept broadly enough to resolve in a
sentence all of the thought-experiment cases described above. For
Justice Powell, it was apparently enough that race was "relevant
to the law enforcement need to be served"-a circumstance that,
if the factual assumptions of the police were accurate, would justify the seizures in all of these cases. If one assumes that most
young black men in Pothole are carrying concealed knives and
most young white men are not, race is "relevant to the law enforcement need to be served." Just as the Border Patrol is likely
to arrest more illegal aliens when it concentrates on Latinos, the
police in Pothole are likely to arrest more weapons violators when
they concentrate on blacks. Indeed, the Pothole Precinct's better
than .500 batting average will put the Border Patrol's average to
shame.
"Relevancy," however, is insufficient under the Constitution
to justify a racial or ethnic classification. Neither the majority nor
the dissenting opinion in Martinez-Fuerte mentioned the familiar
principle that when Latinos are deliberately treated less favorably than Anglos, a "rational basis" will not do. To justify stopping
Latinos even briefly while Anglos drive to Los Angeles, venerable
constitutional doctrine declares that a "compelling governmental
interest" is required.
Ironically, the Supreme Court first articulated the requirement that racial classifications meet this demanding standard in
its most infamous decision on racial profiling. Upholding the preventive detention of Japanese Americans during World War

11,48

it declared, "All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect. ... [Ciourts must

45

Id at 564 n 17.
422 US 873 (1975).

47 Id at 886-87.
48

Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944).
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subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."' The Court's current
formulation of the principle appears in a decision striking down a
federal affirmative action program'0 : "[All racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."1
Under the Supreme Court's decisions, only purposeful discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause."2 The Court's
rhetoric occasionally has indicated that only racial animus, bias,
or a desire to subordinate the members of a race qualifies as a
discriminatory purpose." The Court's recent decisions make clear,
however, that although racial bias or invidious motivation remains sufficient, it is unnecessary. An intention to treat the
members of different races differently is enough. "Our decisions
have established," the Court wrote in 1999, "that all laws that
classify citizens on the basis of race ... are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly scrutinized." 4 The defect the Court perceives in affirmative action plans, for example, is that they intentionally classify by race, not that they reflect racial hatred or
bias.
The decisions demanding a compelling reason for every racial
classification arose under the Equal Protection Clause, and Martinez-Fuerte was decided, not under the Equal Protection Clause,
but under the Fourth Amendment. Read narrowly, this case could
become merely a decision about constitutional pleading. The defendant failed to say "equal protection," and if only he had invoked the proper constitutional provision, he might have won.

'9 Id at 216.

so Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995).
51 Id at 227.
12 See, for example, Washington v Davis, 426
US 229, 238-39 (1979).
See, for example, PersonnelAdministrator v Feeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979) ('Dis-

criminatory purpose' ... implies more th~n intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences .... It implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.") (rejecting a claim that a state law preferring veterans for civil
service positions denied equal protection to women) (citations omitted). For analysis of the
Feeney formulation, see David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of

Brown, 56 U Chi L Rev 935, 962-64 (1989).
'

Hunt v Cromartie,526 US 541, 546 (1999).
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"Not Solely Because of Her Race": The Sixth Circuit and the
Equal Protection Clause

Many courts, however, have refused to subject the use of racial classifications by law enforcement officers to strict scrutiny
even when litigants have invoked the Equal Protection Clause. In
United States v Travis,55 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that
because officers "did not choose to interview the defendant solely
because of her race[,] ... they did not violate her rights under the

Equal Protection Clause."' The court declared, "[When officers
compile several reasons before initiating an interview, as long as
some of those reasons are legitimate, there is no Equal Protection
violation." This analysis appeared to echo Martinez-Fuerte'semphasis on the fact that the Border Patrol did not rely on ethnicity
alone in referring people for inspection and did not detain all Latinos.
As Randall Kennedy has noted, however, whenever race is
one factor in a decision, it may be the decisive factor.58 In a case
following Martinez-Fuerte, a Chief Patrol Agent for the Immigration and Nationalization Service testified that, in making rovingpatrol stops, his subordinates considered, in addition to Latino
ethnicity, a "dirty, unkempt appearance," a "lean and hungry
look," and wearing work clothes. 5 When the government allows
unkempt Anglos to proceed and detains unkempt Latinos, it employs an ethnic classification.

55 62 F3d 170 (6th Cir 1995).

' Id at 174.
17 Id. Subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions are in accord.
See United States v Avery, 137
F3d 343, 353 (6th Cir 1997) ("The race issue.., is without merit since race was only one of
several factors that contributed to a reasonable suspicion."); United States v Moss, 2001
US App LEXIS 462, * 5 n 1 (6th Cir 2001) (unpublished). An earlier Sixth Circuit decision,
however, was to the contrary. United States v Jennings, 1993 US App LEXIS 926, * 12-13
(6th Cir 1993) (unpublished). Other cases holding that the use of race does not require
strict scrutiny as long as it is not the sole basis for a police classification are United States
v Weaver, 966 F2d 391, 394 n 2 (8th Cir 1992), cert denied, 506 US 1040 (1992); United
States v Lacy, 2000 US App LEXIS 31195, * 3 (9' Cir 2000) (unpublished); United States v
Cuevas-Ceja, 58 F Supp 2d 1175, 1184 (D Or 1999); and State v Dean, 543 P2d 425, 427
(Ariz 1975) (upholding the stop of a Latino in a white neighborhood because he was out of
place). Contrary cases are United States v Laymon, 730 F Supp 332, 339 (D Colo 1990);
Whitfield v Board of County Commissioners, 837 F Supp 338, 340, 344 (D Colo 1993);
People v Bower, 597 P2d 115, 119 (Cal 1979); State v Kuhn, 517 A2d 162, 165 (NJ Super
1986); and Lowery v Virginia, 388 SE2d 265, 267 (Va App 1990) (declaring that a motorist's race is not "a permissible factor in the decision to stop his vehicle").
Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law at 148-49 (cited in note 38).
59 Nicacio v INS, 797 F2d 700, 704 (9th Cir 1985).
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Even in our nation's shameful old days, only a small minority
of blacks were lynched, and blacks were not alone in being
lynched. Lynch mobs considered not only race but also gender,
religion, attitude, and allegations of criminal conduct.' These
mobs, however, employed racial classifications. Even old-style
racists often have reasons in addition to race for hating people;
we call someone a racist because race provides one of his reasons
for judging other people, not because it provides the only one.
Outside the context of criminal investigation, courts have
rejected the view that only classifications based exclusively on
race or designed to disadvantage all members of a race qualify as
racial classifications. For example, under the affirmative action
plans the Supreme Court has subjected to strict scrutiny and held
invalid, no one awarded government-funded contracts on the basis of race alone."1 The Court has declared that the Equal Protection Clause "does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.... When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose
has been a motivating factor in the decision, [strict scrutiny is
required] .'
C.

"Race Neutral on Its Face": The Second Circuit and Oneonta's
Racial Sweep

In Brown v City of Oneonta,3 the Second Circuit denied that
a law enforcement officer who stops a suspect on the basis of a
witness's description that includes race employs a racial classification.' Oneonta, New York is a town of ten thousand permanent
60 See, for example, Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An
Analysis of Southern Lynchings 1882-1930 47 (1995) (Table 2-5).
61 See Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995); Richmond v J.A Croson Co,

488 US 469 (1989).
62 Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 US 252, 265-66
(1977). In Hunt v Cromartie, 526 US 541 (1999), the Court declared that race could be
considered with other circumstances in legislative redistricting but could not be the legislature's "predominant" criterion in the absence of compelling justification. Id at 547. Cromartie recognized that someone proposing legislative districts would be aware of and
probably would take account of the racial demographics of these districts, and it emphasized that no inquiry into motivation is necessary when, as in most of the cases considered
in this article, government officials expressly classify by race. Id at 546.
221 F3d 329 (2d Cir), petition for rehg en banc denied, 239 F3d 769 (2000), cert
denied, 122 S Ct 44 (2001).
See id at 337-38. See also Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1077-78 (cited in note 24)
(noting that [no court has treated law enforcement reliance on a race-based suspect
description as a racial classification warranting strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.").
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residents, fewer than three hundred of whom are black. The
7,500 students of a state university also live in this town, and 2
percent of these students are black.
Just before 2:00 a.m. one night in Oneonta, someone broke
into a home occupied by a 77-year-old woman. The victim did not
see the burglar's face, but she could tell from his hands and forearms that he was black. She inferred from his movements that he
was young. The burglar had a knife, and as he and the victim
struggled, the burglar apparently cut his hand.
The Oneonta Police Department asked the state university to
supply a list of its black male students, which it did. Although the
police did their best to contact and question everyone on the list,
they discovered no suspects among the students. Then, according
to the Second Circuit, "over the next several days, the police conducted a 'sweep' of Oneonta, stopping and questioning non-white
persons on the streets and inspecting their hands for cuts. More
than two hundred persons were questioned during that period."5
Once more, the police failed to identify the burglar. Black male
students at the state university and others questioned by the
Oneonta police sued the police department and various officials
for violating their civil rights."
In Oneonta, the Second Circuit vacated the trial court's determination that none of the plaintiffs had been detained involuntarily or seized. One plaintiff, for example, reported that "a
police officer pointed a spotlight at him and said 'What, are you
stupid? Come here. I want to talk to you.' He was then told to
show his hands."" According to the Second Circuit, these allegations presented "arguably a close case," but the court declared,
"[A] reasonable person in [the plaintiff's] circumstances would
have considered the police officer's request to be compulsory."'
Another plaintiff reported "that he encountered two police officers
in his dorm lobby, and ...

hands."'9

they asked him to show them his

The Second Circuit concluded that this plaintiff did not
allege anything that "[rose] to the level of a seizure."7' Although
the court held that, on the plaintiffs' allegations, the police violated some people's Fourth Amendment rights, it concluded that

'7

Brown, 221 F3d at 334.
See id.
Id at 340.

68 Id.
69 Brown, 221 F3d at
341.
70 Id.
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the police had denied no one the equal protection of the lawsneither the suspects they detained nor the suspects whose supposedly voluntary cooperation they secured.7
The Second Circuit reiterated the Sixth Circuit's view that
because the police were "not alleged to have investigated 'based
solely upon ...race, without more,"' there was no "actionable
claim under the Equal Protection Clause."72 Because the police
considered "not only race, but also gender and age, as well as the
possibility of a cut on the hand,"' they did not employ a racial
classification. Presumably the police did not classify by age or
gender either, because they did consider race. In the magic land
of Oneonta, police officers who classify on more than one basis
classify on none. One plus one equals zero.
The court advanced a second reason for its conclusion that
the plaintiffs did "not identif[y] any law or policy that contains an
express racial classification."74 The racial classification had come
from the victim, and the police department's own policy was raceneutral:
[The plaintiffs] were questioned on the altogether legitimate basis of a physical description given by the victim of
a crime. Defendants' policy was race-neutral on its face;
their policy was to investigate crimes by interviewing the
victim, getting a description of the assailant, and seeking
out persons who matched that description.7"
The Second Circuit apparently imagined that the Oneonta
Police Department would have questioned all of the young white
men in Oneonta if only the victim had described the burglar as
white. Because, in the court's view, the Department's policy was
to pursue all witness descriptions evenhandedly, it presumably
would have questioned thousands of white suspects.
Perhaps, however, the court imagined something less absurd-that the police would have questioned all of the young
white men in Oneonta if the victim had identified the offender as
white and whites constituted only three hundred of the people in
town. When someone believes that a needle may be hidden in a
haystack, she may search the haystack if it is small enough.
71

See id at 339 (internal citations omitted).

72 Id

at 338.

73 Brown, 221 F3d at 337.
74 Id.
75

Id.
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Perhaps, then, it was not race but simply the fact that blacks
were a discrete minority that led to their disparate treatment,
and perhaps any other discrete minority would have been treated
the same way. For example, if a black victim had spotted a St.
Christopher medal around a white burglar's neck and there were
only three hundred Catholics in Oneonta, a police officer might
have approached each of the town's white Catholics with a greeting like, "What, are you stupid? Come here. I want to talk to you."
Imagining that the Oneonta police would have questioned
every white Catholic if the burglar had been one seems nalve. R.
Richard Banks says of Oneonta, "Research has unearthed not one
case anywhere in the United States in which law enforcement
authorities conducted a search of comparable scope and intensity
for a white perpetrator of a crime against a black victim."7'
Even on the assumption that the Oneonta police questioned
blacks only because their numbers were small and that they
would have treated any other small group the same way, the department's action would have been unconstitutional. In 1914, the
Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of blacks and
whites cannot be justified on the ground that the differing sizes of
the two groups make this treatment efficient. In the era of separate-but-equal, a railroad that provided sleeping cars for whites
could not refuse to provide them for blacks even if too few blacks
would use the cars to make them profitable. The argument from
economic efficiency would, the Court said in McCabe v Atchison,
Topeka & SF Railway Co, "make [ the constitutional right depend
upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against,
whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal one .... It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws."77 The government may not impose distinctive
burdens on blacks simply because there are fewer of them.
After disregarding a constitutional principle the Supreme
Court settled in 1914, the Second Circuit disregarded a principle
the Court settled in 1948. It emphasized in Oneonta that the

7' Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1113 (cited in note 24). The OneontaDaily Starobserved,

"Police were overzealous from the start because the woman was visiting a prominent Oneonta family. It is probable that such an aggressive investigation would not have occurred
if the burglary had taken place in different quarters." "Black List" Case Ought to be Settled,
The
Oneonta
Daily
Star
(Oct
3,
2001),
available
online
at
<http://www.thedailystar.com/opinion/edits/2001/10/edl003.html> (visited Nov 15, 2002)
[on file with U Chi Legal F].
77 235 US 151, 161-62
(1914).
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classification "originated not with the state but with the victim."78
When a state adopts and acts upon a private individual's racial
classification, however, it also classifies by race. This action
would not become constitutional even if the state ratified automatically every racial classification a private person supplied. In
1948, the Supreme Court held that state courts could not enforce
racially restrictive real estate covenants approved by private parties, and it observed that the Equal Protection Clause does not
countenance the "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."9 The
Court noted in a later case, "It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons
suffer them in equal degree."
One can imagine a superstitious upstate New York police
chief who lunched every Monday at a Chinese restaurant. On one
Monday, the chief discovered a message in his fortune cookie,
which read, "Hassle blacks." The following Monday, the message
read, "Hassle whites." Then, on the next Monday, the message
read, "Hassle Asian-Americans, sparing only the owner of this
restaurant." Every Monday afternoon, the chief told his officers to
do as that week's message instructed. Neither the fact that the
racial classifications originated with a private person nor the fact
that the chief approved all of them would warrant the conclusion
that the police department had employed no racial classification.
Oneonta and all of the thought-experiment cases are cases of
express racial classification. When an officer, relying on a witness
description, restricts the liberty of black men in green coats and
not the liberty of white men in green coats, this officer differentiates by race. Of course the officer's conduct may nevertheless be
legitimate. Identifying a racial classification begins, not ends, the
inquiry, and as the Supreme Court has noted, judges and commentators may have been too hasty in announcing that "strict in
theory" means "fatal in fact."
Finding and prosecuting burglars surely qualifies as a compelling interest,82 and although not everyone agrees that the interest in prosecuting drug offenders is compelling, appropriate
78

221 F3d at 338.

'9 Shelley v Kraemer,334 US 1, 22 (1948).
8oPowers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 410 (1991). See Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 651 (1993)
("[Riacial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or
benefit the races equally.").
8' See Adarand, 515 US at 237 (citation omitted).
See United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 749 (1987) ("[Tlhe government's interest
in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.").
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deference to the judgments of legislatures and other respected
authorities precludes courts from denying that it is. Textbook
equal protection analysis therefore suggests that when the police
employ a racial classification in investigating crime, the critical
question is simply whether this classification is "narrowly tailored" to advancing the government's crime-fighting goal.
When a police department employs a racial classification
found in a fortune cookie, its means are not adapted to this end.
When, in an effort to find one burglar, the police question hundreds of suspects on the basis of a description consisting of race,
age, and gender alone, they are barely a step from the fortune
cookie. A claim that police sweep in Oneonta was "narrowly tailored" to advance a compelling governmental interest could not
survive the laugh test.'
When, however, the police, relying on a thicker description,
stop a black man in a green coat near the scene of a robbery, their
means are well adapted to apprehending the robber. Although
eyewitness descriptions are fallible," precluding the police from
using them would bring law enforcement to a halt, and requiring
the police to disregard a witness's references to race (which, like
gender, comprises one of the most salient features of an individual's appearance 8 ) would greatly diminish the effectiveness of
these descriptions."
One wonders what the police would have done if they had discovered a young black
'
man with a cut on his hand. Being young, black, male, and injured does not supply probable cause for an arrest. The police could not lawfully have detained this suspect for viewing by the victim. The victim, who did not see the burglar's face, probably could not have
provided a useful identification in any event. Being young, black, male, and injured also
does not supply justification for searching the suspect's home. Moreover, the burglar
apparently had not taken any of the victim's property. At most, the circumstances would
have supplied grounds for a brief investigative detention.
Of course the discovery of a young black man with a cut on his hand might have
resolved the case. The suspect might have agreed voluntarily to answer questions, lied
inartfully about how he sustained the cut, and then confessed when a skilled interrogator
confronted him with his falsehoods. He also might have been carrying the knife used in
the burglary or another unlawful weapon for which he could have been arrested. The odds,
however, were against it. Even if the Oneonta police had found what they were seeking, it
seems doubtful that their sweep would have led to a successful prosecution. (Of course I
assume that, if the police had located someone with a cut on his hand, they would have
employed only lawful methods of investigation and, if these methods did not reveal incriminating evidence, would have released the suspect.)
'
See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 7 (1979).
Here is a thought experiment suggested by R. Richard Banks. I have embellished it
slightly:
A victim has given the police a detailed description of a black bicycle
thief. Later a police officer notices two men, one black and one white,
each riding an unusual bicycle like the one reported stolen. Apart from
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Notice that, when the police seek to justify their use of a racial classification in making a stop or arrest, analysis of the
"means-end fit" under the Equal Protection Clause has much in
common with analysis of whether the stop or arrest was justified
by reasonable suspicion or probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment. Notice, too, that when the police target people for
investigation and questioning on the basis of race but do not seize
them, they glide beneath the radar of the Fourth Amendment,
and the Equal Protection Clause has work to do.7 In Oneonta, the
Second Circuit did not play by the hornbook.
The court's refusal to apply ordinary equal protection principles to the police became clearer when the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for rehearing en banc.' Dissenting from this denial,
Judge Calabresi proposed granting relief on a theory different
from the one the plaintiffs had advanced, a theory described and
considered below." He said that approving his alternative theory
would avoid the "complex" and "highly divisive'O question
whether, by acting on the basis of a witness description that includes race, the police employ a racial classification."1
To people who use the English language in the ordinary way,
questioning blacks and not whites does appear to classify by race,
but Judge Calabresi declared,

race, the white man matches the victim's description exactly. The black
man appears to be four inches taller and twenty-five pounds heavier. The
two men are bicycling in opposite directions, and Banks asks which of
them the officer is more likely to stop.
Banks then imagines that the victim has described the thief as a lightskinned black while the black observed by the officer is dark-skinned.
This black man's skin color differs as much (or more) from the victim's
description as the white man's. Again Banks asks which suspect the officer is more likely to stop. Banks observes that race is "the most prominent component of suspect descriptions ... primarily because of its social
and cultural significance."
Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1109-10 (cited in note 24).
86 In addition, directing the police to consider the "green
coat" part of a witness's
description and disregard the "black man" part would demand the impossible (and would
be weird besides).
87 In many situations in which the police investigate crimes without seizing suspects,
individualized suspicion might not be required and the "compelling governmental interest"
formula might be inappropriate. Every classification on the basis of race, however, should
require some affirmative justification. See text at notes 86-88, 220-22, 340-41.
235 F3d 769 (2d Cir 2000) (denying rehearing en banc), cert denied, 122 S Ct 44
(2001).
89 See text accompanying notes 101-12.
90 235 F3d at 785 (Calabresi dissenting).
91 See id at 779,
785-86.
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If an action is deemed a racial classification, it is very difficult, under the Supreme Court precedents, ever to justify
it. And, were such justification made easier in cases of police following a victim's description, the spillover to other
racial classification contexts would be highly undesirable.
In other words, were the requirements of strict scrutiny to
be relaxed in the police/victim's description area, it would
be hard indeed to keep them from also being weakened in
other areas in which racial classifications ought virtually
never to be countenanced. 9
Chief Judge Walker, the author of the panel opinion in Oneonta, endorsed this portion of Judge Calabresi's opinion. He similarly feared "undermin[ing] the strict scrutiny standard ...be-

cause apprehending dangerous criminals in almost all instances
would constitute a compelling state interest."3 Judge Jacobs also
spoke of "trivializing" strict scrutiny.94
A fair paraphrase of the argument offered by these judges
might be:
We would not hold all police racial classifications unconstitutional, especially when these classifications rest on
witnesses' descriptions of criminals. If we applied the
same standards to these classifications that we apply to
other classifications, we therefore would recognize that
they sometimes advance compelling interests. Acknowledging this fact would embolden people to think that racial classifications by actors other than the police also
might advance compelling interests. We should not
weaken the equal protection standards we apply to these
other officials, and we therefore will not subject the police
to the same standards as everyone else. We will either
avoid the issue for now (Judge Calabresi) or deny that police racial classifications qualify as racial classifications
(Judges Walker and Jacobs). Because upholding police
classifications that advance compelling interests would
Oneonta, 235 F3d at 786. I doubt that Judge Calabresi is as strong an opponent of
affirmative action as this statement makes him seem. Most of the people who insist that
racial classifications by people other than police officers should "virtually never be countenanced" would not have approved of the admissions practices of the Yale Law School under any of its recent deans.
93 Id at 772 (Walker concurring).
94 Id at 778 (Jacobs concurring).
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undermine suitably demanding equal protection standards, we will uphold a police action that fell ridiculously
short of meeting these standards. By upholding a police
department's sweep of hundreds of people guilty only of
"breathing while black,"'5 we will preserve our unbending
commitment to the strictest scrutiny of racial classifications.
This article will contend that the demand for a "compelling
governmental interest" in all cases of racial classification is misguided." This standard requires too little justification for some
racial classifications and too much for others. In some unobtrusive investigations, the police should be permitted to classify by
race even when their classification is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest. For example, following an anonymous threat to avenge Vicki Weaver by bombing a specified federal building on the anniversary of Ruby Ridge, 7 law enforcement
officers near the building should be allowed to watch whites more
closely than blacks.' Recognizing the legitimacy of taking race
into account in some investigations might indeed have a "spillover" effect, but this effect would not be regrettable. For example,
reconsidering use of the Supreme Court's conventional formula in
affirmative action cases and other cases far removed from those
that generated the formula might be to the good."

95 See Bob Herbert, Breathing While Black, NY Times A29 (Nov 4, 1999).
See text at notes 231-38.
" Vicki Weaver was the wife of white separatist Randy Weaver. She was killed at
Ruby Ridge by an F.B.I. agent seeking to arrest Weaver after he had failed to appear in
court on a weapons charge and after an initial attempt to arrest him had ended in a shootout in which both an F.B.I. agent and Weaver's fourteen-year-old son were killed. See
Thomas Clouse, Slow Fadefrom Ruby Ridge: Wounds Have Yet to Heal from 10-Year-Old
Siege that Sparked Nation's Anti-Government Movement, Spokane Spokesman-Rev Al
(Aug 18, 2002).
9" Of course the legality of this surveillance from a distance would be unlikely to come
before a court. A white person subjected to unequal scrutiny usually would not know it,
and if the surveillance were brief and unlikely to reveal personal information, he probably
would not care much about it if he knew.
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have carefully analyzed the moral and constitutional issues raised by proposals to award reparations for slavery to blacks. They have
considered, for example, whether an award to blacks would deny equal protection to the
members of other historically victimized racial and ethnic groups. Posner and Vermeule
conclude that the judiciary should allow Congress to address one situation at a time. Although a Congressional award of reparations to blacks and not others would classify by
race, Congress's classification should be subject, not to strict, but to virtually no scrutiny.
See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, Colum L Rev (forthcoming in 2003).
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To avoid results it believed straightforward application of the
conventional formula would produce, the Second Circuit denied
that police racial classifications are what they are. It sought to
have things both ways, avoiding reconsideration of the conventional standard while refusing to employ this standard to limit a
manifestly unreasonable race-specific investigation by the police.
Of course the Second Circuit lacked the authority to revise or
depart from a standard approved by Supreme Court. Its duty,
however, was to apply this standard without dodging rather than
attempt to save the higher court from the consequences of its
sweeping assertions in cases finding discrimination against
whites-declarations, for example, that "[rlacial classifications of
any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society"" and that,
regardless of context, these classifications are "immediately suspect."10 1
Moreover, Oneonta reveals that, under the conventional formula, the alternative to subjecting a police classification to strict
scrutiny is subjecting it to almost none. Perhaps racial classifications in some police investigations need not be narrowly tailored
to advance compelling interests, but confronting hundreds of
blacks as suspects should require more than the "rational basis"
supplied by a witness's statement that a black person somewhere
in Oneonta committed a crime.
Judge Calabresi contended that the court could avoid the divisive issue raised by the plaintiffs because the Oneonta police
had questioned many people who did not meet the victim's description. Their dragnet allegedly included one woman, all black
male students of the state university regardless of their age, and
many other "non-white persons" whose appearance failed to
match the description.
For Congress to award reparations for past wrongs to, say, Irish-Americans while
not awarding them to blacks would seem discriminatory and unconstitutional. "One case
at a time" may not be the appropriate constitutional standard. Congress, however, could
have plausible reasons for awarding reparations to blacks and not Native Americans, just
as it could have plausible reasons for awarding reparations to Native Americans and not
blacks. Congress's defensible reasons should make an award of reparations to either group
constitutional, at least if the only constitutional challenge were that it had left the other
group out. Certainly, as Posner and Vermeule maintain, distinctions among victimized
groups in granting reparations should not be subject to strict scrutiny. A court that accepted this position, however, could not continue to resolve affirmative action and other
equal protection cases by proclaiming that all "[classifications of citizens solely on the
basis of race 'are by their very nature odious to a free people. .. .'" Shaw v Reno, 509 US
630, 643 (1993), quoting Hirabayashiv United States, 320 US 81, 100 (1943).
'ooShaw, 509 US at 657.
101 Id at 642.
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The numbers recited by the panel opinion themselves indicated that the police might not have confined their sweep to
young black men. According to the court, only three hundred
blacks resided in Oneonta. Many of these blacks probably were
female, and many of the males probably were children or older
men. The court reported, however, that after the police had completed their investigation of the university students, they questioned more than two hundred "non-white persons" over the
course of several days."°2 Some of the people questioned may have
been students away from the campus or others questioned and
counted more than once. It seems likely, however, that the police
confronted people who failed to match the victim's description.
Judge Calabresi maintained that the police had "ignor[ed]
essentially everything but the racial part of [the] victim's description."' 0 By doing so, they had "creat[ed] an express racial classification that can only be approved if it survives strict scrutiny.""

102
103
104

221 F3d at 334 (panel opinion).
235 F3d at 781 (Calabresi dissenting).
Id. Judge Calabresi explained why the court should not address the issue raised by

the plaintiffs:
The question of when, if ever, merely following a victim's description that
is predominantly racial might violate equal protection norms is an extremely difficult one. A couple of examples will suggest why. Suppose an
armed robbery occurs in which the victim cuts the arm of the robber. The
robber, described by the victim in racial terms, runs into a crowded bar
where there are only three others who could be so described. Is it wrong
for the police to ask the four to show whether they have a cut on their
arm? Of course not. But imagine, instead, that a passer-by sees someone
illegally swimming naked in a park pond and describes the swimmer to
the police in racial terms, adding that the swimmer can readily be identified because he has a distinctive tattoo on his posterior. Can it possibly
be acceptable for the police to ask every male in town who fits that racial
description to strip, even if the police do so with utmost politeness and in
full conformity with Fourth Amendment strictures? I would certainly
think not.
Id at 785.
For a court to distinguish Judge Calabresi's cases under the Equal Protection Clause
would not be difficult. Apprehending robbers constitutes a compelling governmental interest, but apprehending nude swimmers does not. Asking four suspects to show their arms
is a "narrowly tailored measure," but asking every black man in town to undress is not.
After noting the difficulty of the issue, Judge Calabresi declared:
[Clourts should recognize severe limitations on their competence to deal
with victim racial descriptions. But limitations do not mean impotence,
they mean that courts ought to be reluctant to act alone. Rather, courts
should encourage legislatures to develop guidelines for this area. Such
legislative guidelines could make nuanced distinctions between what is
needed and acceptable police behavior, and what is not.
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Judge Calabresi articulated a strong basis for affording relief
to the Oneonta plaintiffs who did not match the victim's description. The Second Circuit could not properly have refused to decide, however, whether the plaintiffs who did match this description also had a cause of action. Embracing Judge Calabresi's theory might not have saved the court from the issue he struggled to
avoid.'°5
Moreover, Judge Calabresi's formulation of the issue was
confusing in at least two respects. First, the Oneonta police may
have disregarded "the racial part" of the victim's description as
well as the other parts. If only a few of the more than 200 people
they questioned were women and only 150 of the men in town
were black, some of the "non-white" men they questioned probably were "non-black" men as well." Second, insofar as the police
departed from the victim's description, their classification lacked
a rational basis. Judge Calabresi's insistence that the classification was racial and subject to strict scrutiny therefore seemed
beside the point.'07
For the police to treat as suspects blacks and others who did
not meet the victim's description was plainly irrational. Nevertheless, Chief Judge Walker refused to acknowledge that this
practice would violate the Equal Protection Clause. He declared,
"The fact that no legal opinion, concurrence, dissent (or other judicial pronouncement) has ever intimated, much less proposed,
any such rules of equal protection confirms a strong intuition of
Id at 786-87. Judge Calabresi maintained that taking his view of the case "Would... have
furthered a legislative/judicial dialogue." Id at 787. He did not explain why. His opinion
showed signs of having been written by someone from Yale.
105 Perhaps the game was this: Relying on the victim's description,
the police had questioned blacks or "non-white persons." They thereby had employed a racial classification.
This classification was improper, however, because it included women, older men, and
children who did not match the description. Although black men who did match the description could have been questioned lawfully, they were part of the improper class (all
blacks or all "non-white persons"). Accordingly, they also should have a cause of action,
and the court need not decide whether questioning people who meet a witness's description can ever violate the Equal Protection Clause. The game of classification can become
too clever.
10'For what it's worth, the names of two of the plaintiffs in Oneonta were Quinones
and Gonzales.
107"Sweeping" some unpopular whites along with blacks and others would have made
the police investigation even more overbroad. Doing so, however, apparently would have
eliminated Judge Calabresi's reason for applying strict scrutiny and might have saved the
sweep from his condemnation. Compare Chavez v Illinois State Police, 251 F3d 612, 637
(7th Cir 2001) ("Allowing defendants to escape liability for discriminating against Hispanics simply because they occasionally mistreat white motorists would dismantle our equal
protection jurisprudence.").
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their non-viability."'' According to the chief judge, if the court
approved Judge Calabresi's position, "[p]olice work, as we know
it, would be impaired and the safety of all citizens compromised.
The most vulnerable and isolated would be harmed the most and,
if police effectiveness is hobbled by special racial rules, residents
of inner cities would be harmed most of all."' Chief Judge Walker
made this statement in a case in which the police responded to a
white person's complaint by confronting hundreds of "non-white
persons" and in which this response apparently was unmatched
by any investigation ever triggered by a black person's complaint
over the course of American history.
Although Chief Judge Walker himself had recited the numbers indicating that the police probably had questioned suspects
other than young black men, he was confident that no such thing
could have happened: "[I]t strikes me as nonsensical to believe
that the police, who have been given a description of the attacker,
would disregard the description and look for someone else."" ° In a
similar spirit, Judge Jacobs declared that the court need not consider Judge Calabresi's theory "because I don't see how it would
ever arise in an actual case: if, for example, the description is of a
short black man with cropped hair, why would the police stop all
black men, women and children, short and tall, long hair, short
hair, or bald?""' That the police might have harassed "non-white
persons" who failed to meet a victim's description seemed inconceivable to Judges Walker and Jacobs, because such harassment
would have been irrational. One wonders how much of the lives of
some judges has been spent inside their country clubs."'
Chief Judge Walker wrote for the Second Circuit:
We are not blind to the sense of frustration that was
doubtlessly felt by those questioned by the police during
this investigation. The actions of the police were under108 235 F3d at 771 (Walker concurring).
109
10

I
112

Id.

Id at 773 (Walker concurring).
Id at 778 (Jacobs concurring).
Two Second Circuit judges in an often-told story are conversing about a case as

they walk home from the country club. One says, "Look. There's a five-dollar bill on the
sidewalk." The other replies, "I'm sorry. There cannot be a five-dollar bill on the sidewalk."
When the first judge insists there is a five-dollar bill on the sidewalk, the second explains,
"If there were a five-dollar bill on the sidewalk, someone would have picked it up."
A five-dollar bill cannot be on the sidewalk, and the police never would harass minorities simply because they enjoyed it. Moreover, a governmental action cannot fail the
rational-basis test, because any official who took this action would be irrational.
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standably upsetting to the innocent plaintiffs who were
stopped to see if they fit the victim's description of the
suspect. ... Law enforcement officials should always be
cognizant of the impressions they leave on a community,
lest distrust of law enforcement undermine its effective113
ness.
What the court said of law enforcement officials seems true of
judges too. On the first day of its October 2001 Term, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Oneonta.'
IV. A SECOND LESSON IN How NOT TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
DECRYING ALL RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion in Martinez-Fuerte. In response to Justice Powell's
claim of "rationality," this opinion protested, "That law in this
country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any circumstances."11 5
Like the majority, the dissenting justices swept broadly enough to
resolve in a sentence all of the thought-experiment cases described at the outset of this article. When the victim of a robbery
has described the robber as a black man in a green coat, however,
Justice Brennan probably did not mean that the police must disregard the "black man" part of the description and consider only
the green coat. Neither Justice Brennan's blanket condemnation
of racial classification nor Justice Powell's talk of rationality carried the analysis of the use of racial classifications in police investigation very far.
V. A THIRD LESSON IN How NOT TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION: DIVORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In Whren v United States,"' plain-clothes vice-squad officers
seeking drugs stopped a vehicle for a traffic offense -one so mi-

113

114
115

221 F3d at 339 (panel opinion).
122 S Ct 44 (2001).
428 US at 571 n 1 (Brennan dissenting). Justice Brennan discussed at length the

differential burdens checkpoint stops impose on Latinos, but his analysis proceeded no
further.
116 517 US 806
(1996).
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nor that traffic officers assertedly would have ignored it."' The
black defendants who challenged this stop noted the danger of
racial profiling the police practice posed. The Supreme Court declared, 've of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 1 8
Eight years before Whren, a commentator observed that the
Court's Fourth Amendment decisions had "ignore[d] the distinctive class of harms that racially discriminatory police behavior
inflicts. The resulting Fourth Amendment case law ...

is re-

markably silent on the racial dimension of encounters between
citizen and police.""' 9 For the most part, the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment decisions have evaluated searches and seizures in what Anthony Thompson describes as "a raceless
world."" ° By declaring race the concern of a different amendment,
Whren supplied a doctrinal explanation for the narrow focus of
these decisions.
The Court appeared to treat the Fourth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause as hermetically sealed units whose principles must not contaminate one another. Both before and after
Whren, a flood of apparently unanimous commentary has opposed
this bifurcation of the two constitutional provisions.12
Martinez-Fuerte illustrates why the Court's compartmentalization is artificial. Focusing on the Fourth Amendment, the Su117

See id at 808.

118

Id at 813.

119 Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv L Rev 1472,

1498 (1988).
120 Thompson, 74 NYU L Rev at
962 (cited in note 39).

121 See David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class
in the American Criminal Justice
System 39-40 (New Press 1999); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,

107 Harv L Rev 757, 808-09 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 820, 839-41 (1994); David A. Slansky, Traffic Stops, Minority
Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 S Ct Rev 271, 327; Sherry F.

Colb, Stopping A Moving Target, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev 191, 204-05 (2001); Rudovsky, 3
U Pa J Const L at 320 (cited in note 24); Maclin, 51 Vand L Rev at 368 (cited in note 27);
Thompson, 74 NYU L Rev at 961 (cited in note 39); Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial ProfilingAfter Whren v. United States: The New York
and New Jersey Responses Compared, 83 Alb L Rev 725-28 (2000); Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The FourthAmendment Apartheid, 32 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 383, 405-

06 (2001); Lyle, Note, 21 BC Third World L J at 256-58 (cited in note 28); Christopher
Hall, Note, Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the Dishar-

monic Convergence: Whren v. United States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 Tex L Rev 1083, 1109 (1998).
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preme Court concluded that the Border Patrol's detentions were
so brief and unintrusive that "reasonable suspicion" was unnecessary to justify them. The Equal Protection Clause, however, declares that only a compelling governmental interest can support a
racial or ethnic classification, and a compelling reason for acting
on the basis of a law enforcement officer's whim or hunch is difficult to conceive. If the Supreme Court had read the Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause together, it might
have noticed this incongruity. Reasonable suspicion (or more)
should be required to establish the governmental interest needed
to support a seizure based on a racial classification.
In Fourth Amendment and equal protection litigation alike,
the Supreme Court has balanced individual against governmental interests, ' 2 and genuine interest balancing requires weighing
all individual interests against all governmental interests at the
same time. A court should ask, for example, whether the interests
asserted by the government in Martinez-Fuertejustified both the
intrinsic burdens of a brief checkpoint detention and the additional burden of being selected for this detention on the basis of
skin color. Dividing the individual interests in half and declaring
that one half does not defeat the government (under the Fourth
Amendment) while the other half does not defeat the government
either (under the Equal Protection Clause) is playing a utilitarian
shell game. Jeremy Bentham would not have approved of it. One
participant in a contest should not be allowed to fight with both
hands while the other is required to switch from one hand to the
other. The Fourth Amendment declares the right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and this
language requires a court to consider in one package all circumstances tending to make a seizure unreasonable. These circumstances include the imposition of differential burdens on the basis
of race.
Rather than treat racial discrimination by the police as immaterial to Fourth Amendment litigation, the Supreme Court
might have read the Fourth Amendment as it has the Sixth
Amendment to go beyond the Equal Protection Clause in countering racial inequality. According to the Court, the Sixth Amendment, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, does not require proof
of a discriminatory purpose. This amendment forbids the systematic exclusion from jury service of any "distinctive groups in the
122

See text at notes 224-32.
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community. '"" The exclusion need not be purposeful and need not
be total, but it must be regular and foreseeable. Systematic exclusion can be justified only by showing that it is "appropriately
tailored" to advance "a significant state interest."' "
Tracey Maclin writes, "In America, police targeting of black
people for excessive and disproportionate search and seizure is a
'
This practice has perpractice older than the Republic itself.""
sisted on a grand scale into the twenty-first century. 6 Partly as a
result, what the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
told the Supreme Court in 1968 still seems true: "[Tihe policeman
... is the object of widespread and intense hatred in our inner

cities."' 7 In some places, "many blacks have come to see the police
as just another gang."' The correction of racial discrimination by
the police is no less vital than the correction of racial discrimination in jury selection, and police officers and police administrators
should be subject to constitutional standards like those applied to
court clerks and jury commissioners."n When a police practice systematically subjects minorities to searches or seizures at a higher
rate than their rate of offending, courts should hold that this
practice violates the Fourth Amendment unless the challenged
practice is "appropriately tailored" to advance "a significant state
interest."''
Later sections of this article will explain more fully the need
to consider whether a burden is disproportionate not only to a
group's share of the population but also to its rate of offending.
'23

(1979).
124

See Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 538 (1975); Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364
See Duren, 435 US at 367-70. In this respect, the Sixth Amendment appears to be

less demanding than the Equal Protection Clause. "Appropriately" tailored to serve a
'significant" state interest is a less deafening phrase than 'narrowly" tailored to serve a
"compelling" state interest.
126 Maclin, 51 Vand L Rev at 333 (cited in note 27) (citation omitted).
126 For empirical proof, see David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice:
Why ProfilingCannot
Work 53-72 (New Press 2002) (documenting systematic profiling in New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, Illinois, Colorado, and Michigan); Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street
Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urb
L J 457, 477-96 (2000) (documenting systematic profiling in New York City street stops).
'27 Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc, as Amicus Curiae
at 60-61, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968), reprinted in Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard
Caspers eds, Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
ConstitutionalLaw at 636-37 (Univ Pub of Am 1975).
'2 David K. Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, NY Times A33 (Feb 7, 1997), quoted in
Maclin, 51 Vand L Rev at 388 (cited in note 27).
'2' See Rose v Mitchell, 443 US 545, 555 (1979) ("Discrimination on the basis of race,
odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration ofjustice.").
'30 See Duren, 439 US at 367-370.
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Briefly, however, when the members of different races commit
crimes at different rates, a decision to arrest every offender the
police can discover will impose disproportionate burdens on the
races whose crime rates are highest. The justification for systematically imposing burdens disproportionate to these races' share
of the population is evident. No apparent justification exists,
however, for systematically burdening the members of a race at a
higher rate than the rate at which they commit crimes. Crime
rates, not population figures, provide the appropriate baseline for
requiring the government to justify systematic, foreseeable disparities in the rates at which the police search and arrest the
members of different racial groups.
Whren's language is in fact consistent with this reading of
the Fourth Amendment. The Whren opinion said only, "[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment."'3 ' The Court explained, "Subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."'32 A fourth-amendment anti-discrimination principle modeled
after the anti-discrimination principle of the Sixth Amendment
would be objective, not subjective. Later sections of this article
will describe some implications of this reading of the Fourth
Amendment.'33
VI. A FOURTH LESSON IN How NOT TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION: PARTICULARIZED AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

When critics of the Supreme Court's ruling in MartinezFuerte and of profiling on the highway have mentioned cases in
which witnesses have described offenders by race, they generally
have set these cases aside in a phrase or footnote."' From their
perspective, an officer who stops a person with the features mentioned by a witness is not "profiling."
A defender of Martinez-Fuerte might wonder, however, why
the statement of a victim or witness should make a difference
517 US at 813.
Id.
,33See text accompanying notes 205-06, 239-40, 276-77, 359-60.
,34See, for example, many of the definitions of racial profiling set forth in note
24;
Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law at 137 n * (cited in note 38); Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const
L at 299 n 27 (cited in note 24); Jerome H. Skolnick and Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs
and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling,43 Ariz L Rev 413, 421
(2001) (citation omitted). A notable exception is Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev (cited in note 24).
'3'
'32
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when the information this witness could provide can be known
without her help. A Border Patrol agent needs no eyewitness, for
example, to know that illegal immigration has occurred, nor does
she need a witness to know that most immigration offenders on
the highway between San Diego and Los Angeles have distinctive
ethnic characteristics. 3 ' One wonders whether the critics of Martinez-Fuerte would view the case differently if a troop of alert Girl
Scouts camping in the desert had observed hundreds of illegal
border crossings and informed the Border Patrol of the ethnicity
of each offender.
Typically, the officers accused of racial profiling in train stations, in airports, and on highways claim to have received intelligence from informants and undercover agents that drug suppliers
are employing as their couriers young black and Hispanic women
or other racially described suspects." These officers claim to rely
on suspect descriptions of a sort. By contrast, the Islamic Jihad
might credibly claim responsibility for an assassination without
confirming the belief that its membership consists entirely or almost entirely of Arabs. An officer who considered Arab ethnicity
along with other circumstances in stopping a person suspected of
this crime would not rely on a witness description.
A lawsuit by the Department of Justice to enjoin racial profiling in New Jersey ended with a 1999 consent decree that the Department considered a victory. This decree forbade state highway
patrol officers from considering race in deciding whether to stop
or search motorists, but it excepted cases in which suspects previously had been identified by race." When, on September 11,
word arrived of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington,
and Pennsylvania, John Farmer, Jr., New Jersey's Attorney General, was discussing the state's progress in eliminating racial profiling at a meeting of legislators and law enforcement officials.
Moreover, just as the officer who stops a suspect on the basis of a witness's description considers race together with other innocent characteristics (the suspect's green coat),
a Border Patrol agent considers ethnicity and other innocent characteristics like clothing
and hairstyle.
136 See, for example, United States v Travis, 837 F Supp 1386,
1390 (E D Ky 1993) (to
explain statistics showing a highly disproportionate questioning of blacks at the Greater
Cincinnati Airport, an officer testified he had learned at a seminar that most drug trafficking was "done by black gangs out of Los Angeles"); United States v Weaver, 966 F2d
391, 394 n 2 (8th Cir 1992) ("intelligence information" indicated that "young, roughly
dressed male blacks" from Los Angeles were transporting cocaine to Kansas City-relying
on this information, the court approved the consideration of race in the selection of targets), cert denied, 506 US 1040 (1992).
137 See New Jersey Enters into Consent Decree on Racial
Issues in Highway Stops, 66
Crim L Rptr 251 (2000).
1
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Farmer, "visibly shaken," left the room.'" He later informed a
gathering of Sikhs that the police might need to "stop, question,
and scrutinize New Jerseyans who look Middle Eastern solely
because of their ethnicity." The Attorney General added, "A lot of
people who are innocent are going to be questioned.... Everyone

has to take a step back and let law enforcement do what it needs
to do.... Farmer declined to describe the questioning he endorsed
as racial profiling, ' and he argued in a newspaper column that it
was consistent with the consent decree. The decree, he explained,
"allows race or ethnicity to be considered when it is related to
specific suspect information, and there are nearly two hundred
'be on the lookout' warnings currently for people of the same ethnicity as the alleged hijackers."' With enough descriptions of
Arab suspects in hand, an officer could be confident that every
Arab would match one of them.
Among the critics of racial profiling who have set aside in a
footnote the case of the black man in a green coat is the en banc
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In United
States v Montero-Camargo,'2 the court declared it unconstitutional for the Border Patrol to take ethnicity into account in deciding whether to stop someone for a suspected immigration violation."'
The court's opinion expressed a common intuition:
unlike
profiling, which rests on statistical evidence, the stop of a suspect
matching a witness's description is based on particularized evidence. In explaining why Border Patrol officers could not consider
ethnicity in making immigration stops, the court declared, "Reasonable suspicion requires particularized suspicion, and in an
area in which a large number of people share a specific characteristic, that characteristic casts too wide a net to play any part in a
particularized reasonable suspicion determination.' 4

Carter, Need for Racial Profiling,Newark Star-Ledger at 21 (cited in note 8).
"1 Alexander Lane, WTC Probers Pay Attention to Race, Newark Star-Ledger 6 (Sept
25, 2001).
'38

'

Id.

Farmer, Rethinking Racial Profilingat 11 (cited in note 8).
208 F3d 1122 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc), cert denied in Sanchez-Guillen v
United
States, 531 US 889 (2000).
143 See id at 1135. Seven judges joined the majority opinion by
Judge Reinhardt. Judge
Kozinski and three other judges filed a concurring opinion that said nothing about the
issue. See id at 1140 (Kozinski dissenting).
'I" Id at 1134.
14'

142
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The Ninth Circuit recognized that a 1975 Supreme Court
decision, United States v Brignoni-Ponce,'" had declared Latino
appearance a relevant circumstance in stopping a motorist to investigate a possible immigration violation. ' Although the court's
ruling seemed inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, the
Ninth Circuit characterized the Supreme Court's statement as
dictum.17 It also noted that the Supreme Court had approved the
use of ethnicity when Latinos constituted a smaller portion of the
population of the West and Southwest than they do today." With
the rapid growth of the Latino population, the court declared,
"The likelihood that in an area in which the majority-or even a
substantial part-of the population is Hispanic, any given person
of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone an illegal alien,
is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor
in the reasonable suspicion calculus."' A predictable footnote
then set forth the predictable exception: "Hispanic appearance, or
any other racial or ethnic appearance, including Caucasian, may
be considered when the suspected perpetrator of a specific offense
has been identified as having such an appearance. " 0°
The Ninth Circuit might have applied its argument against
the use of ethnicity more easily to the case in which it permitted
this use than to the case in which it forbade it. The court might
have declared, "The likelihood that in an area in which the majority-or even a substantial part-of the population is Hispanic,
any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact the robber described by yesterday's crime victim is not high enough to make
Hispanic appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion
calculus." Presumably few judges, even of the Ninth Circuit,
would have endorsed this statement, yet the probability that a
particular Hispanic in a majority-Hispanic area would prove to be
the robber described by a victim seems even less substantial than
the probability that he would prove to be an illegal immigrant.
The Ninth Circuit's denial of the relevancy of ethnicity was as
unfortunate as other courts' treatment of relevancy as conclusive.
A later section of this article will consider in greater detail the
issue addressed in Montero-Camargo and Brignoni-Ponce-the
145422

US 873 (1975).

See id at 886-87.
147See Montero-Camargo,208 F3d at 1132-33.
"'

14

See id at 1133.
Id at 1132.

"

Id at 1134 n 22.

".
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propriety of stopping suspected immigration offenders partly on
the basis of their ethnicity."'
From her own perspective, a robbery victim's description of
the robber is particularized; she describes a particular offender.
From the perspective of a law enforcement officer, however, the
evidence she supplies is statistical. The victim's description identifies a class of suspects-a group composed of everyone in the
population with the characteristics specified by the victim. The
critics of racial profiling who treat as inapposite the case of the
black man in the green coat have not noticed that the victim's
front-end particularity becomes the police officer's
demographic
12
generality at the point of arrest or detention.
Opponents of racial profiling sometimes observe that an officer who stops a suspect on the basis of a witness's description
does not use race as a predictor of criminal behavior. This statement is useful if "prediction" is understood to refer to treating
race without more as an indicator of criminality in the past, the
present, or the future. As a later section of this article will emphasize, effectively declaring some racial or ethnic groups particularly likely to commit crimes injures them. In none of the
thought-experiment cases, however, do law enforcement officers
employ race to predict future criminality. In all of them, officers
hope to identify people who already have committed crimes (and
who in most cases of drug, weapons and immigration-law violations are still committing them). The cases involve prediction
only in the sense that, in each of them, an officer uses race to
predict whether a person will prove guilty of a past or continuing
offense.!5
161See text accompanying notes 277-99.
152Some commentators have recognized that all evidence is statistical.
See Laurence
H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv L Rev
1329, 1330 n 2 (1971) ("Iam, of course, aware that all factual evidence is ultimately 'statistical,' and all legal proof ultimately 'probablistic' .....
);Michael Saks and Robert Kidd,
Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 Law & Society L
Rev 123, 151 (1980-81) ("All identification techniques place the identified object in a class
with others."); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv L Rev 851, 870 (1984) ("[Tjhe entire notion
that 'particularistic' evidence differs in some significant qualitative way from statistical
evidence must be questioned ....'Particularistic' evidence ... is in fact no less probabilistic than is the statistical evidence that courts purport to shun.").
"3 Of course law enforcement officers sometimes use race to identify people who have
not yet committed crimes but whom they consider dangerous. It may be difficult in some
situations to distinguish this practice from the use of race to identify past offenders. The
New Jersey officers who stopped people of Arab ethnicity after September 11 probably had
both goals in mind. The prevention of further terrorism was probably their dominant
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VII. A FIFTH LESSON IN How NOT TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION: DEMANDING THE IDENTIFICATION OF A
"SIMILARLY SITUATED" MEMBER OF ANOTHER RACE WHOM THE

POLICE HAVE LEFT ALONE
In Brown v City of Oneonta," the trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs' equal protection claims on a different ground from the
one later advanced by the Second Circuit. The court said that the
plaintiffs had failed to show "specific instances ...where [they]
were singled out for unlawful oppression in contrast to others
similarly situated."5" Similarly, in Chavez v Illinois State Police, 6
a federal district judge dismissed an action to enjoin racial profiling by state highway patrol officers because the plaintiffs had
failed "to identify similarly situated white motorists who were
17
treated differently from [them] ...
The Second Circuit in Oneonta and the Seventh Circuit in
Chavez set aside these trial court rulings. Both Courts of Appeals
held that a litigant challenging an express racial classification by
the police need not identify a similarly situated member of another race whom the police had treated differently."8
The district courts in Oneonta and Chavez relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v Armstrong,"9 in which
the Court "consider[ed] the showing necessary for a defendant to
be entitled to discovery on a claim that the prosecuting attorney
singled him out for prosecution on the basis of his race.""' The
defendants in Armstrong offered preliminary evidence that
whites were never prosecuted for crack cocaine offenses in the
federal district court in Los Angeles. The reason for the absence
of whites among the ranks of defendants, moreover, was not their
absence from the ranks of offenders.

objective, but the possibility of apprehending past offenders made it unnecessary for them
to draw any distinction.
154221 F3d 329 (discussed in text accompanying note 63 et seq).
55 Id at 335 (quoting the trial court's decision).
156 27 F Supp 2d 1053 (N D Ill 1998), affd on other grounds, 251
F3d 612 (7th Cir
2001).
...Id at 1066.

18 Oneonta, 221 F3d at 337; Chavez, 251 F3d at 636-40. The Oneonta court held that
the police had not employed a racial classification, see 221 F3d at 338, and the Chavez
court held that the plaintiffs' proffered evidence failed to establish their claim of racial
profiling, see 251 F3d at 648.
169517 US 456 (1996).
"

Id at 458.
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The defendants' evidence consisted of an affidavit noting that
all twenty-four of the crack defendants represented by the Federal Public Defender in 1991 were black, another affidavit reporting the view of an intake coordinator at a drug treatment center
that approximately half of all crack users and sellers were white,
and a third affidavit by an experienced defense attorney reporting that many non-black defendants were prosecuted for crack
offenses in the California state courts.16' On the basis of this showing, the defendants sought an order requiring the United States
Attorney's office to supply information about the races of the
crack defendants it had prosecuted during the previous three
years and other information. The Supreme Court held that the
defendants
were not entitled to this discovery from the govern62
ment.

Information not included in the record in Armstrong but published before the Supreme Court's decision revealed what the defendants would have been able to prove if they had been afforded
discovery. In another Los Angeles crack case, the United States
Attorney's office supplied much of the information the Armstrong
defendants had sought."
Only one of the 149 defendants charged with selling crack in
the federal district court in Los Angeles between January 1992
and March 1995 was white. '" This defendant was the last defendant charged, and repeated undercover purchases were necessary
to bring his sales to the level the United States Attorney required
for prosecution." He was charged only after the Federal Public
Defender's office had alleged discriminatory prosecution in Armstrong and had filed its affidavit declaring that all of its clients in
crack cases in 1991 were black." The district court remarked that
the inference that one white defendant had been targeted "deliberately so that a white person could be... included in subsequent
prosecution statistics is almost irresistible."' 7
Two statistical studies also were published after the trial
court decision in Armstrong. In a national household survey, 52
percent of the people who reported crack use during the previous
161 See

id at 459-60.

See id at 458.
United States v Turner, 901 F Supp 1491 (C D Cal 1995), revd, 104 F3d 1180 (9th
Cir 1997).
1" Id at 1496.
1" Id.
6
13

"6 Id at 1496.
167

Turner, 901 F Supp at 1496.
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year were white, ' 6 and a study by UCLA researchers showed a
significant number of white crack defendants in the state court in
Los Angeles."
Explaining why the Armstrong defendants were not entitled
to discovery, the Supreme Court observed that their "study failed
to identify individuals who were not black and could have been
prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were
charged." 0 It said, "[RIespondents could have investigated
whether similarly situated persons of other races were prosecuted
by the State of California and were known to federal law enforcement officers, but were not prosecuted in federal court.1 .' A
concurring justice declared, "[It should have been fairly easy for
the defendants to find, not only instances in which the Federal
Government prosecuted African-Americans, but also some instances in which the Federal Government did not prosecute similarly situated caucasians.". 2 Statements like these led the district
court in Chavez, the Illinois highway profiling case, to conclude
that the plaintiffs were required to "identify white motorists

'6

National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1993 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse

58 (Table 4.4).
169 Richard Berk and Alec Campbell, PreliminaryData on Race and Crack Charging
Practices in Los Angeles, Fed Sent Rptr at 37 Table 1 (July/Aug 1993) (showing 17 percent
of the defendants charged with selling crack cocaine were white). But see Joseph E.
Finley, Crack Chargingin Los Angeles: Do Statistics Tell the Whole Truth About 'Selective
Prosecution"?, Fed Sent Rptr at 113-14 (Sept/Oct 1993) (criticizing the Berk-Campbell
study).
The Supreme Court said in Armstrong:
If discovery is ordered, the Government must assemble from its own files
documents which might corroborate or refute the defendant's claim. Discovery thus imposes many of the costs present when the Government
must respond to a prima facie case of selective prosecution. It will divert
prosecutors' resources and may disclose the Government's prosecutorial
strategy. The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a
selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim.
517 US at 468.
The Supreme Court might have denied discovery in Armstrong, however, not because it feared forcing prosecutors to waste resources responding to an insubstantial
claim, but because it realized how substantial the defendants' claim would be if they obtained the information they sought. Some of the material outside the record was mentioned at argument and in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Armstrong. Of course a
litigant challenging a governmental affirmative action plan would be able to discover
information comparable to that sought by the Armstrong defendants. See FRCP 26(b) &
34(a). Prosecutors are especially privileged people.
170 517 US at
470.
171 Id.
172

Id at 476 (Breyer concurring).
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treated differently."7 The court declared that statistical evidence
alone could not establish differential treatment.7
The district court misread Armstrong. As the Seventh Circuit
noted,'75 Armstrong declared a prior Supreme Court decision "consistent with ... the similarly situated requirement" although the
76

only evidence offered of discriminatory effect was statistical.
Proof that similarly situated but unprosecuted offenders exist
should satisfy the "similarly situated requirement" regardless of
the character of this evidence. A litigant should not be required to
identify a similarly situated offender by name, occupation, and
social security number.
The Armstrong opinion declared, "The requirements for a
selective-prosecution claim draw on 'ordinary equal protection
standards, "".. and it called the "similarly situated requirement"

an "ordinary equal protection principle.'.. This requirement,
however, departs from customary equal protection standards.
When there is a rational basis for treating one person differently
from another, the two are not "similarly situated." To require an
equal protection claimant to establish that people whom the government has treated differently were "similarly situated" is to
require her to establish the lack of any reason for the government's classification. When the government deliberately treats
blacks and whites differently, however, ordinary equal protection
standards require the government to show a "compelling" reason
for its classification. This classification must be "narrowly tailored" to the government's objective.'78 The "similarly situated requirement" undercuts these basic requirements of equal protection law.
In Oneonta, for example, blacks and whites were not "similarly situated." The crime victim's statement that a black man
had invaded her home provided a reason for treating blacks and
whites differently. That blacks and whites were not "similarly
situated," however, did not make the police "sweep" of every

173

27 F Supp 2d at 1066-67.

174 See

id.

175251 F3d at 636-40.
176517 US at 467 (discussing Hunter v Underwood, 471 US 222, 227
(1985), which

invalidated an Alabama statute disenfranchising people convicted of passing bad checks
because this statute denied the vote to ten times as many blacks as whites).
177 Id at 465.
178 Id.
179 See text accompanying notes 48-51.
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young black man in town a narrowly tailored measure furthering
a compelling governmental interest.
In Armstrong, because the defendants alleged discriminatory
prosecution, the Supreme Court considered only the actions of the
United States Attorney's office. The focus of counsel and the
Court on prosecutors, however, was divorced from the realities of
the criminal justice system. A reader of the Armstrong opinion
might have concluded that there could be only two possible explanations for a racial disparity in crack prosecutions. Either
blacks and whites committed crack offenses at different rates, or
prosecutors had discriminated. The practice that in fact produced
the racial disparity in Armstrong-differential targeting by law
enforcement officers-was off the Supreme Court's screen.
The likelihood that, when federal prosecutors considered the
comparable cases of white and non-white defendants, they filed
the cases of the non-white defendants in the federal court and
instructed law enforcement officers to refer the cases of the white
defendants to state prosecutors seems remote. Every federal
prosecutor I know (even the few who are not nice) would regard
such screening as lunacy. That law enforcement "stings" targeted
only non-whites, however, so that cases involving white defendants never reached the United States Attorney's office seems
entirely plausible. Armstrong, with its exclusive focus on the
prosecutor, was a never-never land case.
The evidence presented in another federal crack case in Los
Angeles made clear why virtually every defendant charged with a
crack offense in the Central District of California was non-white.
United States v Turner18 arose after the Ninth Circuit held that
the Armstrong defendants were entitled to discovery and before
the Supreme Court held that they were not. When the defendants
in Turner alleged that they had been selected for prosecution on
the basis of their race, the United States Attorney's office supplied much of the evidence it had refused to supply in Armstrong.
On the basis of its disclosures, the district court concluded that
the vast majority of federal crack prosecutions in Los Angeles
were the product of sting operations by two law enforcement task
forces. These task forces had "concentrate [d] their investigative
efforts on members of black street gangs to reduce violent street
crime.""'
901 F Supp 1491 (C D Cal 1995), revd, 104 F3d 1180 (9th Cir 1997).
181Id at 1492.
180
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The district court ordered the United States Attorney to supply additional information to the defendants. It said:
The Court finds before it four defendants who were stung
and charged with crack offenses. In every meaningful
sense, these defendants are to be deprived of their liberty
for eleven to twenty-five years not because they committed
the charged offense, but because law enforcement officers
want them incarcerated for other reasons. . . . If these defendants had been white persons engaged in the same
criminal activities, they would not have been suspected of
any gang association, they would not have been stung by
the government to increase the penalty for the offense,
and they would not have been selected by the U.S. Attorney for prosecution. They would not be here today. Their
real offense is alleged gang association, not the crack offenses with which they are charged.' 8
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's discovery order."'
The Supreme Court said in Armstrong, "The similarly situated requirement does not make a selective-prosecution claim
impossible to prove.". 4 If applied to police profiling and interpreted to require the identification of unprosecuted offenders,
however, the "similarly situated requirement" would make proof
of an equal protection violation nearly impossible. A black motorist stopped on a highway cannot identify the white speeders
whom the police allowed to pass, and a black crack offender in
Los Angeles has no way of knowing what white crack offenders
the police might have "stung" but did not.
Armstrong and Turner differ from the thought-experiment
cases described at the outset of this article. The thoughtexperiment cases, like most of the other cases discussed in this
article, are cases of express racial classification, and the intent of
the police to classify by race qualifies as a discriminatory purpose.' When law enforcement officers target a street gang for
proactive investigation, however, they do not expressly classify by
race. They may realize that all members of the gang are black,
Id at 1501.
'83 United States v Turner, 104 F3d 1180 (9th Cir 1997).
"2

184

517 US at 466.

8' See text accompanying notes 52-54.
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but their knowledge is not enough. Absent proof of a racial motive, targeting a particular gang is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The differential treatment of blacks and whites may be knowing, foreseeable, foreseen,
and systematic, but it is not purposeful.
An earlier section of this article proposed reading the Fourth
Amendment to prohibit some racial discrimination the Equal Protection Clause does not reach. Courts should hold that systematically subjecting racial minorities to searches or seizures at a
higher rate than their rate of offending violates the Fourth
Amendment unless this practice is appropriately tailored to advance a significant state interest.'6

When law enforcement officers have sound reasons for regarding a particular black street gang as more threatening than
any white gang, targeting the black gang for special investigation
(and for more frequent searches and arrests) could be constitutional under this standard. Police officers, however, should be
required to justify practices that they know will subject nonwhites to searches and seizures at a higher rate than their rate of
offending. One need not collect crime statistics to know that the
practice of targeting only non-white gangs for investigation will
subject non-whites to searches and seizures at a highly disparate
rate.
The proposed reading of Fourth Amendment would allow
courts to scrutinize some police practices that, despite the absence of formal racial classification and racial animus, systematically burden minorities. The following section of this article will
propose a revision of equal protection doctrine to facilitate the
judicial review of police practices that systematically impose a
less tangible sort of racial burden-social stigmatization of the
kind that prompted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v
Boardof Education.8 '
VIII. A FIRST LESSON IN How TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION: SOCIAL MEANING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE AND EFFECT

When, on the anniversary of his coronation, the King of Pretendia appeared on a balcony before the multitude, a soldier
failed to remove his hat. The Master of Dignity charged the sol186
187

See text accompanying notes 123-33.
347 US 483 (1954).
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dier with insulting the king, and the soldier then sought the opinion of the Learned Lawyers on the meaning of this offense. Could
he have insulted the king if he was unaware that he was expected
to remove his hat and intended no disrespect? Could he have insulted the king if the king's back was turned so that he did not
know of the soldier's default? Could the soldier have insulted the
king if the crowd did not regard the soldier's omission as insulting? Whose perspective counted-the soldier's, the king's, or the
crowd's? Might more than one perspective matter?'s
In Plessy v Ferguson,"' in which the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of racial segregation, it wrote, "We consider
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.""' The Supreme Court recognized that for the government to declare one
race inferior to another was unconstitutional. The belief of the
members of a race that they had been branded inferior, however,
was not decisive. Separate but equal facilities were not inherently
insulting-no more than a soldier's failure to remove his hat. The
colored race and the king should just get over their sensitivity.
When Brown v Board of Education"" overruled Plessy, the
Court reversed direction and emphasized the perspective of the
victimized race: "To separate [children] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone..' .
Twenty-five years after Brown, in Washington v Davis,'93 the
Court declared the perspective of the asserted wrongdoer at least
as important as that of the asserted victim. Establishing an equal
protection violation required proof of discriminatory purpose as
well as discriminatory effect.'" Although current doctrine thus
takes the viewpoint of both the soldier and the king, it seems to
disregard the crowd. According to the Court, the meaning of a
'8' Philippe Nonet suggested an illustration like this one in conversations twenty years
ago.
189

163 US 537 (1896).

" Id at 551.
191 347 US 483 (1954).

'92 Id at 494.

193426
194

US 229 (1979).
Id at 238-39.
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challenged act (segregating the races or wearing a hat) lies in the
eye of the victim and the asserted wrongdoer. It is not determined
by the chorus of bystanders. The act's social meaning-its objective meaning'9'-not only is not decisive; it is irrelevant.

Disregarding social meaning is an odd way of looking at language, verbal or nonverbal. Although equal protection doctrine
formally emphasizes the soldier's perspective and the king's,
Brown is best understood as a decision about the crowd. Of course
the circumstances of Brown itself did not focus the issue sharply,
for everyone-soldier, king, and crowd-understood that America's regime of apartheid branded one race as inferior.
When Brown declared, however, "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"'" the Court did not have all forms of
separation in mind. Separation does not always convey the same
social message, as three cases indicate: (1) Directing all students
whose surnames begin with the letters A through N to Classroom
1 and those whose names begin with the letters 0 through Z to
Classroom 2 stigmatizes no one. (2) Directing whites to Classroom 1 and blacks to Classroom 2 brands a race. (3) Directing
male students to Classroom 1 and female students to Classroom 2
sparks an argument: What statement does this separation of the
sexes make about women? A lawyer challenging separate educational facilities for women who rested her case after reciting
Brown's declaration that separate facilities are inherently unequal would not be a good lawyer.
The competing perspectives can all be relevant. The actor's
perspective matters most when the issue is punishment, and the
victim's perspective seems most salient when the issue is compensation or damages. Nevertheless, when the question is
whether a group has been socially stigmatized, the crowd's perspective is the most important of the three.
If a student considered himself stigmatized by being assigned
to Classroom 2 on the basis of his surname, one could offer the
Plessy response: "Get over it."'97 Similarly, if an administrator
hoped to punish students with end-of-the-alphabet names by
'9'The "objective" meaning of an act consists of the subjective meaning attributed to it

by a great many people.
196

347 US at 495.

'9'If this illustration seems fantastic, consider the confrontation between the dean of a
Chicago-area law school and a faculty member. The faculty member protested that another member of the faculty had been assigned a larger office. The dean replied that she
did not believe the other faculty member's office was larger. "Yes, it is," the indignant
faculty member declared. "I measured. His office is two inches longer than mine."
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separating them from students with front-of-the-alphabet names,
one could dismiss his malevolent madness on the ground it
caused no harm.
If the administrator realized, however, that a hypersensitive
student named Quaver could be injured by assignment on the
basis of his surname, one might not care about the crowd. If the
administrator's improper purpose and his act's injurious effect
were evident, social meaning might not matter. The victim and
the victimizer might speak a private language. Social meaning
also might not matter if a slow-witted victim failed to perceive an
injury recognized by the crowd. One possible response to this
situation (probably not the best response) would be: No harm, no
foul.
Despite these qualifications, the wisdom and triumph of
Brown lay in the fact that the Supreme Court disregarded the
asserted formal meaning of racial segregation and recognized the
social meaning. The Court judged the message of segregation in
the way language always should be judged-in the context of a
particular culture at a particular time.
Some critics of Brown were troubled by the Court's move to
realism. Although sympathetic to the result in Brown, these critics were suspicious of a rationale that might cause constitutional
doctrine to vary with shifting cultural circumstances.' " They
sought neutral, enduring principles, apparently oblivious to how
neutral and enduring Brown's anti-subordination principle was. 99
The vice of segregation was its message of racial inferiority and
the rippling outward of this message through society-its ratification and encouragement of the view that blacks are less valued
than whites."n
Social meaning distinguishes the case of the black man in the
green coat from the other thought-experiment cases described at
the outset of this article. No one views the stop of a black man
who meets a robbery victim's description as a statement that
blacks are more likely to commit robberies than anyone else. The
stop of the black man in the green coat does not brand a race.

198 Most notably, Herbert Wechsler affixed an A+ title to a B- article advancing this
thesis. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 Harv L
Rev 1 (1959).
'" A classic response to the critics of Brown is Charles L. Black, Jr, The Lawfulness of
the SegregationDecisions, 69 Yale L J 421 (1960).
2w See Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303, 308 (1880) (condemning governmental
discrimination in jury selection as "a stimulant to race prejudice").
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The Pothole police, the drug-profiling troopers on the highway, and the Border Patrol agents at the INS checkpoint, however, all treat race itself as an indicator of criminality. Their actions declare that blacks or Latinos are more likely to be weapons
violators, drug offenders, or immigration offenders than other
people. Even when the officers' statements are statistically accurate, they mark a race.20 1 These statements ratify and encourage
202
the view that minorities are crime-prone.
America's history of racial subordination makes the meaning
of racial profiling more disturbing here than it would be elsewhere. This practice occurs against a background of slave patrols,
lynch mobs, Klan terrorism, all-white juries, discriminatory use
of the death penalty, disenfranchisement, segregation, the third
degree, Los Angeles choke holds, Birmingham water hoses, police
perjury, planted evidence, the beating of Rodney King, the torture of Abner Louima, and the shooting of Amadou Diallo."
"Driving while black" comes at the end of a long and shameful
list.
Reinforcing the view that some racial groups are dangerous
is likely to encourage discrimination, not only in the administration of criminal justice, but throughout society. The sense that
black men in particular are dangerous may make black men hesitant to wear either old clothes or flashy clothes, to drive red or
white cars, to travel by air, to drive some highways, to appear
boisterous, to wear jewelry, or even to approach strangers of
other races to ask directions. It may lead whites and others to
over-perceive the danger blacks pose. It may even encourage
some blacks to see themselves as others see them and to become

20 See J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 US 127, 139 n 11 (1994):
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes
used to justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection. We
have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that
rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause,
even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalizations.
202 See Lu-in Wang, "Suitable Targets"? Parallels and Connections Between "Hate"
Crimes and "DrivingWhile Black", 6 Mich J of Race & L 209, 233-34 (2001).
203 For a chilling review of the history, see Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law at 29135 (cited in note 38). See also A. Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race in the
American Legal Process (Oxford 1978).
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more dangerous. A view of minorities as crime-prone sometimes
may become a self-fulfilling prophecy."
Racial profiling today sparks controversy, outrage, jokes,
lawsuits, and legislation. Gender profiling, however, goes unnoticed. The explanation for this disparity does not seem to be that
gender profiling occurs less often. Instead, the explanation is cultural and historic. Men, the usual targets of this profiling, have
not been abused by the police and subordinated by American society in the same way racial minorities have. Social meaning is
contextual, and although gender profiling does declare men more
crime prone than women, no one believes that it expresses contempt for men or marks them as the less worthy gender.
The Supreme Court has concluded that racial classifications
have an impermissible effect simply because they are not colorblind. The Court seeks a society in which race will not matter.
The Court also has declared that a discriminatory purpose exists
whenever a government officer classifies by race. Racial profiling,
however, works a greater injury than that produced by racial
classification alone. It makes a negative, not merely a colorconscious, statement.
The police may not always intend the harm their profiling
produces. The purpose of their classifications may be only to apprehend as many criminals as they can. Nevertheless, the brand
sensed by the objects of their profiling does not arise, in Plessy's
words, "solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction on it."' ° This brand is visible to the crowd.
As indicated in the previous section of this article, a brand
may be evident to the crowd even when the police do not expressly classify by race and do not act for racial reasons. Targeting only black street gangs or only black drug dealers, for example, clearly conveys the message that blacks are more to be feared
than whites. The Equal Protection Clause should require the government to justify its delivery of this message.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., notes, "Blacks-in particular, black
men-swap their experiences of police encounters like war stories, and there are few who don't have more than one story to
tell."2 In 1999, United States District Judge Filemon Vela drove
204 See Ellis Cose, The Envy of the World: On Being a Black Man in America 7 (Pocket
Books 2002).
205 Plessy, 163 US at 551.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr, Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, New Yorker 58
(Oct 23, 1995).
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from Brownsville, Texas, where his wife is the mayor, to a court
session in Laredo, Texas. Three members of his staff were with
him in his Ford Explorer. The Border Patrol agent who pulled
him over explained that there were "too many people in the vehicle." 7 A year later, Judge Vela was alone in his car when he
drove to Laredo. This time, the Border Patrol agent who stopped
him explained that the car had tinted windows. Another judge in
Brownsville declared, "It feels like occupied territory. It does not
feel like we're in the United States of America."" Members of
Congress, prominent entertainers, prosecutors, off-duty police
officers, and countless others have had like experiences. When
blacks and Latinos are stopped under circumstances in which
whites are not, they-indeed all blacks and Latinos-are
branded. As the following section of this article will indicate,
however, the social meaning of racial profiling is not the only reason this practice is unjust. Profiling also distributes the tangible
burdens of law enforcement inequitably.
IX. A SECOND LESSON IN HOW TO THINK ABOUT RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
THE SYSTEMATIC IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENTIAL BURDENS ON THE

BASIS OF COLOR

A. Racial Taxation
Randall Kennedy observes that a Latino stopped at an immigration checkpoint is
made to pay a type of racial tax for the campaign against
illegal immigration that whites, blacks, and Asians escape. Similarly, a young black man selected for questioning by police as he alights from an airplane or drives a car
is being made to pay a type of racial tax for the war
against drugs that whites and other groups escape.2 "9
Although the word "tax" may seem regrettably antiseptic when
applied to the resentment, fear, and sense of physical restraint
that unwanted police contact often generates,"' Kennedy's obser-

Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 4-5 (cited in note 126).
Id at 6.
209 Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law at 159 (cited in note 38).
210 See Johnson, 78 Wash U L Q at 713 (cited in note
38).
207
208
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vation captures an important part of the injustice of racial profiling.
Kennedy implies that the government imposes a racial tax
only when it uses "race as a proxy for increased risk of criminality" and not when it relies on a witness's description of a criminal.21' Shari Lynn Johnson writes, "The use of race to identify a
particular perpetrator... does not disadvantage any racial group
and thus does not require strict scrutiny.... Because suspects in
all racial groups will be identified in part by their race, reliance
upon the witness's description of the perpetrator's race seems to
impose equal burdens on all races." 12
This analysis overlooks the fact that, in Kennedy's words,
"blacks, particularly young black men, commit a percentage of the
nation's street crime that is strikingly disproportionate to their
percentage in the nation's population."212 People arrested on probable cause and stopped on reasonable suspicion may be innocent,"' and when blacks commit crimes at a higher rate than
whites, innocent blacks are likely to be stopped and arrested
more often than innocent whites. They simply fit victims' descriptions of criminals more often. In this respect, the obligations of
citizenship are more onerous for blacks than for whites. The
members of the most disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups pay
more.
A regressive, racially disparate tax for law enforcement is
troublesome, especially when it takes the form of police detention.
Presumably, however, neither Professor Kennedy nor most of the
rest of us would repeal this tax. When the victim of a robbery has
described the robber as a black man in a green coat and an officer
discovers a black man in a green coat near the scene of the crime,
the officer should classify on the basis of race and risk adding to
the tax that innocent blacks regularly pay for law enforcement
because of their color.

211Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law at 137 n * (cited in note
38).
212Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect,

93 Yale L J 214,
242-43 (1983).
213Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law at 145 (cited in note
38). See Michael Tonry,
Malign Neglect-Race, Crime, and Punishment in America 49-80 (Oxford 1995).
211See, for example, Hill v California, 401 US 797, 802 (1971)
(upholding the arrest of
a misidentified person who matched the description of a criminal); United States v Turner,
699 A2d 1125, 1128-30 (DC 1997) (upholding the stop of a suspect on reasonable suspicion
although the police stopped at the same time a second suspect who equally matched their
description of the person sought).
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When minorities are stopped not merely at a higher rate
than their share of the population but also at a higher rate than
their rate of offending, the tax described by Professor Kennedy
becomes harsher. The government's classification becomes not
only racially over-inclusive but racially under-inclusive as well.
Consider the case of profiling on the highway. Little evidence
suggests that blacks and Latinos commit drug crimes at higher
rates than whites, and whether racial profiling has even a rational basis is disputed.' In many jurisdictions in which the police stop blacks more frequently than whites they discover evidence of crime substantially less often when they stop blacks. In

these jurisdictions, the police apparently overpredict on the basis
of race.16
See Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Con L at 308-13 (cited in note 24).
216Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 73-90 (cited in note 126). The subtitle of Harris's
216

book is Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work, and Harris declares that "racial profiling
doesn't help police catch criminals." Id at 84. The data he presents, however, stop short of
establishing this thesis. Harris writes:
The rate at which officers uncover contraband in stops and searches is
not higher for blacks than for whites, as most people believe. Contrary to
what the "rational" law enforcement justification for racial profiling
would predict, the hit rate for drug and weapons in police searches of African Americans is the same as or lower than the rate for whites. Comparing Latinos and whites yields even more surprising results. Police catch
criminals at far lower rates than among whites. These results hold true
for studies done in New York, Maryland, New Jersey, and other places.
We see the same results in data collected by the U.S. Customs Service,
concerning the searches it does of people entering the country at airports:
the hit rate is lower for blacks than it is for whites, and the hit rate for
Latinos is lower still.
Id at 13.
When, as in the Maryland highway study Harris mentions, the "hit rates" for blacks
and whites are identical, these rates do not indicate a failure of racial profiling. They are
consistent with the possibility that the police achieved the highest attainable rate of success by using a formula that included race as one indicator of criminality. One would in
fact expect identical rates of success if racial profiling were working perfectly. The data
are also consistent, however, with the possibility that random stops would have yielded
identical "hit rates." In short, these data say nothing at all about the empirical success or
failure of racial profiling.
In all of the other studies Harris mentions, the "hit rate" for minorities was significantly lower than the rate for whites. Id at 78-84. These studies do indicate that the police overpredicted on the basis of race and that their racial profiles were inaccurate. But
see George C. Thomas, Blinded by the Light: How to Deter Racial Profiling-Thinking
about Remedies, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev 39, 44 (2000) (noting that successful police
searches of minority motorists generally have yielded larger quantities of drugs than
successful searches of white motorists). Establishing that the police overpredicted on the
basis of race is important. It does not establish, however, that race lacks any predictive
power or, in Harris's words, that "racial profiling cannot work."
Race cannot have any predictive power-and racial profiling on the highway cannot
work-if rates of drug possession and drug dealing do not differ by race. Contrary to
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Suppose, however, that an officer has reason to believe that
stopping one hundred blacks will, on average, yield six arrests for
drug offenses while stopping one hundred whites will yield only
five. If race were this officer's only predictor of illegal drug activity and if the officer had an unlimited number of blacks and
whites to stop, she could maximize the number drug arrests by
stopping only blacks. A 6 percent rate of return is better than a 5
percent rate. A patrol officer therefore might stop one hundred
blacks while allowing, say, 850 whites to proceed-all to make
one additional arrest. Although the disparity in the rate of drug
offending by blacks and whites would be minuscule, the disparity
in the rate of police stops and searches would be infinite.
The economics of proactive policing often encourage the police to "pile on." A small perceived disparity in the rate of offending of two groups can make it economically rational to concentrate enforcement resources on the group whose investigation
appears to yield the greater payoff in arrests and convictions. The
result may be a "multiplier effect," a "cop cascade," or a "race to
the black or brown race." Police officials whose political incentives
encourage them to denounce racial profiling may have economic
incentives to do it. These incentives are independent of the racial
biases that continue to infect American policing."7
The racial tax is likely to be highest when policing is proactive-when the police select their own targets as they do in most
drug, weapons, and immigration cases (and as they do in other
cases in which ascertainable victims have not initiated police investigations). Crimes of personal violence and property crimes
pose a lesser danger. When the police make an effort to apprehend all offenders rather than just a portion of them and when
they respond to victims' descriptions of offenders in roughly the
same way, they may stop blacks at a higher rate than the proportion of blacks in the population, but they will not stop blacks at a
higher rate than the proportion of blacks in the universe of raceidentified criminals.
Of course, as Brown v Oneonta illustrates, the police may
treat some victims' complaints more seriously than others. When

common stereotypes and as best we can tell, whites do commit all sorts of drug offenses at
roughly the same rates as blacks and Latinos. See the data recited in Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J
Con L at 309-10 (cited in note 24).
217 See Albert W. Alschuler and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antequated Proceduresor Bedrock Rights? A Response to ProfessorsMeares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F 215, 223-25
(documenting the persistence of racial bias).
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the police expend more resources responding to a report that a,
black has victimized a white than responding to a report that a
white has victimized a black (for example, when they attempt to
question every black youth in town), they again tax blacks at a
higher rate than their rate of offending. In this situation, moreover, the racial tax may lack even an efficiency justification.""
Focusing on whether a police practice taxes a race at a higher
rate than this race's rate of offending may sometimes order our
intuitions about racial profiling better than focusing on whether
the police are seeking one criminal or many, whether they have
obtained a witness description, or whether they employ particularized or statistical evidence.
Racial classifications in criminal investigation often pose a
classic trade-off between distributive justice and efficiency. 9 As
noted above, distributive unfairness is evident even in the case of
the black man in the green coat. Law-abiding black men should
not be subject to unwanted police contacts at a higher rate than
law-abiding white men simply because the members of their race
20
commit crimes at an above-average rate.
When blacks do commit crimes at a higher rate than whites,
however, the only way to end this distributive unfairness (this
"racial tax") would be to bring law enforcement to a halt-for example, by ordering the police not to stop a possibly innocent black
man in a green coat even on probable cause. Stopping a person
who matches a victim's detailed description seems so plainly necessary that we barely notice the distributive unfairness if we notice it at all. Routine, unquestioned law enforcement practices
may have a systematic disparate impact on innocent blacks, but
when stops based on reasonable suspicion and arrests based on
probable cause burden minorities at no higher rate than the minorities' rate of offending, these stops and arrests should require
no further justification. In this situation, reasonable suspicion or
218

Recall that in Oneonta, the differing sizes of the two racial groups did provide a

weak efficiency rationale for the police department's differing treatment of blacks and
whites. Recall, too, that the Supreme Court held eighty-eight years ago that this sort of
efficiency cannot justify treating blacks and whites differently. See the discussion in text
accompanying notes 75-77.
219But see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 Harv L Rev
961, 982, 1028-38 (2001) (denying that trade-offs between justice and efficiency are necessary).
220 This distributive injustice is aggravated by the fact that
it reflects and compounds
earlier injustices. The higher crime rate of blacks is presumably attributable to centuries
of racial subordination. The accident of being born a member of a historically subordinated
race generates an increased personal tax for law enforcement today.
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probable cause provides a sufficiently compelling reason and a
sufficiently tight means-end fit to justify the racial classifications
used by the police.
In the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
however, seizures based on racial classifications lack a compelling
justification. Martinez-Fuerte to the contrary notwithstanding,
detentions based in whole or in part on ethnicity and lacking any
particularized evidentiary basis warrant condemnation under
both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause." '
Perhaps a life-threatening emergency could justify a departure
from this principle, but nothing less could.
When law enforcement practices burden minorities not only
at a higher rate than their share of the population but also at a
higher rate than their rate of offending, the racial tax grows
harsher and the justification for it less apparent. In this situation, neither the evidentiary justification for individual stops and
arrests nor increasing the government's batting average or rate of
return should automatically justify the tax. It makes sense to
place one's cash in the bank offering the highest rate of return,
but the government must allocate the burdens of criminal investigation more evenly. In the case of the black man in the green
coat, effective or efficient law enforcement justifies some distributive unfairness. In the case of the young man from Pothole, however, hardly anyone would contend that efficiency justifies stopping someone on the basis of race, age, gender, and residency
alone.
B.

The Unbearable Lightness of Doctrine

The case of the young man from Pothole illustrates both the
power of distributive concerns and the failure of current constitutional doctrine to take appropriate account of them. Taken at face
value, Fourth Amendment doctrine does not appear to condemn
the stop in this case.222 Probable cause requires only a "substantial
basis" for concluding that a person whom the police arrest is
guilty of a crime," and a stop can be justified by reasonable sus-

121 Note that at this point I am speaking only of seizing
suspects, not of approaching
them simply to ask for information. For discussion of the use of racial classifications in
investigations that stop short of seizures, see text at notes 96-98, 236-38, 359.
222 I emphasize "taken at face value," for a court might tug, haul, and shove the
doc-

trine to reach an appropriate result.
223 Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 236 (1983).
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picion, a less demanding standard. A better than 50 percent
likelihood that a person is carrying an illegal weapon seems to
satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
five tiers. Requesting people's voluntary cooperation-the kind
that (astonishingly) drug-carrying motorists usually provide
when the police ask to search their vehicles-is not a search or
seizure and requires no justification (tier one)."' Searches, seizures and stops that serve "special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement" are subject to whatever safeguards the
Supreme Court considers appropriate but often are allowed en
masse without reasonable suspicion (tier two). 26 Brief stops in the
course of criminal investigation and some brief seizures of property require reasonable suspicion (tier three).
Most arrests,
searches, and seizures require probable cause (tier four).28 A few
very highly intrusive arrests, searches, and seizures (those requiring the use of deadly force or major surgery) require justification beyond probable cause (tier five).229 The Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which balances interests by
fits and starts, could be described as "clunky utilitarianism." As
noted earlier, however, the Court has placed a thumb on the utilitarian scale by declaring that the intentional imposition of differential burdens on the basis of race is the concern of a different
amendment." °
The stop of the young man from Pothole does not appear to
violate the Equal Protection Clause either. The Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence has three clunky tiers. Every classification of persons must have at least a rational basis (tier one).
Some classifications are subject to "intermediate" scrutiny. They
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" (tier
two)."' Other classifications, including those based on race and
22

Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20, 30-31 (1968).

221 See, for example, United States v Drayton, 122 S Ct 2105, 2110 (2002); Florida
v

Bostick, 501 US 429, 434-35 (1991).
22" See, for example, Board of Education v Earls, 122 S Ct 2559, 2564-65 (2002);
Vernonia School District v Acton, 515 US 646, 653 (1995); Michigan Department of State
Police v Sitz, 496 US 444, 455 (1990).
221 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); United States v Place, 462 US 696, 706 (1983).
See, for example, Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 227-28 (1983).
See Tennessee v Garner,471 US 1, 3 (1985) (deadly force); Winston v Lee, 470 US
753, 759-63 (1985) (major surgery).
m See text accompanying notes 116-23.
23' Craigv Boren, 429 US 190, 197 (1976).
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ethnicity, are subject to "strict" scrutiny. They are constitutional

only when they are "narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests" (tier three)."'
The stop of the young man from Pothole does rest on a racial
classification, but the government's interest in arresting weapons
offenders and seizing illegal weapons is compelling. Moreover, the
government's classification seems well adapted to achieving its
goal.
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
is insistently distributive; distributive justice is what it's about.
Under the Supreme Court's decisions, however, distributive fairness always is subject to a utilitarian constraint. When the end is
compelling and the government's means are well adapted to
achieve it, this end justifies the means. The conventional law of
both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments appears to
have left something out.
In some situations, utility ought to trump distribution. People of normal moral sensibilities usually seek a middle ground
between Immanuel Kant's insistence on desert-based distribution2 and Jeremy Bentham's insistence on the greater good for
the greater number.13 If the alternative to imposing a small, undeserved racial burden were a nuclear explosion in Cleveland,
imposing this racial burden would be justified. In ethics as in
Gilbert and Sullivan's H.M.S. Pinafore, the answer to the question "What, never?," often may be, "Well, hardly ever." Generally
appropriate principles of justice fade in life-threatening emergencies and other situations, and for people who shun the moral extremism of both Kant and Bentham, some squishy balancing
seems unavoidable.
As the case of the young man from Pothole illustrates, however, concern for distributive justice should not vanish altogether
whenever an interest labeled "compelling" and a suitable meansend fit appear. Trade-offs between distributive justice and efficiency are characterized by continuous (not dichotomous) variables on both sides, and these trade-offs frequently are complicated by concerns extrinsic to the balance. Problems of distribu2 Adarand Constructorsv Pena, 515 US 200, 227
233See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law

(1995).
47 (Augustus M. Kelley 1974) (W.

Hastie, trans).
See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation
11-16 (Anthalone 1970) (J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, eds).
2

William Schwenk Gilbert, H.M.S. Pinafore, in Ian Bradley, ed, The Complete Anno-

tated Gilbertand Sullivan 127 (Oxford 1996).
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tive fairness cannot be solved with an on-off switch. Proclaiming
the government's interest in fighting crime "compelling" should
not validate every crime-fighting measure likely to prove effective.
Just as the phrase "compelling governmental interest" may
demand too little justification for a racial classification, it may
demand too much. The Supreme Court has stretched the Fourth
Amendment category of voluntary interaction with the police to
the point at which it includes many highly resented contacts,8
but one can envision courteous police requests for cooperation by
people of a single race who are not themselves suspects. Moreover, without questioning or approaching anyone, the police
might watch people of one race more closely than those of another. The police should have a reason for focusing greater attention on one group than another, 7 but demanding that unobtrusive preliminary investigation constitute a "narrowly tailored"
response to a "compelling" law enforcement interest seems excessive. The formula employed in Sixth Amendment jury-selection
decisions seems more appropriate: the challenged action must be
"appropriately tailored" to advance "a significant state interest."M
In the end, the talismans "compelling governmental interest"
and "narrowly tailored measure" may not notably constrain decision. If the constraint provided by these words is not illusory,
however, it is misguided.
C.

A Recapitulation and Some Implications

This section has examined the tangible, differential burdens
a police racial classification can impose, drawing on Randall
Kennedy's useful metaphor of racial taxation. The evaluation of a
racial classification by the police requires examining both the extent to which this classification burdens minorities at a higher
rate than their share of the population and the extent to which it
burdens them at a higher rate than their rate of offending. Police
236

See, for example, Drayton, 122 S Ct 2105 (2002); Florida v Bostick, 501 US 429

(1991).
2 An unpublished analysis of police computer traffic found that patrol officers ran
license checks on automobiles driven by blacks more often than those driven by whites.
Although the legality of race-specific surveillance from a distance is unlikely to be litigated, see note 98, in the absence of appropriate justification it is surely unconstitutional.
See Gross and Livingston, 102 Colum L Rev at 1425 (cited in note 24) (describing Albert J.
Meehan and Michael Ponder, Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial Profiling African.
American Motorists (unpublished 2001)).
See Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 367, 370 (1979).
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racial classifications produce both racially skewed false positives
and racially skewed false negatives.
Even routine, unquestioned police practices (like stopping
suspects who meet witness descriptions) may tax innocent blacks
at a higher rate than innocent whites. The systematic imposition
of differential burdens on the innocent members of a historically
subordinated race is always unjust, for it fails, in Plato's words,
to "render each his due. ' 29 Nevertheless, this imposition of unjust
burdens is not always invalid. For everyone other than a Kantian
or Benthamite, a trade-off between justice and efficiency is unavoidable.
Current equal protection doctrine botches the trade-off. Occasionally this doctrine tilts too far in favor of equal distribution.
Approaching blacks but not whites in an unobtrusive manner
simply to ask questions requires some justification. In this context, however, talk of compelling governmental interests and narrow tailoring seems out of place.
More often, current doctrine tilts too far in favor of efficiency.
The police should not be allowed to stop all the young black men
in Pothole even when there is good reason to believe that most of
them are carrying unlawful weapons. Although the governmental
purpose is compelling and the means employed by the police well
designed to achieve it, the maldistribution of burdens is too great.
Like the preceding section on social meaning, this section on
racial taxation has focused on one sort of discriminatory effect,
not on discriminatory purpose. When express racial classifications by the police produce unequal racial burdens, current doctrine does treat the police purpose as discriminatory. The police
could produce equally disproportionate burdens, however, without an express racial classification and without the discriminatory purpose courts now consider crucial to an Equal Protection
Clause violation.
For example, a police department might devote a large share
of its resources to apprehending and punishing the members of a
gang called the Bloods, the largest gang in town. Sting operations
might target the Bloods; the department might designate Blood

29 See Plato, The Republic 21 (Harvard 1978) (Paul Shorey, trans) (G.P. Goold, ed).
See also The Institutes of Justinian 5 (Longmans 1962) (Thomas Collett Sandars, trans)
("Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render everyone his due."); William Blackstone, 1 Commentarieson the Laws of England 40 (Chicago 1979) (listing among the immutable principles of good and evil "that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and
should render every one it's [sic] due.").
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territory as a zone in which the local gang loitering ordinance
would be rigorously enforced; and the police might stop and frisk
suspected Bloods whenever the law allows. Assume that the
Bloods have only black members and the police know it. Assume
in addition that the police could target gangs with white members but do not. The imposition of a disproportionate tax for law
enforcement-disproportionate to blacks' share of the population
and to their rate of offending-would be systematic and knowing.
Absent proof of racial animus, however, it would not be purposeful. The police can engage in racial profiling (or at least duplicate
the evils of profiling) without employing an express racial classification. The absence of this express classification would not reduce the distributive unfairness.
To address this unfairness, this article has proposed that
when a police practice systematically subjects the members of a
race to searches and seizures at a higher rate than their rate of
offending, courts should hold the practice unconstitutional unless
it is appropriately tailored to advance a significant state interest.
Under the proposed standard, a qualitative difference between
the activities of the Bloods and those of other gangs might justify
targeting only this group, but the prospect of improving the police
department's batting average could not. The police could no
longer simply pile on.
Although this section has emphasized the racial tax profiling
imposes on the innocent, the distributive unfairness extends to
the guilty as well. Targeting only blacks ultimately will send only
blacks to prison, and a policy that predictably sends guilty blacks
to prison while guilty whites go free is unjust. Once again, this
policy cannot be justified simply by the fact that targeting only
blacks yields a higher rate of return. The distributive injustice is
clearest when the police concentrate their investigative resources
almost entirely on blacks and make little or no effort to discover
guilty whites, but the unfairness exists whenever a practice or
policy systematically subjects the guilty members of one race to
punishment at a higher rate than the guilty members of another.
X. THREE APPLICATIONS

A.

Security Screening at Airports

In Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to brief "administrative" detention although the people detained were chosen largely on the basis of
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their ethnicity. Ethnicity, the Court said, was "clearly ... relevant to the law enforcement need to be served. As noted at the
outset of this article, most Americans in the period after September 11 favored requiring airline passengers who appeared to be
Arabs to submit to searches and detentions from which other
passengers were excused.24 ' Like the stops at issue in MartinezFuerte, preboarding searches of airline passengers and their luggage are "administrative" or "special needs" searches conducted
without individualized suspicion."' Proposals to subject people of
apparent Arab ethnicity to more intense screening than other
passengers raise issues resembling those presented by MartinezFuerte.
One may doubt, however, that apparent Arab (or MiddleEastern or any other.) ethnicity is "clearly relevant" to the need
to be served by airport screening. For at least three reasons, ethnicity seems less relevant to identifying hijackers than to identifying illegal immigrants on the highway between San Diego and
Los Angeles.
First, defenses of racial and ethnic profiling depend upon the
ability of law enforcement officers to do it-to distinguish racial
and ethnic groups from one another. Although Mexicans and Latinos often cannot be distinguished from others on the basis of

240

428 US at 564 n 17.

See text accompanying notes 5-6.
See United States v Davis, 482 F2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir 1973). Because people can
avoid being searched at airports either by giving up their right to travel or by using trains,
busses, bicycles, steamships, motorcycles, automobiles, or horses, some courts have characterized preboarding searches as consent searches. See United States v Henry, 615 F2d
1223, 1226, 1228-29 (9th Cir 1980); United States v Edwards, 498 F2d 496, 500 (2d Cir
1974). The consent of air travelers, however, is obtained through leverage, and the consent-search rationale for preboarding searches knows no limits. It apparently validates all
searches to which passengers submit rather than forego air travel regardless of how intrusive and unjustified these searches are. Moreover, even if consent could justify security
screening at airports, it could not justify the similar screening that occurs at places where
appearance is often involuntary-notably courthouses.
243 The Afghanis who fought for the Taliban were not Arabs. Moreover, militantly antiAmerican Pakistanis are neither Arab nor Middle Eastern. The assertedly relevant category is far from clear. People who hate America live in many lands, including of course
America.
241
242
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their appearance,244 Arabs seem even less distinctive in appearance than Latinos.
A substantial majority of the people whom the "point agent"
at the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint identified as Latino probably
were Latino. Moreover, this agent's "false negatives" (her failure
to identify some Latinos) was not notably disturbing. The agent
did not seek to stop more than a minority of Latinos in any event.
If directed to subject people of "Arab appearance" to special
screening, however, airport security personnel probably would
detain many non-Arabs while overlooking many Arabs.246 If Arab
ethnicity truly were a legitimate indicator of danger, the screeners' false negatives would be a matter of concern. So would their
false positives -detaining and searching, largely on the basis of
color, people
who were not in fact members of the targeted ethnic
247
group.
Second, post-September 11 proposals to subject Arabs (and
others who cannot be distinguished from Arabs) to distinctive
screening have been shaped by what one might call the "September 11 availability heuristic." (The term "availability heuristic"
refers to people's tendency to overestimate the likelihood of dramatic, easily remembered events, 4 ' and few events are more
"available" to Americans than those of September 11.)
Of course, even before September 11, Arabs committed acts of
terrorism against Americans and others at a higher rate than,
•

24

240

"[Many Mexicans] are blond, blue-eyed and 'white,' while others have red hair and

hazel eyes." Johnson, 78 Wash U L Q at 715 (cited in note 38) (emphasis omitted), quoting
Julian Samora and Patricia Vandel Simon, A History of the Mexican People 8 (rev ed
1993).
245 One might test this proposition, but I know of no one who has. If it seems discomforting to debate which ethnic groups are distinctive in appearance and just how distinctive they are, you may count the discomfort as an argument against ethnic profiling.
24 Even experienced, well trained, carefully selected security personnel would be
likely to make errors, and prior to September 11, low pay and unattractive working conditions contributed to a high turnover of airport security personnel. See Donna Smith,
Comment, PassengerProfiling:A Greater Terror than Terrorism Itself?, 32 J Marshall L

Rev 167, 188-89 (1998). The "federalization" of airport security after September 11 seems
to have produced only limited improvement. See John Hilkevitch, Air Security Tightens;
but Gaps Remain, Chi Trib 1 (Sept 11, 2002); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Air Security Deadline Not on Track; Security: Mineta Warns Congress that Budget Cuts Will ProbablyDelay
Airport Screening Goals, LA Times 16 (July 24, 2002).
27 Arab terrorists may not be able to alter their skin color, but they can leave distinctive garb at home and obtain forged identification papers bearing names like Rodriguez,
Mastroianni, Balibanian, Anastaplo, Gandhi, and Goldfarb.

See Paul Slovic, et al, Facts Versus Fears: UnderstandingPerceived Risk, in Daniel
Kahneman, et al, eds, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases 463, 464-65

(Cambridge 1982); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
JudgingFrequencyand Probability,in Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty at 163.
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say, Canadians did. The deadliest act of terrorism in the United
States prior to September 11, however, was the murder in Oklahoma City of 186 people by Timothy McVeigh and other white
citizens of the United States. " ' White Americans appear to have
been responsible for many other terrorist acts as well, including
anthrax mailings and airplane hijackings." Permitting the
"availability" of September 11 to drive concerns about domestic
terrorists to the background seems perilous. Perhaps non-Latinos
could be excluded from the pool of suspected illegal immigrants
on the highway between San Diego and Los Angeles without diminishing the effectiveness of the government's screening, but
non-Arabs cannot be excluded from the pool of potential terrorists
and hijackers.
Third, a Latino who wants to enter the United States illegally must cross the border herself. She cannot "beat the profile"
by sending a Minnesota wheat farmer in her place. When terrorists realize that law enforcement officers are profiling, however,
they are likely to seek operatives who do not match the profile.
Tomorrow's terrorists are unlikely to duplicate yesterday's, and
militantly anti-American Islamic groups apparently have some
ability to use Americans (like John Walker Lindh and Jose
Padilla) and other non-Arabs (like Richard Reid) to carry out
unlawful acts. 5' Profiling may embolden terrorists to believe they
can outsmart the profilers. It then may prove not only ineffective
but counterproductive.
For these reasons, one may doubt that subjecting people of
apparent Arab ethnicity to special scrutiny at airports would be

249 See Jo Thomas, The Oklahoma City Bombing: The Overview;
McVeigh Guilty on All
Counts in the Oklahoma City Bombing; Jury to Weigh Death Penalty, NY Times Al (June
3, 1997); Lois Romano, McVeigh Is Executed; Bomber Is 1st Federal PrisonerPut to Death
Since 1963, Wash Post Al (June 12, 2001).
250 See Laurent Belsie, Reminder in a Vial: Many Terror Threats are Homegrown, The
Christian Sci Mon 2 (Mar 15, 2002) (describing the focus of the ongoing anthrax investigation and noting that '[bletween 1980 and 2000, three-quarters of the nation's 335 suspected terrorist incidents came from domestic groups, not foreign ones, according to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation"); Peter St. John, Air Piracy,Airport Security, and International Terrorism 49-50 (1991) (noting that only 65 of 560 reported airplane hijacking
incidents between 1947 and 1986 were attributed to Palestinians or Islamic fundamentalists).
251 See Evelyn Nieves, A U.S. Convert'sPath from Suburbia to a Gory Jailfor Taliban,
NY Times B1 (Dec 4, 2001) (Lindh); Jodi Wilgoren and Jo Thomas, Traces of Terror: The
Bomb Suspect; from Chicago Gang to Possible Al Qaeda Ties, NY Times A19 (June 11,
2002) (Padilla); Pam Belluck, Crew Grabs Man; Explosives Feared, NY Times Al (Dec 23,
2001) (Reid).
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effective." Assume, however, that it would and that efficiency
would support this ethnic profiling.
This article has criticized the result in Martinez-Fuerte and
maintained that, except in life-threatening emergencies, searches
and seizures based on ethnic classifications should rest on individualized suspicion at least. People of apparent Arab ethnicity
should not be subject to preboarding searches and seizures that
other people avoid.
Columnist Charles Krauthammer describes this view as
"crazy." He says that he "roll[s his] eyes in disbelief' as "the 80year-old Irish nun" is "randomly chosen and subjected to head-totoe searching." He declares, "[W]e are spending 90% of our time
scrutinizing people everyone knows are no threat," and he protests that Americans have exalted "political appearances" over
"real security.""'
There is no denying the truism that the alternative to efficiency is waste, and waste is not to be cheered. Airport screening
makes the trade-off between efficiency and distributive fairness
particularly visible-more visible than it might have been in
Martinez-Fuerte.
Prohibiting the use of ethnic classifications at the MartinezFuerte checkpoint probably would have led the INS to abandon
the checkpoint. Everyone, including some illegal immigrants,
would have driven happily to Los Angeles. Forbidding the use of
ethnic classifications in airport screening, however, has not
brought this screening to an end. It has led to uniform searches,
random searches, and searches on the basis of non-racial, nonethnic standards-standards that sometimes may have swept 80year-old Irish nuns into the net.
Although sacrificing efficiency for distributive fairness causes
economic waste by definition," forbidding ethnic profiling at air2152

The "hijacker profile" used by airport screeners to identify potential hijackers before

1973-a profile based on undisclosed but reportedly nonracial characteristics-has been
called "extremely ineffective." It was far less effective than the mandatory screening of all
passengers that followed it. See Smith, 32 J Marshall L Rev at 171 (cited in note 246).
' Charles Krauthammer, The Case for Profiling, Time Magazine 104 (Mar 18, 2002).
Other columnists have expressed similar views. See Michael Kinsley, When is Racial
Profiling Okay?, Washington Post B7 (Sept 30, 2001); Stanley Crouch, Drawing the Line
on Racial Profiling, NY Daily News 41 (Oct 6, 2001); Stephen J. Singer, Racial Profiling
Also Has a Good Side, Newsday A38 (Sept 25, 2001); Editorial, Profiling Debate Resumes,
Denver Post B6 (Oct 3, 2001).
2' Economists can, however, make both the trade-off and the waste disappear
by
positing that people have a "taste" for justice and by supposing that the only reason for
doing justice is to satisfy this taste. See generally Kaplow and Shavell, 114 Harv L Rev
874-75 (cited in note 219).
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ports need not produce precisely the waste that offends Krauthammer. As this article has noted, gender profiling and age profiling stand on a different footing from racial and ethnic profiling."° If it truly were efficient to exempt 80-year-old women (or all
women and all octogenarians) from intensive airport screening, I
for one would not object. Leaving Irish nuns out of it, the issue
might become whether young men who appear to be Arabs or
Arab-Americans should be subject to some forms of screening
that other young men escape.'
Krauthammer may have assumed that racial, gender, and
age classifications should be treated alike, and whether not-quitealike cases should be treated alike can be a challenging issue.
This article has noted, for example, that the subordination of
blacks in America has given racial profiling a different social
meaning here than it might have elsewhere."' Although discrimination against blacks has made the message of profiling especially troublesome, forbidding the police from "profiling" blacks
but not other minority races and ethnic groups would be offensive. Even if profiling by gender and age should not be equated
with racial profiling, minority races and ethnic groups should be
treated alike.
Imagine, then, a long line of "Arab-looking" young men awaiting search and interrogation at an airport while Charles Krauthammer, other white men, and I move quickly through the
screening considered appropriate for our race, age, and gender."
Although the great majority of the "Arab-looking" men awaiting
special interrogation would be as law-abiding as Krauthammer
and probably more law-abiding than I, Krauthammer apparently
would not feel guilty as he passed them by.
Perhaps Krauthammer would be more uneasy if the line we
passed at the airport consisted of young black men, some of whom
he recognized. Would he think it appropriate to subject black men
to special screening following a suicide bombing causing the

251See text accompanying notes 204-05.

One could add characteristics other than age, gender, and ethnicity to the profile
without significantly altering the legal and ethical issues. No matter how many characteristics the profile included, some Arab-Americans would be subject to screening that others
with identical non-ethnic characteristics would avoid.
257

See text at notes 202-04.

2 Krauthammer and I might rank close to elderly Irish nuns
on the nondangerousness index. We are not only white but also older than Osama bin Laden. We
clearly pose no threat.
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death of thousands by nineteen black terrorists who appeared to
be part of an international organization?
Perhaps one could distinguish the profiling of blacks from the
profiling of Arabs on the ground that blacks bear the scars of
their race's long and continuing subordination in America. Imposing further race-specific indignities on young black men might
seem especially unjust. Even if this racial distinction seemed
plausible, however, one should not act on it. Allowing the profiling of some minority groups and not others seems unthinkable.
Discrimination against blacks remains the paradigm of racial
discrimination in America, and this paradigm properly shapes
the principles that apply to racial profiling generally.
Reasons less defensible than the one just noted might make
the intensive screening of Arabs more acceptable to some Americans than the intensive screening of blacks. Arabs have less political power in the United States and less ability to make their
grievances heard. They are likely to appear more "foreign" and, to
some, more menacing. If sentiments like these led Americans to
restrict the liberty of Arabs although they would not restrict the
liberty of blacks, the distinctive treatment of people of Arab ethnicity would seem especially invidious. As happened with many of
our ancestors, recent and seemingly less assimilated immigrants
would be disfavored.
The line of men at the airport might not be composed of Arabs or blacks. If a large number of white terrorists had bombed
several federal buildings and other facilities, Charles Krauthammer and I might be required to line-up by race while black
men, Asian men, Latino men, Native-American men, and Arab
men passed us by. Krauthammer, a person of consistent principle, has written that he would not resent this profiling,'9 but I
would.
The Supreme Court has held that roadblock stops without
particularized suspicion can be constitutional in some situations
although police stops of individual motorists would not be. °
When the Court first suggested this distinction, Justice
Rehnquist remarked in dissent that the Court had "elevate[d] the
adage 'misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth Amend-

2
260

Krauthammer, The Case for Profiling (cited in note 253).
See, for example, Delaware v Prouse,440 US 648, 661 (1979); MichiganDepartment

of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444, 454-55 (1990); City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US
32, 39-40 (2000).
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2 1 Despite Rehnquist's arresting
ment jurisprudence."
wisecrack,
there is force to the old adage. What Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan call "community burden sharing" is relevant both to the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and to its
ethical justification.
The willingness of the majority to share the burden of a restriction of liberty demonstrates its judgment that the benefits of
this restriction exceed the costs. Majority and minority groups
together pay higher airline ticket prices or taxes, wait in line,
empty their pockets, submit to magnetometer and x-ray screenings, and suffer the confiscation of their nail clippers.
Burden sharing also makes political remedies more likely
when the burden becomes excessive. Although the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of drunk-driving roadblocks,' few law enforcement agencies now inflict the inconvenience and indignity of these roadblocks on middle-class motorists.
The agencies might not have been as quick to abandon similarly
burdensome measures limited to minorities.
The social meaning of burden sharing is that the members of
a community act together-as "one nation indivisible," not just
collected groups with differing actuarial profiles. Burden sharing
demonstrates to people of Arab ethnicity and others that the hassles to which they are subjected do not flow from suspicion of
their appearance or other invidious motives. (In that sense, misery does indeed love company.) Exempting 80-year-old Irish nuns
and others from the burdens of intensive airport screening need
not undercut the sense of democratic sharing when other majority-group passengers assume these burdens. All things considered, Charles Krauthammer and I should take our lumps.

B.

The War on Drugs

Some numbers make apparent the racial cast of the war on
drugs. From 1965 until 1973, the arrest rates of whites and nonwhites for drug offenses increased sharply but equally. Throughout this period, nonwhites were arrested at about twice the rate
281 Prouse,440 US at 664 (Rehnquist dissenting).
212 See Tracey L. Meares and Dan M.
Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197, 209. Meares and
Kahan treat burden sharing as more than a relevant circumstance, and in my view, they
find it where it does not exist. See Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 23844 (cited in note 217).
26 Sitz, 496 US at 454-55.
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of whites. In 1973, however, the arrest rate for whites leveled off
while the rate for nonwhites continued to climb. Fifteen years
later, the rate for nonwhites was five times the rate for whites."
Blacks reportedly constitute about 12 percent of the United
States population, 13 percent of all chronic drug users, 35 percent
of the people arrested for drug possession, 55 percent of the people convicted of drug offenses, and
74 percent of the people sen265
tenced to prison for drug crimes.

A black arrested for a drug offense might cite these numbers
and seek dismissal of his case on grounds of discriminatory
prosecution. The Supreme Court has held, however, that state
and national statistics are insufficiently focused to establish discrimination by local officials."
To overcome the defects of national statistics, a future drug
defendant might present comparable figures for the Kojack Sheriffs Department, a currently nonexistent law enforcement agency
in Ohio. The defendant might show that anonymously selfreported drug use occurs in Kojack County at about the same rate
for blacks and whites, that nearly all users report buying drugs
from sellers of their own races, and that the Kojack Sheriff's Department nevertheless arrests blacks for drug offenses at two,
three, or five times the rate for whites. The defendant might
claim on the basis of this evidence that he would not have been
arrested and prosecuted if he had been white.
Prosecutors might respond that survey evidence is unreliable
and might argue that the defendant's proof is inconclusive in
other ways. Fair-minded people applying a standard of proof less
demanding than "deadbang" or "hogchoker," however, would accept the defendant's claim.
The Kojack statistics, like the national figures, establish a
massive discriminatory effect, and the inference that this disparity did not arise by chance is overwhelming. In the absence of a
nonracial explanation for the disparity, the numbers appear to

264

See Tonry, Malign Neglect at 110-11 and Figure 3-10 (cited in note 213).

20 Deborah Small, The War on Drugs Is a War on Racial Justice, 68 Social
Research

896, 897 (2001), citing Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice:Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs (2000). These numbers are not very well-documented, but there
seems to be no doubt that, as Micheal Tonry observes, "[bilacks ... are arrested and imprisoned for drug crimes in numbers far out of line with their proportions of the general
population, of drug users, and of drug traffickers." Malign Neglect at 4 (cited in note 213).
26 See McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987) (discussed in text accompanying
notes
304-13).
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establish a discriminatory purpose as well as a discriminatory
effect.
When the New York City Police Department began a program of vigorous gun-law enforcement in 1994, critics observed
that it was stopping and frisking blacks and Latinos at a far
higher rate than whites. They charged the department with racial profiling.26 ' In response, the department noted the races of the
people described in 911 calls as carrying guns, the races of the
violent offenders described by crime victims, and the races of the
people the department had arrested for violent crimes. 8
Although the department stopped blacks and Latinos at a
substantially higher rate than their share of the population, its
evidence indicated that its stops were not disproportionate to the
rate at which blacks and Latinos committed serious gun crimes.
In the terms suggested by this article, the department was not
"piling on" or seeking "more bangs for the buck." Disparities in
the races of the people it stopped matched disparities in rates of
offending. The department might have stopped everyone it had
grounds to stop.
If this evidence had stood alone, the analysis proposed by this
article suggests that the department should have borne no further burden of justification. Other evidence revealed, however,
that officers made arrests substantially less frequently after
stopping blacks and Latinos than after stopping whites. This evidence indicated that the police had applied a less demanding
standard of suspicion for stopping minorities. °
Evidence of differing rates of offending of the sort recited by
the New York City Police Department disappears when the focus
shifts from guns to drugs. One can plausibly explain most of the
disparity in the rates at which blacks and whites are arrested
See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Police Practicesand Civil Rights
in
New York City ch 5, 106 (Aug 2000) (declaring that the clear predominance of blacks and
Latinos among the people stopped by the police "strongly suggest[s] that racial profiling
plays some role in the stop and frisk practices of the overall department").
261 See Gross and Livingston, 102 Colum L Rev at 1418 (cited in
note 24) (citing several sources).
269 Responding to a charge of police racial discrimination by citing police arrest
rates is
problematic, for these rates could be the product of discrimination themselves. The arrest
rates, however, apparently did not offer a notably different picture of crime in New York
from the other data. The department's evidence supplied only a crude basis for estimating
the rates at which people carried guns unlawfully, but it did indicate differing rates of
unlawful gun use.
270 See Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry,
Race, and Disorderin New York City, 28 Fordham Urb L J 457, 478 (2000).
211
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and convicted of crimes against the person and property crimes
on the ground that blacks commit these crimes at higher rates
than whites. No informed person believes, however, that different
rates of offending begin to explain the extremely different rates
at which minorities and whites are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and punished for drug crimes.
Michael Tonry writes:
[F]or nearly a decade there has been a near consensus
among scholars and policy analysts that most of the black
punishment disproportions result not from racial bias or
discrimination within the system but from patterns of
black offending and of blacks' criminal records. Drug enforcement is the conspicuous exception. Blacks are arrested and confined in numbers grossly out of line with
their use and sale of drugs.
Although the higher drug-arrest rates of minorities cannot be
explained primarily as a product of their higher rates of offending, people seeking to alibi the racially skewed focus of the war on
drugs have a second line of defense: Higher arrest rates do not
disadvantage minorities. They are instead a form of affirmative
action. Just as the blacks who commit violent crimes victimize
mostly blacks, " the blacks who sell illegal drugs injure mostly
black drug users and black communities. Arresting and prosecuting minorities more frequently than whites and sentencing them
to prison for longer periods may be a special service the government provides to minority victims. Kate Stith writes, "While it
appears true that the enhanced penalties for crack cocaine more
often fall upon black defendants, the' legislature's action might
also have been viewed as a laudatory attempt to provide enhanced protection to those communities-largely black. ..- who
are ravaged by abuse of this potent drug."
Presumably Stith would not suggest that a legislature might
have engaged in laudable affirmative action if it had expressly
provided for sentencing blacks more severely than whites. The
principal beneficiaries of this legislative action also might have
21' Tonry, Malign Neglect at 49 (cited in note 213).
212 See Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law at 19 (cited in note 38) ("IFlour-fifths
of

violent crimes are committed by persons of the same race as their victims.").
273 Kate Stith, The Government Interest in Criminal Law: Whose Interest Is It, Anyway?, in Stephen E. Gottlieb, ed, Public Values in Constitutional Law 137, 153 (Michigan
1993).
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been prospective black victims. Arresting blacks at a higher rate
than the rate at which they commit crimes seems no more defensible as affirmative action than discriminatory sentencing. Moreover, a judiciary that sees little difference between affirmative
action and discrimination against minorities could not consistently accept an "affirmative action" or "victims are minorities
too" defense of race-specific drug-law enforcement.
Another defense of differential drug enforcement appears to
be more persuasive. There may be as much unlawful drug use
among Wall Street traders as among unemployed people on Harlem street corners, but the problems posed by unlawful drug use
in the two places are different. A police commissioner who acknowledged focusing drug-enforcement efforts primarily on inner
city neighborhoods might note the absence on Wall Street of
drive-by shootings, gang loitering, open-air drug dealing, and
twelve-year-olds guarding crack houses with shotguns. The commissioner might report that her department had concentrated its
drug-enforcement efforts, not necessarily in the neighborhoods
where drug use is most frequent, but in the neighborhoods where
drug trafficking is most disruptive.
Without doubting the truth of the commissioner's explanation, one might doubt its completeness. Drug law enforcement is
easier in inner city neighborhoods, both because "more of the routine activities of life, including retail drug dealing, occur on the
streets and alleys" and because "it is easier for undercover narcotics officers to penetrate networks of friends and acquaintances in
poor urban minority neighborhoods."" Moreover, even a moderately higher rate of drug crime in the inner city can lead the police to "pile on." Indeed, perceptions of differential offending can
prompt a "race to the black or brown race" even when these perceptions are inaccurate.
Although the problems associated with drug trafficking in
minority neighborhoods are severe, intensive drug-law enforcement is probably more harmful than helpful to these neighborhoods. I subscribe to only a few of the conspiracy theories circulating in black communities,275 and I am confident that George
Bush, Dick Cheney, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore never met in the
17'

Tonry, Malign Neglect at 105-06 (cited in note
213).

275 See Patricia Turner, I Heard it Through the Grapevine:Rumor in African American

Culture (California 1993); S.Parsons et al, A Test of the Grapevine:An Empirical Examination of Conspiracy Theories Among African-Americans, 19 Sociological Spectrum 201
(1999).
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White House basement to plan the subordination of inner-city
blacks. If they had, however, I wonder whether they could have
done any better than America has done in fact.
A promising plan for subordinating inner-city blacks might
begin by ensuring racially segregated, low quality schools in inner-city neighborhoods. Poor education combined with the disappearance of manufacturing jobs would guarantee a lack of economic opportunity in these neighborhoods. One important economic opportunity would remain, however, for many of the
neighborhoods' residents would be likely to seek the temporary
escape provided by recreational drugs. A key part of the plan
would be punishing the sale of these drugs with life-destroying
penalties, removing many males from the neighborhoods and ensuring that they would not contribute economically or socially to
their families. Additional benefits of the plan would include the
social disruption that would accompany the unlawful drug trade
and the sense of scrutiny, invasion, and mistrust that intrusive
law enforcement would generate.
A potential defect of the plan would be that enforcing the
drug laws might diminish drug use and drug-related violence and
thereby improve the conditions of inner city life. The risk of this
occurrence, however, seems small. Especially when economic opportunities are limited, the arrest and incarceration of one drug
seller would merely enable another to take his place. The pieces
of the plan fit together nicely. 76
The rationales offered for intensive drug-law enforcement in
minority neighborhoods seem unconvincing, and racially skewed
enforcement may be prompted in part by the relative ease of
making drug arrests in minority neighborhoods. It also may be
driven by "more bangs for the bucks" law enforcement strategies.
Nevertheless, a judge probably could not reject the claim that
racial disparities in drug arrest and prosecution rates reflect the
judgment of responsible officials that drugs pose different and
more serious problems in inner city neighborhoods.
The rationales offered by these officials appear to rebut the
inference of discriminatory purpose the unexplained statistics
might support. Officials who accept these rationales do not have
an improper purpose, and a judge could not reasonably find the
officials insincere.
2'6 For discussion of the harmful effects of the drug war on inner city neighborhoods,
see Tracey L. Meares, Social Organizationand Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am Crim L Rev
191, 206-07 (1998).
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Although the analysis proposed by this article places less
emphasis on discriminatory purpose, it would be unlikely to alter
the bottom line. This analysis requires affirmative justification
for systematically searching and arresting minorities at a higher
rate than their rate of offending. When officials concentrate drugenforcement efforts in the neighborhoods most disrupted by drug
activity, however, their practices seem appropriately tailored to
the advancement of a significant state interest. A judge could not
reject the judgment of these officials without substituting her
own debatable views of appropriate drug policy for theirs-and
also for the views of most other officials, many knowledgeable
experts, and most Americans.
Constitutional analysis of the war on drugs leads to discouraging conclusions. In American policing generally and in druglaw enforcement especially, the most harmful racial profiling may
be done by officials behind desks and in legislatures and budget
committees rather than by patrol officers. The evidence needed to
challenge these officials' allocation of law enforcement resources
is rarely available. Administrative decisions beyond the prospect
of effective judicial review may impose greater burdens on minorities than decades of racial abuse by a group of old-style Los
Angeles police officers. The courts probably lack the ability to correct American law enforcement's most serious racial injustice.
C.

Immigration Cases

The use of ethnic classifications in the enforcement of immigration laws seems to produce greater hesitation and provoke
greater disagreement than other instances of racial profiling. Focusing on whether law enforcement practices burden minorities
at a higher rate than their rate of offending may indicate why
immigration cases have proven especially problematic.
Assume that all illegal immigrants residing in a particular
area are Latinos but that most Latinos in this ethnically diverse
area are lawful residents of the United States. In other words, all
offenders are Latinos, but all Latinos are not offenders. In this
area, concentrating law enforcement activity on Latinos would
burden or tax the members of this group at a higher rate than
their share of the area's population but not at a higher rate than
their rate of offending.
In the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, I
have suggested that subjecting the Latino residents of this hypo-

1631

RACIAL PROFILINGAND THE CONSTITUTION

237

thetical area to even brief administrative detention based in
whole or in part on their ethnicity would be unjustified. Nevertheless, on the assumptions set forth above, my view is that law
enforcement officers should not be precluded from considering
ethnicity together with other circumstances in judging whether
reasonable suspicion or probable cause supports a stop or arrest.
On the issue on which the Ninth Circuit's decision in MonteroCamargo1 7 purported to set aside a statement of the Supreme
Court in Brignoni-Ponce,271 I side with the Supreme Court. Unlike

the use of ethnicity in Martinez-Fuerte,the use of ethnicity approved by Brignoni-Ponceseems justified.
Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit neglected half
the issue. The Supreme Court wrote in Brignoni-Ponce,"The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is
high enough [in an area near the Mexican-U.S. border] to make
79
Mexican appearance a relevant factorY.
Emphasizing the in-

crease in the Latino population since Brignoni-Ponce, the Ninth
Circuit pronounced the Supreme Court's empirical judgment no
longer sound: "The likelihood that in an area in which the majority-or even a substantial part-of the population is Hispanic,
any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone
an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance
a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.' °
The question before the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, however, was not simply whether "[tihe likelihood that any
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor." 1 It was also
whether the probability that a person of black, white, AsianAmerican, or Native American ancestry had entered the United
States illegally was low enough to justify a border patrol agent's
decision to focus his attention elsewhere. Both the Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit appeared to overlook the fact that
ethnic classifications exclude as well as include.
The defendant in Montero-Camargowas arrested in a county
whose population was almost three-quarters Latino." The Ninth
Circuit undoubtedly was correct that this defendant's ethnicity
277 United States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc), cert

denied in Sanchez-Guillen v United States, 531 US 889 (2000).
278 United States v Brignoni-Ponce,422 US 873 (1975).
279 Id

at 886-87.

280 208 F3d at 1132.

2
282

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US at 886-87.
Montero-Camargo,208 F3d at 1133.
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had very little tendency to establish his violation of the immigration laws. The size and changing proportion of the county's Latino
population had no bearing at all, however, on whether nonLatinos were sufficiently unlikely to be illegal immigrants that
they usually could be eliminated from the pool of potential suspects. An ethnic classification often gains its power, not from
whom it identifies, but from whom it sets aside.2"
In the hypothetical case described above, all non-Latinos can
be set aside: all of the illegal immigrants in the area are assumed
to be Latinos. In this situation, considering ethnicity in deciding
whether reasonable suspicion justifies a stop does not seem significantly different from considering race when a robbery victim
has described the robber as black.
The two situations do not differ in principle simply because,
in one, law enforcement officers are attempting to identify the
members of a group of offenders and, in the other, only one offender. If a crime victim reported that she recently had been
robbed by six tall young black men, each of them wearing a black
mask and a green coat, the apparent presence in the neighborhood of multiple offenders meeting the victim's description would
only increase the justification for stopping a tall young black man
in a green coat. Moreover, the way in which the group's characteristics became known seems immaterial. When information
from a source other than an eyewitness is as reliable as the
statements of a witness, an officer should not be precluded from
considering it.
To be sure, the members of a criminal group are unlikely to
share many physical characteristics, and a description of their
common characteristics is likely to be thin. For this reason, the
description may not provide much affirmative justification for
seizing or questioning anyone-no more, perhaps, than the victim's description of the single offender in Oneonta. Just as the
police should be allowed to use the Oneonta victim's description
together with other circumstances, however, they should be allowed to use what they know about the common characteristics of
a group of offenders. Although the victim's description in Oneonta
consisted essentially of race, age, and gender, this description
should have excluded non-blacks, older men, and all women from

283

Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston observe, "While a suspect's race alone is never

proof of guilt, a suspect's race is frequently powerful evidence of innocence." Gross and
Livingston, 102 Colum L Rev at 1428 (cited in note 24).
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the pool of suspects.' Similarly, the police should be permitted to
use their knowledge of the characteristics of a group of offenders
to exclude from suspicion people lacking these characteristics.
Of course the hypothetical case just discussed was oversimplified. In the world as it is, all immigration offenders do not belong to the same ethnic group. When real-world immigration
cases depart from the hypothetical model, the use of ethnic classifications in immigration law enforcement becomes more problematic.
In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court assumed that the
world as it is was close to the model. It repeated the government's
estimate "that 85% of the aliens illegally in the country are from
Mexico." In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court emphasized in addition
that the justification for considering Latino ethnicity varies from
place to place: "Different considerations would arise if... reliance
were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated
near the Canadian border." For the Court, the relevant geographic territory was the area near the Mexican-United States
border, and it assumed that illegal immigration there had a
brown face.
The government's claim in Brignoni-Poncethat 85 percent of
the illegal aliens in the United States were from Mexico was
probably too high.87 The Immigration and Nationalization Service
recently put the figure at about 50 percent.m Latinos, howevera very different category from Mexican nationals-appear to constitute 83 percent or more of the illegal immigrants in the United
States.29
Revise the demographics of our hypothetical area so that Latinos constitute only 50 rather than 100 percent of the illegal
immigrants. Latinos in this area still are much more likely to
have committed immigration offenses than the members of other
groups, so a policy of "more bangs for the buck" might focus law
24 As noted above, it probably did not. Law enforcement
officers apparently confronted
older black men, people of color who were not black, and at least one woman in addition to
people who matched the suspect's description. See text accompanying notes 101-12.
2S5 422 US at 879 (citation
omitted).
2
428 US at 564 n 17.
2"7 See Johnson, 78 Wash U L Q at 708 (cited in note 38).
m United States Department of Justice, 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration
and NaturalizationService 241 at table 1, 242 (2002).
289 See id (estimating that in 1997 3,585,000 illegal immigrants were citizens of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and
Peru while 721,000 others-some of whom may have been Latino-were citizens of other
nations).
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enforcement efforts mostly or entirely on them. In this area, however, a classification based on Latino ethnicity would not have
much legitimate power to exclude, and concentrating law enforcement efforts on Latinos would burden them at a rate considerably higher than their rate of offending. In this area, despite
the probable efficiency gain, focusing exclusively on Latinos
would be unjust.
Analysis of the differential burdens imposed on the members
of an ethnic group requires specification of the relevant geographic area-a task vaguely resembling that of specifying the
relevant market in antitrust litigation. Whether the federal government has unfairly burdened Latinos throughout the United
States is a significant but difficult-to-resolve question. Under the
Supreme Court's equal protection decisions, moreover, the answer to this question would be unlikely to bear on whether any
individual offender could secure judicial relief.'
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the press reported that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service had assigned about eight
thousand agents to police the southern border of the United
States while only about three hundred agents policed the nation's
far lengthier northern border." Did this allocation of resources
reflect a judgment that illegal immigration across the Mexican
border was twenty-seven times more frequent than illegal immigration across the Canadian border? Perhaps it did, but the INS's
allocation of agents might have reflected a policy of "more bangs
for the buck" or "piling on" as well as a judgment about the frequency of unlawful immigration. The agency's distribution of resources might even have reflected a greater concern about illegal
immigration by dark-skinned people than by light-skinned people. Proving that the INS's allocation of agents reflected anything
other than its best judgment about the frequency of illegal immigration probably would be impossible. As with the deployment of
law enforcement resources in the war on drugs, administrative
decisions beyond the prospect of effective judicial review might
have imposed unfair burdens on minorities.
From the perspective of an individual INS agent, the percentage of Latinos among the illegal immigrant population of the
United States as a whole is immaterial. Her allocation of law en29 See McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987) (discussed in text accompanying notes
304-13).
291 See Sam Howe Verhovek, A Nation Challenged: The Northern Border: Vast U.S.-

Canada BorderSuddenly Poses a Problem to PatrolAgents, NY Times Bi (Oct 4, 2001).
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forcement resources-the allocation of her attention, energy, and
time-is much more likely to rest on her sense of the proportion
of Latinos among the unlawful immigrants traveling on a single
highway or harvesting crops in a single area. When this agent's
decisions are challenged, the relevant geographic area is only the
area before her.
Even on a highway near the southern border, all illegal immigrants are unlikely to be Latinos. Some non-Latinos do enter
the United States illegally through Mexico.9 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's judgment in Brignoni-Poncethat the great majority of immigration offenders near the border are Latinos seems
sound. An agent's focus on Latinos taxes the members of this
group at a rate only slightly higher than their rate of offending.
When reasonable suspicion or probable cause supports a stop or
arrest, the efficiency gain resulting from the exclusion of nonLatinos seems great enough to justify the resulting ethnic tax.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Montero-Camargothat Border
Patrol agents near the border could not consider Latino ethnicity
in making stops and arrests made perjury by these agents almost
inevitable. Directing agents not to think about ethnicity in investigating immigration violations near the border resembles instructing a child not to think about hippopotamuses. MonteroCamargo demanded the impossible and then encouraged agents
to swear that they had done it.
A more plausible ruling would have been that, although officers could consider Latino ethnicity, they could not rely on this
ethnicity, even in part, to provide affirmative justification for a
stop or arrest. 3 By declaring the officers' thoughts irrelevant, this
ruling would have emphasized that the standard for judging
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is usually objective. This ruling not only would have declared the officers' mental processes
off-limits, however; it also would have recognized that the officers
could legitimately exclude non-Latinos from the suspect pool (or
could focus less attention on them) and in that respect could treat
Latinos and non-Latinos differently. At the same time, the revised ruling would have declared that the affirmative probative
292

See David W. Haines and Karen E. Rosenblum, Introduction: ProblematicLabels,

Volatile Issues, in David W. Haines and Karen E. Rosenblum, eds, Illegal Immigration in
America: A Reference Handbook 1, 3 (Greenwood 1999).
2
Most of the Montero-Camargo opinion appears to be consistent with this reformulation of the Ninth Circuit's holding. The court may not have considered the difference between a few of its statements and this reformulation.
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value of Latino ethnicity was negligible-so small that it could
not establish reasonable suspicion in any case in which an officer
could not establish reasonable suspicion without it.
Envisioning a case in which the ethnicity of a vehicle's occupants would make lawful an otherwise unlawful stop of this vehicle is difficult. Assume that an agent cannot lawfully stop a battered station wagon simply because it is transporting a halfdozen Latino men in work clothes.29 Something more-something
like the evasive conduct of the driver in Montero-Camargo itself-is needed. The concurring judges in Montero-Camargo emphasized that the evasive conduct of the driver in that case would
establish reasonable suspicion regardless of the ethnicity of the
suspects." A case in which ethnicity might tip the balance between a lawful and an unlawful vehicle stop does not readily
come to mind-especially when the stop occurs in a county in
which most of the residents are Latino.
Pedestrian stops differ, however, from vehicle stops. A pedestrian stop based on a suspect's physical appearance often may
have a stronger basis than a vehicle stop based on an agent's
view of the moving vehicle and its mostly concealed occupants.
One INS agent claims that a Latino wearing shoes with wooden
soles and socks made of lower grade cotton than is sold in the
United States is highly likely to have entered the United States
illegally.'
Assume that this agent's empirical judgment is sound and
that an INS agent truly can discern the quality of a suspect's
socks by observing him. Could Latino ethnicity, wooden-soled
shoes, and low-grade cotton socks provide the suspicion needed to
justify a brief investigative stop? If, after observing both a black
man and a Latino man wearing wooden-soled shoes and lowgrade cotton socks, an agent stopped the Latino, would the agent
have deprived this suspect of the equal protection of the laws?
At first glance, the case of the Latino in the wooden-soled
shoes may appear closer to that of the young man from Pothole
than to the case of the black man in the green coat. Under almost
every definition of the term, "wooden-soles plus cheap-socks plus
ethnicity" qualifies as profiling. When an officer stops a suspect

See Nicacio v INS, 797 F2d 700, 704 (9th Cir 1985).

295 208 F3d at 1140 (Kozinski concurring).

Interview with Robert Martin, Special Agent of the Immigration and Nationalization Service (Oct 22, 2001).
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on the basis of his ethnicity and two other innocent characteristics, the officer is engaged in ethnic profiling.
The case of the Latino in the wooden-soled shoes differs from
that of the young man from Pothole, however, in two respects.
First, if one can fairly assume that nearly all of the illegal immigrants near the Mexican-United States border are Latino, the
stop of the Latino in wooden-soled shoes does not tax Latinos at a
significantly higher rate than their rate of offending. Unlike the
police in Pothole, the INS agent does not allow many offenders of
a race or ethnicity other than that of the suspect to proceed without interference. This agent has not focused on one ethnicity simply because, in his view, this group's higher rate of offending
promises more bangs for the buck. He reasonably assumes that,
in the area he has reason to consider, offenders of an ethnicity
other than the suspect's are almost nonexistent.
Second, the suspect's socks and wooden-soled shoes differentiate him from the vast majority of lawful Latino residents of the
area. Although some lawful visitors, temporary residents, and
recent immigrants may own footwear bought in Mexico (and although other lawful residents may too), stopping Latinos with
wooden-soled shoes imposes a far smaller tax on the innocent
than stopping people simply for being young, black, male, and on
the streets of Pothole after 10:00 p.m.
As noted, even the practice of stopping suspects who match
eyewitness descriptions is likely to tax innocent blacks at a
higher rate than innocent whites. If the "wooden-sole, cheap-sock"
profile identifies offenders with the same degree of accuracy as a
witness's listing of a criminal's physical characteristics, the differential burden imposed on innocent Latinos by stopping people
who meet this profile is no greater than that imposed on innocent
blacks when the police stop black suspects who meet a witness's
description. For reasons already explained, the case of the Latino
in wooden-soled shoes cannot be distinguished from that of the
black man in the green coat simply because, in one case, the police are investigating a large group of offenders and, in the other,
only one. Nor can the cases be distinguished on the ground that
the statement of a witness should be treated differently from
other evidence of equal strength.
As suggested earlier in this article,' a stronger distinction is
that the social meaning of the "shoe sole, sock fabric" profile dif2' See text accompanying notes 188-208.
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fers from that of the "green coat" witness description. The profile
declares that Latinos (or at least Latinos in a particular area) are
more likely to be immigration offenders than other people. A witness's description of a black robber does not declare that blacks
are more likely to be robbers than anyone else.
Although officially declaring the members of an ethnic group
more likely than the members of other groups to commit crimes
(or to commit particular sorts of crime) can be harmful, I would
not categorically prohibit actions that convey this troublesome
message. Moreover, this message seems less troublesome when
the crime associated with the group is illegal immigration than
when it is a drug offense or a crime of violence.
Illegal immigration appears to be the ultimate malum prohibitum offense; a person who, without force, disobeys a law she
had no voice in making so that she can work hard at low wages to
provide subsistence for herself and her family hardly seems culpable. Some Americans nevertheless manage to view illegal immigrants harshly."9 The association of Latino ethnicity with illegal immigration is indeed a harmful stereotype. When profiling
implies that Latinos are more likely than others to have entered
the United States illegally, however, it probably does less harm
than when profiling suggests that either blacks or Latinos are
more likely than others to have committed serious crimes.
If the "shoe sole, sock fabric" profile identifies illegal immigrants with the high degree of accuracy the INS agent claimed, I
would permit the use of this profile. An officer who observes a
Latino in the vicinity the border wearing wooden-soled shoes and
low-grade cotton socks should be allowed to stop this suspect for
further investigation. This stop would not be an unreasonable
seizure and would not deny the suspect the equal protection of
the laws. My position apparently differs from that of President
George W. Bush, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Senator Hatch,

Particularly in areas near the border, the belief that predatory criminals from Mexico make short-term and long-term incursions into the United States contributes to this
view, as does the belief that some people cross the border in the hope of collecting welfare.
Many Americans, however, take a less harsh view of unlawful immigrants. Over the objection that doing so facilitates illegal immigration, several U.S. cities have approved the use
of identification cards issued by Mexican consulates and employed primarily by undocumented aliens. The sponsor of the Chicago ordinance declared, "The ultimate benefit that
occurs is the support that it gives to the hardworking Mexican citizens here in Chicago.
Their labor ...is a tremendous resource all across not only our city but our region." Sabrina L. Miller and Oscar Avila, City Gives its Blessing to Mexican Consulate IDs, Chi Trib
1 (June 20, 2002).
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all of whom have condemned racial profiling. " No one should call
me a liberal.
This section has noted that the trade-off between justice and
efficiency is especially thorny in some immigration cases. The
Supreme Court's off-hand talk of rational relationship in Martinez-Fuerte exhibited a marked insensitivity to distributive concerns. Although using ethnic classifications in genuinely unobtrusive police investigations might be justified by something less
than individualized suspicion, involuntary detention based in
part on ethnicity should require reasonable suspicion or more. At
the same time, some ethnic profiles (the "wooden-sole, cheapsock" profile may be an example) would neither permit many offenders of an ethnicity other than the suspect's to escape nor subject many innocent people of the suspect's ethnicity to detention.
In terms of tangible burdens (though not in terms of social meaning), the use of such a profile to establish the suspicion needed for
a stop does not seem significantly different from the use of an
eyewitness description. I believe that the use of this profile
should be allowed. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Montero-Camargo, ethnicity can play a legitimate role both in excluding some people from the pool of immigration suspects and in determining the affirmative justification for a seizure.
XI. STANDING AND REMEDIES

A. Statistics and Standing
1. Heartache by the numbers.
Police officers rarely confess to racial profiling, and litigants
often rely on statistical evidence to establish this practice. The
cost in time, energy, and resources of developing this evidence is
great enough that the process serves as an effective barrier to
litigation for most victims. Moreover, even when statistical evidence establishes unlawful profiling, drawing inferences about
the circumstances of particular cases from this aggregate proof
can be problematic.
Suppose, for example, that one hundred whites and one hundred blacks are distinguished from one another only by their
color. All two hundred have engaged in the same conductexceeding the speed limit by precisely ten miles per hour. The
2

See notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
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Kojack Sheriff's Department has stopped and searched thirty-five
of the blacks but only twenty of the whites. The department has
repeated this pattern day after day for years.
The department's action has had a discriminatory effect, and
the inference that this disparity did not arise by chance is all but
inescapable. In this situation, statistical evidence establishes discriminatory intent as well as discriminatory effect. Yet whether
anyone has standing to challenge the constitutional violation (as
either a civil rights plaintiff or a defendant seeking the suppression of evidence) is unclear.
The analysis that follows begins by taking the perspective of
a decision maker who is not wary of statistical proof. It considers
whether, in the case of the Kojack Sheriff's Department, the numerical evidence would establish anyone's standing by a preponderance of the evidence. Then I examine modifications and departures from the initial analysis, some of them affording standing to
a greater number of people and some to fewer.
The evidence of profiling by the Kojack deputies does not reveal which blacks they would have searched and which they
would not if they had respected the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the absence of discrimination, the deputies probably would have
searched the same number of blacks as whites. That is, they
would have searched twenty blacks, a majority of the thirty-five
they did search. Accordingly, none of the blacks searched can
show a greater than 50 percent likelihood that she would not
have been searched if the department had obeyed the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the department violated the Constitution,
no one may have standing to challenge its unlawful action.
Hofeldian logic to the contrary notwithstanding, a legal wrong
may not imply a legal right. Although, more probably than not,
the Kojack deputies wronged fifteen people, they did not wrong
any identifiable individual more probably than not.
Suppose, however, that the Kojack department had searched
forty-five blacks rather than thirty-five and that it still had
searched only twenty whites. The best inference now would be
that most of the blacks searched by the department would not
have been searched if the deputies had obeyed the Constitution.
Because blacks would have been searched more than twice as
often as whites, every one of the forty-five blacks could demonstrate that, more probably than not, she would not have been
searched if the deputies had obeyed the law. All forty-five therefore seem entitled to a remedy-damages, an injunction, the ex-
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clusion of evidence the deputies obtained by violating the Constitution, or perhaps a dismissal of criminal charges.
The use of statistical proof to establish standing builds toward a tipping point. Until blacks are more than twice as likely
as whites to be stopped or searched, no one seems to have standing to challenge the constitutional violation. A 51 percent chance
that law enforcement officers infringed one's rights establishes
standing, but a 49 percent chance does not. As long as the sheriff's department stops short of this two-to-one disparity, no individual can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
department violated her rights.
When the department goes one search over the line, however,
the seesaw tips. Every black the deputies have searched now can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that these officers
did violate her rights. On the down side of the tipping point, conventional standing requirements leave much proven racial discrimination unremedied. On the up side, courts afford a remedy
to some people who would have been treated no differently if the
deputies had obeyed the law.
This analysis does not reflect the wariness of statistical proof
that courts often exhibit. In a hypothetical case often discussed
by the commentators, a negligently driven blue bus injured the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff established that the defendant company operated 80 percent of the blue buses in the area at the time
of the injury. After examining cases resembling this one in the
reports, Charles Nessen concluded, "[Tlhe plaintiff will lose; in
fact the case is unlikely even to reach the jury."' The skeptical
view of numerical proof taken in the "blue bus" cases might leave
even more discrimination by the police unremedied than the initial statistical analysis suggested. A 51 percent statistical probability that the police violated someone's rights might not establish her standing.
The case of the Kojack Sheriff's Department, however, seems
distinguishable from the case of the mystery bus. The sheriff's
department did wrong someone, but the bus company might not
have wronged anyone. A court might be more tolerant of the use
of numerical proof to establish one person's standing than to establish a defendant's fault. Forcing a wrongdoer to provide a
remedy to someone he might not have injured seems less objecCharles Nessen, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 Harv L Rev 1357, 1379 (1985).
3o
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tionable than erroneously declaring an innocent person (or entity)
a wrongdoer.
2. The standing of blacks.
Courts have been especially skeptical of numerical proof of
discrimination against blacks in the criminal justice system. In
Portsmouth, Virginia, for example, where one third of the population was black, 84 percent of the people arrested for selling liquor
illegally were black. °' A 50-year-old widow, arrested for selling
two cans of beer in her home, resisted great pressure to plead
guilty, was convicted at trial, and was sentenced to sixty days'
imprisonment. She later filed a federal civil rights action pro se,
alleging among other things that undercover police officers often
infiltrated black social clubs to discover liquor violations but
never infiltrated comparable white social clubs. Judge Butzner, in
dissent, argued that the plaintiff had alleged enough to obtain
discovery, 2 but the Fourth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Portsmouth Chief of Police and other
defendants. The court endorsed the district court's conclusions
that the plaintiff's allegations were "vague and conclusory" and
"unsupported by factual allegations.'3
Thirty-one years before the United States Supreme Court
decided McCleskey v Kemp,"' a black man who had been sentenced to death for raping a white woman challenged Florida's
discriminatory use of the death penalty. He alleged in a state habeas corpus petition that during the previous twenty years at
least twenty-three blacks and only one white had been executed
for rape. Although juries consistently had recommended capital
punishment for black men convicted of raping white women,
black men convicted of raping black women and white men convicted of raping anyone almost invariably escaped the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court said of the petitioner's allegations, "To a sociologist or a psychologist in some fields of research
they would no doubt have value, but in a court of law as presented they are devoid of force or effect."0 0
30'Butler v Cooper, 554 F2d 645, 648-49 (4th Cir 1977) (Butzner dissenting).

"o Id at 648.
W3

554 F2d at 646.

304

481 US 279 (1987).

30' Copeland v Mayo, 87 So 2d 501, 503 (Fla 1956). See Maxwell v Bishop, 398 F2d 138,

147 (8th Cir 1968) (Blackmun) ("We are not yet ready to condemn and upset the result
reached in every case of a negro rape defendant in the State of Arkansas on the basis of
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McCleskey was another habeas corpus action in which the
petitioner alleged racial discrimination in the administration of
the death penalty." The Supreme Court accepted for purposes of
decision a statistical demonstration by David Baldus and others
that people who killed whites in Georgia were several times more
likely to be sentenced to death than people who killed blacks."°'
This disparity could not be explained by nonracial differences
among the cases. The Court assumed, moreover, that it should
treat discrimination among defendants on the basis of the races
of their victims no differently from discrimination on the basis of
their own races. °' Although the empirical evidence in McCleskey
seemed at first glance to go far beyond the "tipping point," the
Court held that the petitioner had not established a violation of
his rights. "
Just as aggregate proof cannot identify which people the government would have treated differently if it had obeyed the Constitution, it cannot identify which governmental officials violated
the law. When the Kojack Sheriff's Department has searched
blacks far more often than whites, one cannot know which officers within the department were responsible for the discrimination. Perhaps all of the Kojack officers engaged in racial profiling,
but perhaps the actions of only a few officers accounted for the
entire racial disparity.
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court emphasized this weakness
of statistical evidence. Noting that "[elach jury is unique in its
composition," it refused to infer from the statewide pattern that
the petitioner's jury had engaged in purposeful discrimination.310
Similarly, "The District Attorney is elected by the voters in a particular county. . . . Thus, any inference from statewide statistics

to a prosecutorial 'policy' is of doubtful relevance.""
broad theories of social and statistical justice."), vacated, 398 US 262 (1970). But see
Callins v Collins, 510 US 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun dissenting) ("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.").
30 McClesky, 481 US at 285-86, 291.
307 See id at 287, 281 n7.
308 It is not obvious that classifying defendants on the basis of the races of their victims classifies the defendants themselves by race, nor is it obvious that blacks who have
killed whites should have standing to challenge discrimination against black victims.
Murderers are odd surrogate champions of victims' rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court did not mention this issue, perhaps because classifying offenders on the basis of the
races of their victims would violate the Equal Protection Clause under any standard.
309 Id at 313.
310 481 US at 294.
311 Id at 295 n 15.
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If the Supreme Court had been presented with the same evidence of discrimination in rape sentencing that the Florida Supreme Court considered three decades earlier, the Court apparently would have reached the same result. The proof that only
black men were sentenced to death for rape in Florida consisted
of statewide statistics. Presumably the Court would have refused
to draw an inference from this evidence that any particular jury
or prosecutor's office had taken account of a defendant's race in
deciding that he should die.
The Court recognized that collective entities can discriminate. Discrimination by one or more decision makers within a
corporate employer or a jury commission is discrimination by the
corporate employer or the commission itself.1 2 In McCleskey, however, the Court refused to anthropomorphize the State of Georgia
and to attribute a discriminatory purpose to the state. The relevant entities were individual juries and particular prosecutors'
offices.
How the Court determines which non-breathing entities can
harbor a discriminatory purpose is something of a mystery. It
may use the Goldilocks method. A litigant need not identify a
particular individual who has acted with a discriminatory purpose, yet aggregated proof of discrimination by all agencies of the
state acting together is too crude. The individual is too small, and
the State of Georgia is too big. The Fulton County District Attorney's office is just right. Proof of a pattern of discrimination by a
prosecutor's office might entitle a capital defendant to a remedy
even if, because of a recent change in personnel, no act or decision
of any current employee or of anyone who prosecuted the defendant's case contributed to the statistical proof. '3
However strongly statewide statistics encompassing more
than one agency established racial profiling, this evidence apparently would not entitle anyone to a remedy. If proof of profiling by

id at 293-94.
Perhaps courts do not consider statistical evidence of discrimination by a particular

312 See
313

agency because they regard the agency itself as the relevant actor. They may instead
conclude that birds of a feather are flocked together and may infer from the statistical
evidence that an individual responsible for the challenged decision herself discriminated.
On either hypothesis, an agency can properly respond to statistical evidence by showing
that changes of personnel and policy prior to the challenged decision made the proposed
inference from this evidence improper. Similarly, when a litigant seeks injunctive relief,
the agency may show that changes of personnel and policy have eliminated the threat of
repeated wrongdoing.
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a particular agency passed the "tipping point," however,
McCleskey indicates that judicial relief would be appropriate.
3. The standing of whites.,
In McCleskey, although the statistical evidence seemed at
first glance to go beyond the "tipping point," the Supreme Court
found a way to deny relief. In affirmative action cases, the Court
has found a way to afford relief even when the evidence appears
at first glance to fall short of the "tipping point." A litigant seeking an injunction against unlawful affirmative action need not
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that, absent the
alleged discrimination, she would have obtained the benefit
sought (admission to a public university, a government job, or a
government contract).
In the Court's view, the constitutional wrong in affirmative
action cases does not consist of granting a governmental benefit
on a discriminatory basis. The Court explained in Northeastern
Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractorsof America
v Jacksonville"4 :
The "injury in fact" in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit . . . [It] is the inability to compete on an
equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract.1 '
The Court's reasoning suggests that a litigant challenging
racial profiling by the police should not be required to show that,
in the absence of this profiling, the police would not have stopped
and searched. her. It should be sufficient for her to show that she
was unable to compete on an equal footing for the benefit of not
being stopped and searched by the police. Perhaps every black
motorist stopped and searched by the Kojack deputies should
have standing without regard to whether she would have been
stopped in the absence of discrimination.16
314 508 US 656 (1993). See also Regents of the University of California v Bakke,
438 US

265, 280 n 14 (1978); Adarand Constructorsv Pena, 515 US 200, 211 (1995).
315

508 US at 666.

316

Perhaps black motorists who were not stopped should have standing as well. They

too were unable to compete on an equal footing. Under Associated General Contractors,it
may be enough that officials looked at them differently. Like everyone who applies for
admission to a state university, everyone who drives down the highway may be entitled to
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A court might also treat a clear and substantial risk that a
person had been stopped on the basis of her race as an injury
warranting a judicial remedy. In a mass tort case in which the
plaintiffs established a significant but smaller than 50 percent
chance that each defendant's wrong caused their injuries, the
California Supreme Court required each defendant to pay a proportionate share of the plaintiffs' damages."7 At least one scholar
has maintained that a demonstrated likelihood of developing a
disease in the future should be compensable."'8 Neither approving
proportionate compensation nor recognizing risk itself as an injury seems to justify granting an indivisible remedy like the suppression of evidence or dismissal of charges. Nevertheless, a recent Harvard Law Review note supported treating a risk that a
litigant had been the victim of unconstitutional discrimination as
a justiciable harm. It contended that proof of this harm should
lead to a limited remedy-a requirement that the offending
agency establish guidelines and procedures to correct its discrimination and to the collection of data to determine whether the
guidelines and procedures had worked."'
4. Different rules for different remedies.
In 1999, in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court retreated a bit from the logic of its earlier affirmative action decisions. In Texas v Lesage,"' the Court distinguished between injunctive and damage actions and held that a litigant challenging
an affirmative action plan cannot recover damages unless, in the
absence of discrimination, she would have qualified for the benefit sought."' Perhaps the use of improper standards alone does not
result in economic injury, but as Ashutosh Bhagwat has observed, when the Supreme Court refused to allow even nominal
the use of colorblind standards. If, however, a court would not allow a successful white
applicant to a state university to challenge color-conscious admission standards, it should
not allow a black motorist whom the police did not stop to challenge their color-conscious
law enforcement standards.
...See Sindell v Abbott Laboratories,607 P2d 924, 936-38 (Cal 1980); but see Skipworth v Lead IndustriesAssociation, 690 A2d 169, 172-73 (Pa 1997).
'" See Glen Robinson, ProbabilisticCausationand Compensationfor TortiousRisk, 14
J Legal Stud 779, 782-83 (1985); but see Board of Education v A, C & S, Inc, 546 NE2d
580, 587 (Ill 1989) ("The dangerousness which creates a risk of harm is insufficient standing alone to award damages in either strict products liability or negligence.").
319 Note, ConstitutionalRisks to Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice System,
114
Harv L Rev 2098, 2118 (2001).
320528 US 18 (1999).
3' Id at 21.
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damages in Lesage, it failed to treat on an equal footing the right
"to compete on an equal footing."
A black motorist stopped by the Kojack Sheriff's Department
might be able to secure an injunction against racial profiling even
if she probably would have been stopped in the absence of this
profiling. To secure this relief, however, she would be required to
show not only a past denial of her right to colorblind considera'
tion but also "a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.
When a plaintiff could avoid repetition of the constitutional violation by obeying the criminal law, the Court has hesitated to find a
sufficient threat."' It has not exhibited the same reluctance, however when repetition of the constitutional violation depended on a
second arrest for a traffic offense.31 5 The Court also has been reluctant to find a sufficient threat when only a small minority of a
police department's officers might have engaged in an unconstitutional practice.22 Nevertheless, a victim of racial profiling who
regularly travels the highway where the violation occurred, walks
in the neighborhood where it occurred, or passes the checkpoint
where it occurred probably faces a sufficient threat of repeated
injury.
As noted above, a litigant who sought an injunction against
racial profiling might obtain relief even if the police probably
would have searched her in the absence of this practice. A litigant
seeking damages, a dismissal of charges, or the suppression of
evidence, however, apparently must pass the "tipping point" and
show that she probably would not have been searched or prosecuted absent the constitutional violation. This requirement seems
appropriate at least for a defendant seeking the suppression of
evidence or dismissal. Unlike damages, an adjustable remedy
that can be scaled down to "nominal" relief, suppression and dismissal are all-or-nothing remedies. They should be available only
when the government would not have seized the challenged evidence or filed charges against the defendant if the police had
obeyed the Constitution. Incriminating evidence and criminal
charges cannot be the "fruit" of a constitutional violation-not
even of a denial of the right to compete on an equal footing32 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Injury Without Harm: Texas v. Lesage and the Strange World

ofArticle III Injuries, 28 Hastings Const L Q 445, 452-53 (2001).
32 City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95, 102 (1983), quoting O'Shea v Littleton, 414
US 488, 496 (1974).
324 See O'Shea, 414 US at 496-97.
325 See Lyons, 461 US at 105-06, 107-08.
326

See id at 105-07.
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when the government probably would have obtained the evidence
and filed the charges regardless of its violation of the right.
B. Remedies
A litigant challenging racial profiling who crosses the standing minefield is unlikely to find the Emerald City on the other
side. Although the retrospective remedies available for racial profiling (suppression of evidence, dismissal of charges, and monetary damages) may match those available for other constitutional
violations, devising an effective prospective remedy for racial profiling challenges the capacities of the courts.
1. The suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence.
A victim of racial profiling who passes the "tipping point"
should be entitled to the suppression of whatever evidence the
police have obtained by violating the Constitution. If the Supreme Court were to reconsider Whren and recognize that racial
discrimination can make a search or seizure unreasonable,"7 the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would itself supply this
remedy in many situations. Requiring a victim of discrimination
to invoke another constitutional provision would not make the
exclusionary remedy less appropriate. Police violations of the
Equal Protection Clause warrant an effective remedy no less than
police violations of the Fourth Amendment. 38 To say that the Supreme Court would have no principled basis for refusing to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, however, is not to predict that the Court would exclude it.
2. The dismissal of charges.
A criminal defendant who establishes that purposeful discrimination produced his arrest and prosecution often should be
entitled, not simply to the suppression of evidence, but to dismissal of the charges against him. Selective prosecution on the
basis of race is a generally recognized, if rarely successful, de-

327 See text accompanying notes 116-23.
38 See State v Soto, 734 A2d 350, 360 (NJ Super 1996) (suppressing evidence when
statistical evidence established "an officially sanctioned or de facto policy of targeting
minorities for investigation and arrest"), quoting State v Kennedy, 558 A2d 834 (NJ Super
1991).
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fense to criminal prosecution, 32 and courts should treat discrimination by officials other than prosecutors no more favorably than
discrimination by prosecutors themselves. Indeed, courts generally afford much less deference to law enforcement officers than
to prosecutors.330 Discrimination by law enforcement officers, like
discrimination by prosecutors, results in the prosecution of one
group and exemption of another. This
evil warrants the same
31
I
it.
produces
who
of
remedy regardless
A footnote to the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong declared that the Court had "never determined whether dismissal of
the indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a
court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race."33 In 1886, however, in Yick Wo v
Hopkins,3 the Court did determine that release from custody was
appropriate when governmental discrimination had led to a prisoner's prosecution and conviction. In Yick Wo as in cases of racial
profiling by law enforcement officers, the government's discrimiSee Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:Discovering the Pitfalls
of Armstrong, 73 Chi-Kent L Rev 605 (1998).
30 For example, prosecutors, unlike police officers, are absolutely immune from actions to recover civil damages for their violations of the Constitution, see Imbler v Pachman, 424 US 409, 427 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule reaches only
constitutional violations by the police. See United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 922-25
(1984); Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 347-49 (1987); Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1, 15 (1995).
331 Without declaring that the constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence extends to police officers, the Supreme Court has held prosecutors responsible for
the failure of the police to disclose this evidence. See Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437
(1995) (imposing on prosecutors "a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others
acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police" and-very strangelydeclaring it beyond "serious doubt that procedures and regulations can be established to
carry [the prosecutor's] burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on
each case to every lawyer who deals with it."). Similarly, when unlawful police discrimination causes prosecutors to file charges on an unequal basis, courts might hold the prosecutors responsible for the resulting discrimination. Rather than recognize "selective targeting" by the police as a distinct defense, they might use the more familiar term, selective
prosecution. Implying that the defense is one of discrimination by prosecutors rather than
police officers, however, would be unfortunate. Focusing responsibility for police discrimination on the people who did it seems preferable to imposing a vicarious responsibility for
police actions that prosecutors might have been unable to control.
517 US at 461 n 2. The Court did not indicate what "other sanction" it thought
might be appropriate. Perhaps the Court could jettison its customary view of separation of
powers, permit a judge to enjoin discrimination by a prosecutor's office, and authorize the
judge to monitor the frequency and vigor of the office's prosecution of people of races other
than the defendant's. Or perhaps a court could convict a defendant despite the fact that he
had been "prosecut[ed] on the basis of his race" and then award damages for him to spend
in the prison commissary. Approving this second remedy apparently would require the
Supreme Court to abrogate the absolute immunity from civil liability it has afforded
prosecutors.
3
118 US 356 (1886).
329
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nation had occurred before the prisoner's case reached the prosecutor's office.
A San Francisco ordinance forbade the operation of a laundry
in a wooden building without the consent of the Board of Supervisors. Two citizens of China, convicted and imprisoned for violating this ordinance, sought release on habeas corpus, one in a
state and the other in a federal court. The prisoners alleged that
the Board of Supervisors had denied their requests and those of
two hundred of their countrymen to operate laundries. The Board
had granted the requests of all non-Chinese applicants but one.'3
In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court determined that the Board had
administered the ordinance "with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State" of the equal
protection of the laws,"' and it also determined the appropriate
remedy for this violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court wrote, "The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the
public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is
... illegal, and they must be discharged."33'

When police officers, administering facially neutral laws, effectively "license" the members of one race and not another to
pass a checkpoint, drive above the speed limit, or walk the streets
of Pothole without interference, their licensing decisions violate
the Equal Protection Clause no less than those of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. This police discrimination is illegal,
and so is "the public administration which enforces it." At least in
some situations, the victims of this discrimination are entitled to

This applicant was a woman-and probably an Irish Catholic too. See id at 359.
a3

118 US at 373.

336 Id at 374. The only issue before the Supreme Court in the case appealed from the

California Supreme Court might have been whether the state court had resolved correctly
the petitioner's substantive constitutional claim. The scope of California's habeas corpus
remedy was presumably for the state to decide. The case on appeal from the federal court,
however, did present the question of remedy. The Supreme Court decided not only that
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors had denied the prisoner the equal protection of
the laws but also that his conviction and confinement were unconstitutional. He was entitled to be released from custody. In the strained (indeed fictitious) habeas corpus terminology of the time, a state criminal court lacked "jurisdiction" to give effect to the Board of
Supervisors' unconstitutional discrimination. If either the Supreme Court's decision in
Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 had preceded Yick Wo, it would have precluded a court from affording relief to the
federal petitioner in this case. See Teague, 489 US at 316; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) & (e)
(2002).
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dismissal of the charges against them and to release from their
confinement.
3. The limits of dismissal as a remedy.
In principle, an equal protection violation always can be
remedied either by exempting the people unequally burdened or
by burdening the people unequally exempted. Prosecuting white
criminals who have escaped prosecution usually would be preferable to exempting minority defendants who might be guilty, but a
court has no effective way to provide the affirmative remedy. It
cannot mandate the prosecution of uncharged and probably undetected white offenders. A court's choice is usually between exempting some possibly guilty defendants and providing no remedy at all. In Armstrong, the Supreme Court's hesitation to recognize selective prosecution as defense may have stemmed from
its reluctance to free the guilty.
In some situations, this concern probably should be decisive.
Following Duke Klan's election as President in 2008, he followed
the example of the President he most admired, Richard Nixon,
and prepared a list of his political enemies. At the top of the list
was Milly Militant, a black civil rights leader. Secret Oval Office
tapes revealed that President Klan had three reasons for listing
Militant-her race, her criticism of him, and her financial contribution to Klan's electoral opponent, Bush W. Gore. Upon receiving the President's list, federal law enforcement agents began an
intense investigation of Militant.
One day, as the agents trailed Militant down an alley, they
saw her commit a murder. Following her indictment, Militant'
sought dismissal of the murder charge on the ground that it was
the product of unlawful discrimination by the President and federal law enforcement agents. These officials' violation of the equal
protection principle was clear; her prosecution was a "fruit" of the
constitutional violation 7 ; and no other effective remedy was
available. Despite the force of her argument, a court should deny
Militant's motion. Equal treatment is a crucial value but not the
only one.
Justice Burke, dissenting from a decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in 1964, proposed restricting the defense of se' Assume that Militant committed the murder so skillfully that law enforcement
officers probably would have been unable to apprehend her through ordinary investigative
procedures.
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lective prosecution to cases in which defendants were charged
with violating generally unenforced laws. 8 Cases in which prosecutors have invoked essentially dead-letter laws to punish people
for invidious reasons are indeed the strongest cases for recognizing the defense.
A better dividing line than the one proposed by Justice
Burke, however, would distinguish situations in which police investigation is ordinarily proactive from those in which investigation generally is prompted by harm to an identifiable person.
Crimes whose investigation is usually proactive include traffic
offenses, immigration offenses, other regulatory crimes, crimes of
possession, and crimes of unlawful sale to a willing purchaser
(drug, weapons, prostitution, pornography, and gambling offenses
in particular). This category also includes such serious and uncontroversial offenses as selling stolen property and bribery.
Crimes whose investigation usually is prompted by harm to an
identifiable victim include crimes of personal violence and almost
all property crimes.
When law enforcement is proactive, large numbers of offenders usually go undetected. The prospect of freeing a possibly (or
certainly) guilty defendant is likely to appear less alarming when
one contemplates the vast number of other offenders who escape
detection and arrest. Adding to the army of the un-prosecuted is a
tolerable price to pay to remedy unlawful racial discrimination.
At the same time, discrimination is most likely when the police
select their targets and lack the focus that knowledge of a specific
past offense can provide. The danger of unlawful profiling appears to be most acute when its remedy is least worrisome. Affording a defense of discriminatory prosecution in immigration,
drug, and wooden laundry cases would not commit the courts to
providing this defense in cases of murder, rape, and armed robbery.m9

Although the defense of discriminatory prosecution should
lead to a dismissal of criminal charges, it should not supply a license for continuing violation of the law. An illegal immigrant
People v Walker, 200 NE2d 779, 780-81 (NY 1964) (Burke dissenting).
The proposed restriction of the defense of discriminatory prosecution to crimes
whose detection is usually the result of proactive law enforcement resembles in some
respects John Kaplan's proposed restriction of the exclusionary rule. See John Kaplan,
The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan L Rev 1027, 1048 (1974). Although no judge
has formally approved Kaplan's proposal, nearly all judges reportedly recognize a de facto
exception to the exclusionary rule when the evidence a defendant seeks to suppress is a
body.
33
39
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should not be allowed to raise this defense in a deportation proceeding, and a court or administrative tribunal could properly
order a defendant to cease and desist a regulatory violation even
if discrimination by law enforcement officers led to discovery of
the violation. Permitting the government to profit from racial discrimination is disturbing, but some cures are even worse than the
disease.
4. Damages.
A victim of racial profiling who comes to court as a civil
rights plaintiff rather than a criminal defendant should be able to
recover damages on the same terms as other plaintiffs. To do so,
she must demonstrate not only that the police violated her rights
but also that a reasonably well-trained officer would have recognized the unconstitutionality of the challenged police conduct. °
5. Injunctions.
A civil rights plaintiff may be entitled to an injunctive remedy as well, but framing a useful decree is difficult. The decree
can enjoin racial profiling by restating the equal protection principle in general terms, by offering a rough (and potentially harmful) definition of the term profiling (for example, by declaring that
this practice consists of every use of a racial classification not
based on a victim or witness description"'), or by forbidding the
use of race as a basis for making particular law enforcement decisions (for example, determining which traffic offenders to stop).
The decree also may specify "prophylactic" measures to make
unlawful police discrimination less likely.
A 1999 consent decree between the United States Justice Department and the State of New Jersey forbade troopers from requesting a motorist's consent to search when the troopers lacked
a reasonable basis for suspecting that the search would uncover
evidence of a crime."' In a commendable bow to realism, the New
Jersey Supreme Court later held that the state's constitutional
analogue of the Fourth Amendment also precluded police officers
from seeking a motorist's consent to search in the absence "rea340
341

See Harlow v Fitzgerald,457 US 800, 819 (1982).
For a discussion of why this definition is inappropriate, see text accompanying

notes 134-53.
34 New Jersey Enters into Consent Decree on Racial Issues in Highway Stops, 66 Crim
L Rptr 251 (2000).
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sonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 34' The
court spoke of "the widespread abuse of our existing law that allows law enforcement officers to obtain consent searches of every
motor vehicle stopped for even the most minor traffic violation"
and of the need "to restore some semblance of reasonableness to

the type of consent searches involved in the present case.""
The New Jersey decision, although an advance over prior
doctrine, seemed unsound in one respect. By making the standard for requesting consent reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause, the court continued to give effect to expressions of
consent it apparently regarded as involuntary. 5
A bolder prophylactic remedy for profiling on the highwaybut one probably beyond the competency of the courts-would
forbid the police from stopping speeders and possibly other traffic
offenders unless these motorists posed an immediate danger.
Even if framed in negative or prohibitory terms, this remedy
would effectively require the use of photographs and mailed citations as the primary means of enforcing speed limits. 3 8 Diminishing the incentive for profiling might not itself justify the cost of
this innovation, but the virtues of replacing traffic stops with
mailed citations go further. They include increasing police productivity, improving police safety, and avoiding the inconvenience, distraction, and danger posed by stops along the highway.
The benefits also include more effective law enforcement. The use
of cameras to detect speeders and traffic-light violators in west

3 State v Carty, 790 A2d 903, 905 (NJ 2002).

' Id at 911.

34 The court wrote, "In the context of motor vehicle stops, where the
individual is at

the side of the road and confronted by a uniformed officer seeking to search his or her
vehicle, it is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that the individual feels compelled
to consent." 790 A2d at 910. An expression of consent in coercive circumstances cannot
justify any departure from the usual requirement of probable cause for a vehicle search.
Neither the 1999 consent decree nor the 2002 New Jersey Supreme Court decision
limits the ability of the police to conduct searches incident to arrest, but the New Jersey
Supreme Court has held that the state's Motor Vehicle Code does not authorize custodial
arrests for minor traffic offenses. State v Dangerfield, 795 A2d 250, 259 (NJ 2002); compare Atwater v City of Lago Vista, 532 US 318, 354 (2001) (upholding the constitutionality
of a custodial arrest for a seat-belt violation although there was no reason to doubt that
the alleged violator would respond to a citation). In addition, the New Jersey court, rejecting the view of the United States Supreme Court in New York v Belton, 453 US 454
(1981), has held that the New Jersey Constitution does not permit vehicle searches as an
incident of every custodial traffic arrest. State v Pierce, 642 A2d 947, 959-63 (NJ 1994).
3"6 See Sherry F. Colb, Stopping A Moving Target, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev 191, 20719 (2001).
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London, England, led to a 26 percent reduction in fatal accidents
and serious injuries within one year.34
Apart from forbidding racial profiling and a few police practices that facilitate it, lawyers and judges have devised only one
prospective remedy for discrimination by the police-monitoring.
A judicial decree can require a law enforcement agency to collect
statistics on stops, searches, and arrests-more information than
the victims of profiling presented to obtain the decree. Partly because law enforcement officers sometimes have falsified records
of the races of stopped suspects,348 a decree also can require the
use of sound and video equipment to record exchanges between
patrol officers and motorists and pedestrians.
Like the rest of us, police officers may behave better when
they are watched, and bringing racial profiling to light provides
potentially useful information to police administrators, other local officials, legislators, the public, and (possibly) the courts that
ordered the police to gather this information." Sufficiently de347 Id at 215, citing Julie Kirkbride, MP Calls for More Traffic Cameras, Daily Telegraph 19 (Nov 24, 1995).
Two New Jersey troopers pleaded guilty to charges of official misconduct and making false statements after they shot and seriously wounded three unarmed black men they
stopped on the highway. Their shooting led to a civil settlement of $12.95 million, the
largest in New Jersey history. The officers admitted lying about the circumstances of the
shooting and the traffic stop that preceded it. Although they reported that other troopers
had coached and encouraged them to lie, the plea agreement they entered did not require
them to name any of their co-conspirators. The agreement did require them to pay fines of
$280 each and to resign.
According to the Newark Star Ledger:
The two admitted they routinely targeted minority motorists for illegal
car searches in hopes of finding drugs. Hogan [one of the defendants] said
troopers often engaged in "rip and strip"-dismantling car doors in
search of drugs-primarily with minorities.
Hogan said that covering up racial profiling was commonplace and condoned. "No one at the station, including supervisors, seemed to be concerned when a minority arrestee was brought to the station after the radio call had identified that driver as white," Hogan said. "From the time
when I first came to the Turnpike I was aware this was occurring. It was
so common I just assumed it was how it was done."
The judge who approved the defendants' plea agreement declared that they had acted "out
of misguided zeal and misguided loyalty born of an indoctrination into an approach to law
enforcement that can generally be described as Machiavellian." The Executive Director of
the Black Ministers Council of New Jersey compared the officers' plea agreement to a hit
and run, and the President of the Garden State Bar Association (whose members are black
lawyers) said that this agreement told the whole story of race in America. Kathy Barrett
Carter, Two Troopers Admit Profiling and Cover-Up of Shooting: Plea Deal Enables Pair
to Avoid Prison for '98 Turnpike Incident, The Newark Star-Ledger § 1 at 1 & 8 (Jan 15,
2002).
349 See Eric Luna, TransparentPolicing,85 Iowa L Rev
1107 (2000).
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tailed information can remedy the aggregation of most statistical
studies by identifying particular officers and particular groups
whose practices appear to be unlawful.
Judicially mandated data collection, however, poses an obvious question to which no one seems to have offered an answerwhat next? If the data continue to reveal unlawful profiling, can a
court do more than order the monitoring to continue? Holding a
law enforcement agency in contempt and fining it for failing to
produce satisfactory numbers might lead it to employ express or
implicit quotas for stopping and searching whites. The remedy for
racial profiling might be racial profiling in reverse. The difficulty
of remedying racial profiling may be one reason why courts have
strained fact and doctrine to avoid finding violations of the Equal
Protection Clause by the police.
6. Legislation.
Scholars recently have re-emphasized that constitutional issues are not for the courts alone. The people and their elected
representatives must be concerned with these issues too. 30 The
obstacles to proving profiling even when it happens, to establishing a litigant's standing to challenge this practice, and to remedying this practice through the courts accentuate the importance of
a legislative response. Legislatures, however, confront some of
the same difficulties as courts in devising effective remedies. After offering an official denunciation of profiling, recent proposed
and enacted legislation has provided only a familiar remedy for
this practice -monitoring.
The federal government's incentives for drug interdiction'
distort local politics and make legislative responses to profiling
less likely. For example, federal financial incentives discourage
local governments from taking steps to make the enforcement of
the traffic laws the principal objective of traffic-law enforcement
(through such measures as substituting mailed citations for traffic stops). In addition, local majorities and local governments may
not always disapprove of discriminatory police practices. The police "sweep" of hundreds of blacks in Oneonta, New York prom See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, We the Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4 (2001); Louis
Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 8 (Yale 2001). Mark Tushnet argues in fact that the popular resolution of
constitutional issues should replace judicial review altogether. Mark Tushnet, Taking the
ConstitutionAway from the Courts (Princeton 1999).
35, See note 25.
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duced neither a change in police department personnel nor a revision of police department policy. Ten years after this sweep, the
Oneonta Police Department still has no black officers.352
CONCLUSION

I usually write articles because I believe I have something to
say, but my reason for writing this article was different. I had not
adequately considered the constitutionality of using racial classifications to identify and apprehend criminals, and I hoped to resolve the issues in this area to my own satisfaction.
I realized that others were better qualified for the task. The
law of racial discrimination is vast, and I am far from a master of
this subject. Many of America's most notable constitutional law
scholars, however, seem uninterested in doctrinal issues of the
sort discussed in this article except, perhaps, as they bear on larger questions. Their scholarship focuses on such matters as original intent, original meaning, constitutional moments, voting
paradoxes, the uses and dangers of legislative history, the countermajoritarian difficulty, judicial minimalism, incompletely
theorized agreements, hermeneutics, representation reinforcement, fidelity in translation, and reconsidering judicial review. 3"
Profiling issues have been left primarily to pedestrian laborers in
the field of criminal procedure like me, and the commitments of
many criminal procedure scholars apparently preclude them from
acknowledging that any of the issues are debatable.
I have succeeded less well than I hoped. I thought that even
if questions of racial classification in law enforcement would not
yield to bright-line rules, they would yield to statements of general principle. As I struggled to conceptualize the issues, however, broad generalizations flowed from my word processor and
then, a few minutes later, into the trash bin where they belonged.
312 Telephone conversation with Cary Brunswick, Managing Editor of the Oneonta
Daily Star (Apr 24, 2002). The Oneonta Daily Star, however, lamented the Supreme
Court's refusal to review the Second Circuit decision upholding this sweep. The newspaper
called the sweep "clearly a case of racial profiling" and "a lingering embarrassment to most
area residents." It observed, "One leading investigator at the time commented that police
were going to look at every black hand in Oneonta. You can't get much more blatant than
that." "Black List" Case Ought to be Settled, Oneonta Daily Star (Oct 3, 2001), available
online at <http'/www.thedailystar.com/opinion/edits/2001/10/edl003.html> (visited Nov
15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal Fl.
3 Richard Posner writes, "Increasingly judges believe that legal academics are not on
the same wavelength with them, that the academics are not interacting with judges and
other legal practitioners but instead are chasing their own and each other's tails." Richard
A. Posner, The Problematics ofMoral and Legal Theory 156 (Harvard 1999).
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In the end, I have proposed only vague standards. What is
worse, these standards often turn on facts that can be estimated
only crudely (if at all), such as the rate at which the members of
different racial groups commit crimes. To apply the proposed
standards, one must be willing to tolerate possible injustice when
facts are unavailable and to judge circumstances without awaiting scientific "proof."'4 When, for example, law enforcement agencies target black gangs or focus on black neighborhoods to a far
greater extent than white gangs or white neighborhoods, the
agencies' practices burden blacks at a higher rate than their rate
of offending. No one could contend with a straight face that the
rate of criminality of other groups might be zero. The suggested
standards are rough conceptual guides at best; they offer no escape from particularized judgment.
First, a judge or other decision maker should consider the
extent to which a racial classification burdens the innocent members of one race more than the innocent members of another. A
classification that systematically "taxes" a race at a higher rate
than its share of the population requires justification. When a
classification that leads to a search or seizure imposes no further
racial burden, however, customary Fourth Amendment standards
provide the appropriate measure of justification. Stops supported
by reasonable suspicion and arrests supported by probable cause
do not violate the Constitution simply because they burden minorities at a higher rate than their share of the population. Many
stops and arrests in this category are based on physical descriptions provided by victims and witnesses, but some are not. Courts
should not draw a categorical line between racial classifications
based on witness descriptions and other racial classifications.
Except perhaps in life-threatening emergencies, however,
every seizure based on a racial classification should rest on individualized suspicion at least. Administrative detention based in
whole or part on ethnicity (for example, the brief detention the
5'
Supreme Court approved in United States v Martinez-Fuerte,"
164 One reason why the influence of professional social
scientists on law may have been
more pernicious than productive is that some judges have accepted the social scientists'
standards of proof as the only appropriate basis for drawing empirical conclusions. For
example, these judges have learned to sneer at "anecdotal" evidence. See, for example,
United States v Armstrong, 517 US 456, 470 (1996) (discussed in text accompanying notes
159-87). For a brief discussion of the defective worldview of many quantitative social
scientists, see Albert W. Alschuler, Explaining the Public Wariness of Juries, 48 DePaul L
Rev 407, 414-17 (1998).
365 428 US 543, 563
(1976).
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the prolonged detention it approved in Korematsu v United
States,35 and the special screening of people of Arab ethnicity at
airports that most Americans favored after September 11) should
be impermissible.
Second, a judge or other decision maker should consider the
extent to which a classification burdens the members of a race,
not merely at a higher rate than their share of the population,
but also at a higher rate than their rate of offending. "Piling on"
or systematically burdening the members of a race at a higher
rate than the rate at which the members of this race commit
crimes requires stronger justification, and generating a greater
law enforcement return may not provide this justification.
Third, a decision maker should focus on the social meaning of
the racial classification employed by the police. A classification
that declares one race more dangerous than another harms the
members of this race. Like imposing tangible burdens at a higher
rate than a racial group's rate of offending, sending this message
requires justification beyond that demanded by ordinary Fourth
Amendment standards. Once more, the fact that a racial classification has an empirical foundation or "rational basis" is not
enough to justify it. Not all racial classifications, however, convey
this damaging social message. Taking account of race while seeking an offender whose race is apparently known, for example,
does not brand other members of his race as crime-prone.
Finally, a decision maker should consider what justification
beyond the probable cause and reasonable suspicion supporting
individual seizures may exist for the distributive injustice the
second and third inquiries have identified. The greater the distributive unfairness, the greater the efficiency gain must be. This
efficiency gain depends on both the predictive accuracy of the
classification employed by the police and the seriousness of the
harm they seek to prevent. Some trade-off between distributive
justice and efficiency seems inescapable.
In retrospect, my failure to bring very much order to issues of
racial classification by the police may be understandable. Race
can be an indicator of physical characteristics, a predictor of conduct, and a mark of social status. A diagram of the relationships
among these uses of the concept would have lines in almost every
direction. Almost no one seeks to prevent the police from using
race as a partial description of physical appearance, but the iden356

323 US 214, 216-17 (1944).
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tification of a group of offenders by race tends to transform the
physical description into a negative predictor and then into a
mark of social status. The lines between and among the various
uses of race cannot readily be untangled.
The use of race as a predictor has special dangers in an era of
mass production criminal justice. Scholars declare that America
has embraced a new penology. 57 Where the old penology emphasized moral responsibility and the reintegration of offenders into
society, the new penology emphasizes risk management and the
control of dangerous groups. Americans appear to have accepted
poverty as permanent and the crime associated with poverty as
permanent.u They see the criminal justice system as an evermore prominent component-indeed the dominant componentof society's response to an enduring "underclass." When the principal purpose of criminal justice is to identify and control dangerous people at minimal cost, using race as a predictor can be
frightening.
Although this article has not gone far toward unraveling the
issues of racial classification in criminal investigation, it has
drawn clearer conclusions about the current state of equal protection doctrine. The Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause should be declared a federal disaster
area. The central features of this interpretation-three tiers of
formulaic justification and an unwavering requirement of proof of
both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect-block the
fair consideration of issues of distributive justice.
Almost everyone realizes that the formulas "compelling governmental interest" and "narrowly tailored measure" are clumsy,
but they are worse than that. More than other issues, the use of
racial classifications by law enforcement officers reveals how sterile these concepts are. When a law enforcement officer engages in
3" See Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Correctionsand Its Implications,30 Criminology 449, 449-50 (1992); Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: The EmergingNew Criminal Law, in
David Nelkin, ed, The Futures of Criminology 173 (Sage 1994).
Richard Posner notes that although inequality in the distribution of wealth has
increased in recent decades, "public interest in the issue has diminished to nearly the
vanishing point." Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory at 48 n 73 (cited in
note 353). He claims that "the focus of egalitarians has shifted" to inequalities between
middle-class groups-middle-class women and middle-class men, middle-class homosexuals and middle-class heterosexuals, middle-class blacks and Latinos (the usual beneficiaries of affirmative action) and middle-class whites, middle-class people with disabilities and
middle-class people without them, and middle-class workers over forty and middle-class
workers under forty.
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closer surveillance of the members of one ethnic group than of
another (for example, by watching people of apparent Arab ethnicity more closely than other people in an area near a synagogue), he classifies people by ethnicity. Proclaiming the officer's
differential surveillance unjustifiable unless it qualifies as a narrowly tailored measure furthering a compelling governmental
interest, however, seems extravagant. When the consequence of
recognizing an obvious truth-this officer's use of an ethnic classification-is an excessive standard of justification, one can understand why many courts hesitate to recognize the truth. As the
various opinions in Brown v City of Oneonta"9 illustrate, however,
these courts typically exempt the use of racial classifications by
law enforcement officers from even the scrutiny they deserve. The
alternative to "strict" scrutiny appears to be no scrutiny at all.
Treating a compelling governmental interest and a tight
means-end fit as necessary to validate every racial classification
is misguided, but treating these things as sufficient to justify
every racial classification is worse. Proclaiming the government's
interest in fighting crime compelling should not justify every racial classification that promises a victory in the fight. Frisking all
the young black men in Pothole should not be constitutional simply because apprehending weapons offenders is a compelling interest and the frisks are likely to uncover a great many knives.
The Supreme Court's judgment that neither a discriminatory
purpose nor a discriminatory effect should itself violate the Equal
Protection Clause (or require strong governmental justification) is
undoubtedly correct. When a biased police officer treats blacks
and white alike, he may enjoy arresting blacks more without violating the Constitution. Moreover, it would be astonishing if
every distribution of burdens and benefits came out evenly for
every group. The judgment that neither a discriminatory purpose
nor a discriminatory effect is always sufficient, however, does not
warrant the conclusion that both always should be required. On
the "mental culpability" or "mens rea" side of the formula, the
alternatives to purpose include knowledge and objective foreseeability (neither of which would make discriminatory impact alone
impermissible). On the "effects" or "actus reus" side, an alternative to an undifferentiated focus on discriminatory effect is the
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identification of particular effects that should trigger a requirement of justification.
In its decisions on racial discrimination in jury selection, for
example, the Supreme Court has held that the systematic exclusion of a distinctive group violates the Sixth Amendment unless
this exclusion is appropriately tailored to advance a significant
state interest. This article has contended that, in light of America's long and continuing history of police discrimination against
minorities in making stops and arrests, the Court should interpret the Fourth Amendment in much the same way. It should
recognize that racial discrimination by the police can make a seizure unreasonable, and it should depart from the requirement of
discriminatory purpose in judging the reasonableness of police
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
The proposal advanced by this article is not that every systematic and foreseeable discriminatory effect should violate the
Fourth Amendment or require strong justification. When the
members of different races commit crimes at different rates, a
decision to arrest every offender the police can discover will have
a foreseeable discriminatory impact on the races whose crime
rates are highest. The proposal proceeds from a different baseline. When a police practice systematically subjects the members
of a race to searches or seizures at a higher rate than their rate of
offending, this practice should violate the Fourth Amendment
unless it is appropriately tailored to advance a significant state
interest. In addition, this article has contended that when a police practice stigmatizes a race in the eyes of objective observers,
no proof of discriminatory purpose should be necessary.
Although this article has proposed a substantial revision of
current doctrine, I end it with a reminder that simply applying
this doctrine would be a major step forward. When the final volume of America's history of race relations is written, one chapter
will report that governmental discrimination against blacks persisted into the twenty-first century and some judges turned a
blind eye to it. These judges seemed more concerned about discrimination against whites in the award of government contracts
than about discrimination against blacks and Latinos in the administration of criminal justice. Courts invalidated affirmative
action plans because these plans took account of race and other
factors. They sustained police actions that burdened minorities
because these actions took account of other factors and race.
Courts struck down classifications that disadvantaged white
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businesspeople on the ground that these classifications were not
narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests.w
They sustained classifications that targeted minorities for investigation and detention on the ground that race was "relevant to
the law enforcement need to be served.... The courts required the
government to be colorblind in distributing its financial largesse
but not in distributing police harassment, jail time, and capital
punishment. Back in the twenty-first century, the book is likely
to say, the courts got it backwards.

m See, for example, Adarand Constructors,Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 227 (1995).
Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 564 n 17.
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